openldap-bugs October 2024

openldap-bugs@openldap.org

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124 discussions

[Issue 9367] New: back-mdb: encryption support
by openldap-its＠openldap.org 06 May '25

06 May '25

https://bugs.openldap.org/show_bug.cgi?id=9367 Issue ID: 9367 Summary: back-mdb: encryption support Product: OpenLDAP Version: unspecified Hardware: All OS: All Status: UNCONFIRMED Severity: normal Priority: --- Component: backends Assignee: bugs(a)openldap.org Reporter: quanah(a)openldap.org Target Milestone: --- Need to add encryption support to the back-mdb backend, depends on issue#9364 -- You are receiving this mail because: You are on the CC list for the issue.

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[Issue 10254] New: Allow upgrading password hash on bind
by openldap-its＠openldap.org 15 Apr '25

15 Apr '25

https://bugs.openldap.org/show_bug.cgi?id=10254 Issue ID: 10254 Summary: Allow upgrading password hash on bind Product: OpenLDAP Version: unspecified Hardware: All OS: All Status: UNCONFIRMED Keywords: needs_review Severity: normal Priority: --- Component: overlays Assignee: bugs(a)openldap.org Reporter: me(a)floriswesterman.nl Target Milestone: --- Many OpenLDAP installations are likely to contain relatively old password hashes such as SSHA and CRYPT, as modern alternatives such as Argon are only recent additions. Due to the nature of password hashes, it is of course not possible to "unhash" the old values and rehash them with a more modern algorithm. The presence of these old password hashes poses a liability in case of information leaks or hacks. Currently, the only way to upgrade a password hash is to wait for the user to change their password. This can be sped up by expiring passwords and forcing users to change them. However, this can be slow and frequent password rotation is no longer considered a best practice. It would be a very helpful addition to add support for upgrading a password hash on bind. This is implemented in the 389 directory server: https://www.port389.org/docs/389ds/design/pwupgrade-on-bind.html Essentially, when a user binds, the password is checked like normal. In case of a successful bind, the proposed feature would check the hash algorithm used for the password; and in case it is not equal to the current `olcPasswordHash` value, the user-provided password is rehashed using the new algorithm and stored. This way, the old hashes are phased out more quickly, without being a disturbance to users. -- You are receiving this mail because: You are on the CC list for the issue.

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[Issue 10169] New: Add support for token only authentication with otp overlay
by openldap-its＠openldap.org 27 Mar '25

27 Mar '25

https://bugs.openldap.org/show_bug.cgi?id=10169 Issue ID: 10169 Summary: Add support for token only authentication with otp overlay Product: OpenLDAP Version: 2.6.6 Hardware: All OS: All Status: UNCONFIRMED Keywords: needs_review Severity: normal Priority: --- Component: overlays Assignee: bugs(a)openldap.org Reporter: quanah(a)openldap.org Target Milestone: --- Currently the OTP overlay is password + token. It would be nice to be able to configure it so it can run in a token only mode, similar to the slapo-totp overlay in contrib. This would allow us to have a project supported solution and retire that contrib module. -- You are receiving this mail because: You are on the CC list for the issue.

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[Issue 10258] New: test050 failure: connection_close race?
by openldap-its＠openldap.org 25 Mar '25

25 Mar '25

https://bugs.openldap.org/show_bug.cgi?id=10258 Issue ID: 10258 Summary: test050 failure: connection_close race? Product: OpenLDAP Version: unspecified Hardware: All OS: All Status: UNCONFIRMED Keywords: needs_review Severity: normal Priority: --- Component: slapd Assignee: bugs(a)openldap.org Reporter: ondra(a)mistotebe.net Target Milestone: --- Created attachment 1032 --> https://bugs.openldap.org/attachment.cgi?id=1032&action=edit tail of slapd log Running test050 repeatedly, the slapd managed to get itself into an apparent inconsistency in the connections structure. The logs suggest that there might be a race closing the connection. Unfortunately the sanitiser didn't initiate a core dump in this case. -- You are receiving this mail because: You are on the CC list for the issue.

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[Issue 10274] New: Replication issue on MMR configuration
by openldap-its＠openldap.org 25 Mar '25

25 Mar '25

https://bugs.openldap.org/show_bug.cgi?id=10274 Issue ID: 10274 Summary: Replication issue on MMR configuration Product: OpenLDAP Version: 2.5.14 Hardware: All OS: Linux Status: UNCONFIRMED Keywords: needs_review Severity: normal Priority: --- Component: slapd Assignee: bugs(a)openldap.org Reporter: falgon.comp(a)gmail.com Target Milestone: --- Created attachment 1036 --> https://bugs.openldap.org/attachment.cgi?id=1036&action=edit In this attachment you will find 2 openldap configurations for 2 instances + slamd conf exemple + 5 screenshots to show the issue and one text file to explain what you see Hello we are openning this issue further to the initial post in technical : https://lists.openldap.org/hyperkitty/list/openldap-technical@openldap.org/… Issue : We are working on a project and we've come across an issue with the replication after performance testing : *Configuration :* RHEL 8.6 OpenLDAP 2.5.14 *MMR-delta *configuration on multiple servers attached 300,000 users configured and used for tests *olcLastBind: TRUE* Use of SLAMD (performance shooting) *Problem description:* We are currently running performance and resilience tests on our infrastructure using the SLAMD tool configured to perform BINDs and MODs on a defined range of accounts. We use a load balancer (VIP) to poll all of our servers equally. (but it is possible to do performance tests directly on each of the directories) With our current infrastructure we're able to perform approximately 300 MOD/BIND/s. Beyond that, we start to generate delays and can randomly come across one issue. However, when we run performance tests that exceed our write capacity, our replication between servers can randomly create an incident with directories being unable to catch up with their replication delay. The directories update their contextCSNs, but extremely slowly (like freezing). From then on, it's impossible for the directories to catch again. (even with no incoming traffic) A restart of the instance is required to perform a full refresh and solve the incident. We have enabled synchronization logs and have no error or refresh logs to indicate a problem ( we can provide you with logs if necessary). We suspect a write collision or a replication conflict but this is never write in our sync logs. We've run a lot of tests. For example, when we run a performance test on a single live server, we don't reproduce the problem. Anothers examples: if we define different accounts ranges for each server with SALMD, we don't reproduce the problem either. If we use only one account for the range, we don't reproduce the problem either. ______________________________________________________________________ I have add some screenshots on attachement to show you the issue and all the explanations. ______________________________________________________________________ *Symptoms :* One or more directories can no longer be replicated normally after performance testing ends. No apparent error logs. Need a restart of instances to solve the problem. *How to reproduce the problem:* Have at least two servers in MMR mode Set LastBind to TRUE Perform a SLAMD shot from a LoadBalancer in bandwidth mode OR start multiple SLAMD test on same time for each server with the same account range. Exceed the maximum write capacity of the servers. *SLAMD configuration :* authrate.sh --hostname ${HOSTNAME} --port ${PORTSSL} \ --useSSL --trustStorePath ${CACERTJKS} \ --trustStorePassword ${CACERTJKSPW} --bindDN "${BINDDN}" \ --bindPassword ${BINDPW} --baseDN "${BASEDN}" \ --filter "(uid=[${RANGE}])" --credentials ${USERPW} \ --warmUpIntervals ${WARMUP} \ --numThreads ${NTHREADS} ${ARGS} -- You are receiving this mail because: You are on the CC list for the issue.

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[Issue 10026] New: Refresh handling can skip entries (si_dirty not managed properly)
by openldap-its＠openldap.org 25 Mar '25

25 Mar '25

https://bugs.openldap.org/show_bug.cgi?id=10026 Issue ID: 10026 Summary: Refresh handling can skip entries (si_dirty not managed properly) Product: OpenLDAP Version: unspecified Hardware: All OS: All Status: UNCONFIRMED Keywords: needs_review Severity: normal Priority: --- Component: overlays Assignee: bugs(a)openldap.org Reporter: ondra(a)mistotebe.net Target Milestone: --- Take MPR plain syncrepl with 3+ providers. When a provider's own syncrepl session transitions to persist and a it starts a new parallel session towards another host, that session always has to start as a refresh. If that refresh serves entries to us, our handling of si_dirty is not consistent: - if the existing persist session serves some of these entries to us, we can "forget" to pass the others to a newly connected consumer - same if the refresh is abandoned and we start refreshing from a different provider that might be behind what we were being served (again our consumers could suffer) - if we restart, si_dirty is forgotten and our consumers suffer even worse We might need to be told (at the beginning of the refresh?) what the end state we're going for is, so we can keep si_dirty on until then. And somehow persist that knowledge in the DB... -- You are receiving this mail because: You are on the CC list for the issue.

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[Issue 10205] New: SSL handshake blocks forever in async mode if server unaccessible
by openldap-its＠openldap.org 25 Mar '25

25 Mar '25

https://bugs.openldap.org/show_bug.cgi?id=10205 Issue ID: 10205 Summary: SSL handshake blocks forever in async mode if server unaccessible Product: OpenLDAP Version: 2.5.17 Hardware: x86_64 OS: Linux Status: UNCONFIRMED Keywords: needs_review Severity: normal Priority: --- Component: libraries Assignee: bugs(a)openldap.org Reporter: regtube(a)hotmail.com Target Milestone: --- When ldaps:// scheme is used to connect to currently unaccessible server with LDAP_OPT_CONNECT_ASYNC and LDAP_OPT_NETWORK_TIMEOUT options set, it blocks forever on SSL_connect. Here is a trace: ldap_sasl_bind ldap_send_initial_request ldap_new_connection 1 1 0 ldap_int_open_connection ldap_connect_to_host: TCP winserv.test.net:636 ldap_new_socket: 3 ldap_prepare_socket: 3 ldap_connect_to_host: Trying 192.168.56.2:636 ldap_pvt_connect: fd: 3 tm: 30 async: -1 ldap_ndelay_on: 3 attempting to connect: connect errno: 115 ldap_int_poll: fd: 3 tm: 0 ldap_err2string [2024-04-25 15:41:27.112] [error] [:1] bind(): Connecting (X) [2024-04-25 15:41:27.112] [error] [:1] err: -18 ldap_sasl_bind ldap_send_initial_request ldap_int_poll: fd: 3 tm: 0 ldap_is_sock_ready: 3 ldap_ndelay_off: 3 TLS trace: SSL_connect:before SSL initialization TLS trace: SSL_connect:SSLv3/TLS write client hello Looks like it happens because non-blocking mode is cleared from the socket (ldap_ndelay_off) after the first poll for write, and non-blocking mode is never restored before attempt to do tls connect, because of the check that assumes that non-blocking mode has already been set for async mode: if ( !async ) { /* if async, this has already been set */ ber_sockbuf_ctrl( sb, LBER_SB_OPT_SET_NONBLOCK, (void*)1 ); } while in fact it was cleared. -- You are receiving this mail because: You are on the CC list for the issue.

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[Issue 10162] New: Fix for binary attributes data corruption in back-sql
by openldap-its＠openldap.org 25 Mar '25

25 Mar '25

https://bugs.openldap.org/show_bug.cgi?id=10162 Issue ID: 10162 Summary: Fix for binary attributes data corruption in back-sql Product: OpenLDAP Version: unspecified Hardware: All OS: All Status: UNCONFIRMED Keywords: needs_review Severity: normal Priority: --- Component: backends Assignee: bugs(a)openldap.org Reporter: dex.tracers(a)gmail.com Target Milestone: --- Created attachment 1006 --> https://bugs.openldap.org/attachment.cgi?id=1006&action=edit Fix for binary attributes corruption on backed-sql I've configured slapd to use back-sql (mariadb through odbc) and observed issues with the BINARY data retrievals from the database. The length of the attributes was properly reported, but the correct data inside was always 16384 bytes and after that point - some junk (usually filled-up with AAAAAAAA and some other attributes data from memory). During the debugging - I've noticed that: - The MAX_ATTR_LEN (16384 bytes) is used to set the length of the data for BINARY columns when SQLBindCol is done inside of the "backsql_BindRowAsStrings_x" function - After SQLFetch is done - data in row->cols[i] is fetched up to the specified MAX_ATTR_LEN - After SQLFetch is done - the correct data size (greater than MAX_ATTR_LEN) is represented inside of the row->value_len I'm assuming that slapd allocates the pointer in memory (row->cols[i]), fills it with the specified amount of data (MAX_ATTR_LEN), but when forming the actual attribute data - uses the length from row->value_len and so everything from 16384 bytes position till row->value_len is just a junk from the memory (uninitialized, leftovers, data from other variables). After an investigation, I've find-out that: - for BINARY or variable length fields - SQLGetData should be used - SQLGetData supports chunked mode (if length is unknown) or full-read mode if the length is known - it could be used in pair with SQLBindCol after SQLFetch (!) Since we have the correct data length inside of row->value_len, I've just added the code to the backsql_get_attr_vals() function to overwrite the corrupted data with the correct data by issuing SQLGetData request. And it worked - binary data was properly retrieved and reported over LDAP! My current concerns / help needed - I'm not very familiar with the memory allocation/deallocation mechanisms, so I'm afraid that mentioned change can lead to memory corruption (so far not observed). Please review attached patch (testing was done on OPENLDAP_REL_ENG_2_5_13, and applied on the master branch for easier review/application). -- You are receiving this mail because: You are on the CC list for the issue.

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[Issue 10266] New: Adopt broader RFC4511 NoD interpretation on lloadd's client side
by openldap-its＠openldap.org 04 Mar '25

04 Mar '25

https://bugs.openldap.org/show_bug.cgi?id=10266 Issue ID: 10266 Summary: Adopt broader RFC4511 NoD interpretation on lloadd's client side Product: OpenLDAP Version: unspecified Hardware: All OS: All Status: UNCONFIRMED Keywords: needs_review Severity: normal Priority: --- Component: lloadd Assignee: bugs(a)openldap.org Reporter: ondra(a)mistotebe.net Target Milestone: --- Server side, lloadd has long implemented a broad interpretation of NoD unsolicited response handling: when the message is issued, no new requests are accepted on the session however the client and server are both free to keep the session open if there are any operations that have not resolved yet. The server is still expected to close the connection as soon as no operations are still pending. This seems to interoperate with known clients. Those that want to will close the session immediately, unaware of this possibility, those that also want to interpret RFC 4511 this way can choose to wait for existing operations to resolve. This ticket is to track the lloadd's implementation of the client side of this - when receiving a NoD message, we don't close the connection immediately+unconditionally either but are willing to wait. Related functionality: - if connection was a bind connection processing a multi-stage SASL bind, the bind should fail if/when the client attempts to progress it - clients assigned to this connection through coherence at least 'connection' are also marked closing -- You are receiving this mail because: You are on the CC list for the issue.

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[Issue 10024] New: MDB_PREVSNAPSHOT broken
by openldap-its＠openldap.org 21 Feb '25

21 Feb '25

https://bugs.openldap.org/show_bug.cgi?id=10024 Issue ID: 10024 Summary: MDB_PREVSNAPSHOT broken Product: LMDB Version: unspecified Hardware: All OS: All Status: UNCONFIRMED Keywords: needs_review Severity: normal Priority: --- Component: liblmdb Assignee: bugs(a)openldap.org Reporter: markus(a)objectbox.io Target Milestone: --- It seems that the patch #9496 had a negative side effect on MDB_PREVSNAPSHOT. In certain cases, when opening the DB using MDB_PREVSNAPSHOT, the previous (2nd latest) commit is not selected. Instead, reads show that the latest commit was selected voiding the effect of MDB_PREVSNAPSHOT. I observed this in our test cases a while back. Today, I was finally able to reproduce it and debug into it. When creating the transaction to read the data, I debugged into mdb_txn_renew0. Here, ti (MDB_txninfo; env->me_txns) was non-NULL. However, ti->mti_txnid was 0 (!) and thus txn->mt_txnid was set to 0. That's the reason for always selecting the first (index 0) meta page inside mdb_txn_renew0: meta = env->me_metas[txn->mt_txnid & 1]; This line occurs twice (once for read txn and once for write txn; it affects both txn types). Thus, the chances of MDB_PREVSNAPSHOT selecting the correct meta page is 50-50. It's only correct if the first meta page (index 0) is the older one. I believe that this is related to #9496 because the patch, that was provided there, removed the initialization of "env->me_txns->mti_txnid" in mdb_env_open2. This would explain why txn->mt_txnid inside mdb_txn_renew0 was set to 0. I can confirm that adding back the following two lines back in fixes MDB_PREVSNAPSHOT: if (env->me_txns) env->me_txns->mti_txnid = meta.mm_txnid; The said patch including the removal of these two lines was applied in the commit(s) "ITS#9496 fix mdb_env_open bug from #8704" (Howard Chu on 09.04.21). I hope this information is useful to find a suitable fix. Please let me know if you have questions. Also, I'd be happy to help confirming a potential fix with our test suite. -- You are receiving this mail because: You are on the CC list for the issue.

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