Michael Ströder wrote:
On 6/27/19 6:23 PM, Michael Ströder wrote:
> On 6/27/19 6:18 PM, Howard Chu wrote:
>> Michael Ströder wrote:
>>> On 6/14/19 5:15 PM, Quanah Gibson-Mount wrote:
>>>> Thanks to Ondrej, this list is a bit shorter now. :)
>>> But one more I'd love to see in 2.4.48:
>>> ITS#8866: RFE: slapo-constraint to return filter used in diagnostic message
>> I don't believe the information disclosure issues have been
>> sufficiently answered there. Overall it's a bad idea and goes against
>> our standing policy of minimal disclosure.
> Sorry, you already have the disclosure.
> Citing from my old e-mail found here:
>> But this problem exists anyway because an attacker can probe
>> values by adding entries with non-unique attributes and determine
>> whether an attribute value exists or not by distinguishing the result
>> code constraintViolation(19) vs. insufficientAccessRights(50).
>> Even worse this even works in case the attacker does not have read
>> access anywhere!
Then that's a bug that should be fixed.
Furthermore the security of a system should not rely on confidentiality
of the configuration. E.g. with Æ-DIR the config is publicly known.
That was your choice to decide for yourself. Not for everyone else though.
The default behavior has always been to restrict viewing of the config
to administrators. I see no reason to change this policy.
Also note I'm usually blamed for making directory contents too
-- Howard Chu
CTO, Symas Corp. http://www.symas.com
Director, Highland Sun http://highlandsun.com/hyc/
Chief Architect, OpenLDAP http://www.openldap.org/project/