https://bugs.openldap.org/show_bug.cgi?id=10254
Issue ID: 10254
Summary: Allow upgrading password hash on bind
Product: OpenLDAP
Version: unspecified
Hardware: All
OS: All
Status: UNCONFIRMED
Keywords: needs_review
Severity: normal
Priority: ---
Component: overlays
Assignee: bugs(a)openldap.org
Reporter: me(a)floriswesterman.nl
Target Milestone: ---
Many OpenLDAP installations are likely to contain relatively old password
hashes such as SSHA and CRYPT, as modern alternatives such as Argon are only
recent additions. Due to the nature of password hashes, it is of course not
possible to "unhash" the old values and rehash them with a more modern
algorithm. The presence of these old password hashes poses a liability in case
of information leaks or hacks.
Currently, the only way to upgrade a password hash is to wait for the user to
change their password. This can be sped up by expiring passwords and forcing
users to change them. However, this can be slow and frequent password rotation
is no longer considered a best practice.
It would be a very helpful addition to add support for upgrading a password
hash on bind. This is implemented in the 389 directory server:
https://www.port389.org/docs/389ds/design/pwupgrade-on-bind.html
Essentially, when a user binds, the password is checked like normal. In case of
a successful bind, the proposed feature would check the hash algorithm used for
the password; and in case it is not equal to the current `olcPasswordHash`
value, the user-provided password is rehashed using the new algorithm and
stored. This way, the old hashes are phased out more quickly, without being a
disturbance to users.
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https://bugs.openldap.org/show_bug.cgi?id=9343
Issue ID: 9343
Summary: Expand ppolicy policy configuration to allow URL
filter
Product: OpenLDAP
Version: 2.5
Hardware: All
OS: All
Status: UNCONFIRMED
Severity: normal
Priority: ---
Component: overlays
Assignee: bugs(a)openldap.org
Reporter: quanah(a)openldap.org
Target Milestone: ---
Currently, ppolicy only supports a single global default policy, and past that
any policies must be manually added to a given user entry if they are supposed
to have something other than the default policy.
Also, some sites want no default policy, and only a specific subset to have a
policy applied to them.
For both of these cases, it would be helpful if it were possible to configure a
policy to apply to a set of users via a URL similar to the way we handle
creating groups of users in dynlist
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https://bugs.openldap.org/show_bug.cgi?id=10304
Issue ID: 10304
Summary: Unable to remove item from directory as part of
transaction if it is the last item in that directory
Product: OpenLDAP
Version: 2.5.13
Hardware: All
OS: Linux
Status: UNCONFIRMED
Keywords: needs_review
Severity: normal
Priority: ---
Component: backends
Assignee: bugs(a)openldap.org
Reporter: sophie.elliott(a)arcticlake.com
Target Milestone: ---
I am running my ldap server on Debian 11.3, with the mdb backend, using the
backported openldap version 2.5.13. I am not 100% certain if this is an issue
with OpenLDAP or liblmdb, but I have been running tests in the repo and it
looks like the liblmdb tests work fine, so I think it's with OpenLDAP itself.
I have been performing a transaction, and deleting entries from a directory
during this transaction. This works fine if the item that I am deleting isn't
the last entry in its directory, but when it is I get a MDB_NOTFOUND error on
the commit transaction call and the delete doesn't go through. Here is an
excerpt of the logs when this happens:
```
67a64334.14e1fc32 0x766ad2a00700 => index_entry_del( 108,
"accessGroupID=f23de82f-3a1c-4f88-86bb-bb07f9a0992d,o=[COMPANY],ou=accessGroups,dc=local,dc=[COMPANY],dc=com"
)
67a64334.14e21912 0x766ad2a00700 mdb_idl_delete_keys: 6c [62d34624]
67a64334.14e22812 0x766ad2a00700 <= index_entry_del( 108,
"accessGroupID=f23de82f-3a1c-4f88-86bb-bb07f9a0992d,o=[COMPANY],ou=accessGroups,dc=local,dc=[COMPANY],dc=com"
) success
67a64334.14e23a91 0x766ad2a00700 mdb_delete: txn_commit failed: MDB_NOTFOUND:
No matching key/data pair found (-30798)
```
Please let me know if I should submit this issue elsewhere, or if this is
something that has already been fixed in a more recent version. I'm also happy
to provide more details if necessary. Thank you!
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https://bugs.openldap.org/show_bug.cgi?id=10345
Issue ID: 10345
Summary: Potential memory leak in function rbac_create_session
Product: OpenLDAP
Version: unspecified
Hardware: All
OS: All
Status: UNCONFIRMED
Keywords: needs_review
Severity: normal
Priority: ---
Component: contrib
Assignee: bugs(a)openldap.org
Reporter: alexguo1023(a)gmail.com
Target Milestone: ---
In `rbac_create_session`, we have the following code:
```c
if ( rc < 0 ) {
rs->sr_err = LDAP_OTHER;
rs->sr_text = "internal error";
} else {
(void)ber_flatten( ber, &rs->sr_rspdata );
rs->sr_rspoid = ch_strdup( slap_EXOP_CREATE_SESSION.bv_val ); // first
rs->sr_err = LDAP_SUCCESS;
}
ber_free_buf(ber);
done:;
// always put the OID in the response:
rs->sr_rspoid = ch_strdup( slap_EXOP_CREATE_SESSION.bv_val ); //second
```
The second `ch_strdup` at the `done` label overwrites `rs->sr_rspoid` without
freeing the previous string, resulting in a memory leak.
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https://bugs.openldap.org/show_bug.cgi?id=10343
Issue ID: 10343
Summary: Potential Memory Leak in function
slap_uuidstr_from_normalized
Product: OpenLDAP
Version: unspecified
Hardware: All
OS: All
Status: UNCONFIRMED
Keywords: needs_review
Severity: normal
Priority: ---
Component: slapd
Assignee: bugs(a)openldap.org
Reporter: alexguo1023(a)gmail.com
Target Milestone: ---
Created attachment 1070
--> https://bugs.openldap.org/attachment.cgi?id=1070&action=edit
Patch: Change 1 to -1.
In function slap_uuidstr_from_normalized, the code allocates a new `struct
berval` with
```c
new = (struct berval *)slap_sl_malloc(sizeof(struct berval), ctx);
```
and then attempt to allocate `new->bv_val`. If that second allocation fails, it
sets `rc = 1` and jumps to the `done` cleanup label. However, the cleanup code
only runs when `rc == -1`, so the memory pointed by `new` is never freed,
causing a memory leak.
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https://bugs.openldap.org/show_bug.cgi?id=10344
Issue ID: 10344
Summary: Potential memory leak in function
firstComponentNormalize and objectClassPretty.
Product: OpenLDAP
Version: unspecified
Hardware: All
OS: All
Status: UNCONFIRMED
Keywords: needs_review
Severity: normal
Priority: ---
Component: slapd
Assignee: bugs(a)openldap.org
Reporter: alexguo1023(a)gmail.com
Target Milestone: ---
Created attachment 1071
--> https://bugs.openldap.org/attachment.cgi?id=1071&action=edit
Patch: Ensure the first argument passed to `ber_dupbv_x` is not `NULL`.
In `firstComponentNormalize`, the code calls `ber_dupbv_x` but ignores its
return value.
```c
ber_dupbv_x(normalized, val, ctx);
```
When `normalized` is `NULL`, `ber_dupbv_x` allocates a new `struct berval` and
returns it; failing to capture that pointer means we lose ownership and leak
the allocation. The same issue arises in `objectClassPretty`. We should follow
the pattern in function `hexNormalize`, which asserts that its `normalized`
argument is non-NULL before use:
```c
assert(normalized != NULL);
```
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https://bugs.openldap.org/show_bug.cgi?id=10335
Issue ID: 10335
Summary: [PATCH] ldapsearch: fix handling of -LL in
print_reference()
Product: OpenLDAP
Version: 2.6.9
Hardware: All
OS: All
Status: UNCONFIRMED
Keywords: needs_review
Severity: normal
Priority: ---
Component: client tools
Assignee: bugs(a)openldap.org
Reporter: bolek(a)live.com
Target Milestone: ---
Created attachment 1066
--> https://bugs.openldap.org/attachment.cgi?id=1066&action=edit
[PATCH] ldapsearch: fix handling of -LL in print_reference()
I, Boleslaw Ciesielski, hereby place the following modifications to OpenLDAP
Software (and only these modifications) into the public domain. Hence, these
modifications may be freely used and/or redistributed for any purpose with or
without attribution and/or other notice.
The attached patch (against master) fixes a bug in ldapsearch where the -LL (or
-LLL) option is ignored when printing the reference comments in
print_reference().
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https://bugs.openldap.org/show_bug.cgi?id=10339
Issue ID: 10339
Summary: config_add_internal() use-after-free on failed
cn=config mod
Product: OpenLDAP
Version: unspecified
Hardware: All
OS: All
Status: UNCONFIRMED
Keywords: needs_review
Severity: normal
Priority: ---
Component: slapd
Assignee: bugs(a)openldap.org
Reporter: ondra(a)mistotebe.net
Target Milestone: ---
If overlay startup/callback fails, bconfig.c:5593 uses the value of ca->argv[1]
despite it being freed already. I guess we can just log the entry's DN.
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https://bugs.openldap.org/show_bug.cgi?id=10346
Issue ID: 10346
Summary: mdb_env_copy2 on a database with a value larger than
(2GB-16) results in a corrupt copy
Product: LMDB
Version: 0.9.31
Hardware: x86_64
OS: Linux
Status: UNCONFIRMED
Keywords: needs_review
Severity: normal
Priority: ---
Component: liblmdb
Assignee: bugs(a)openldap.org
Reporter: mike.moritz(a)vertex.link
Target Milestone: ---
Created attachment 1072
--> https://bugs.openldap.org/attachment.cgi?id=1072&action=edit
reproduction source code
Running mdb_env_copy2 with compaction on a database with a value larger than
(2GB-16)bytes appears to complete successfully in that there are no errors, but
the copied database cannot be opened and throws an MDB_CORRUPTED error. Looking
at the copied database size, it appears that the value is either being skipped
or significantly truncated. Running mdb_env_copy2 without compaction also
completes successfully, and the copied database can be opened.
I initially encountered this while using py-lmdb with v0.9.31 of LMDB, but was
able to write up a simple script that uses the library directly. The source for
the script is attached, and the results below are from running it with the
latest from master.
Without compaction:
$ ./lmdb_repro test.lmdb $((2 * 1024 * 1024 * 1024 - 16 + 1)) testbak.lmdb
LMDB Version: LMDB 0.9.70: (December 19, 2015)
Set LMDB map size to 21474836330 bytes
Successfully inserted key with 2147483633 bytes of zero-filled data
Retrieved 2147483633 bytes of data
First 16 bytes (hex): 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ...
Copying database to testbak.lmdb...
Database copy completed successfully.
Opening copied database and reading value...
Retrieved 2147483633 bytes of data from copied database
First 16 bytes from copy (hex): 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 ...
Data size matches between original and copy
With compaction:
$ ./lmdb_repro -c test.lmdb $((2 * 1024 * 1024 * 1024 - 16 + 1))
testbak.lmdb
LMDB Version: LMDB 0.9.70: (December 19, 2015)
Set LMDB map size to 21474836330 bytes
Successfully inserted key with 2147483633 bytes of zero-filled data
Retrieved 2147483633 bytes of data
First 16 bytes (hex): 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ...
Copying database to testbak.lmdb (with compaction)...
Database copy completed successfully.
Opening copied database and reading value...
mdb_get (copy) failed: MDB_CORRUPTED: Located page was wrong type
Size difference on corrupt DB:
$ du -sh ./*
312K ./lmdb_repro
24K ./testbak.lmdb
2.1G ./test.lmdb
With compaction at the perceived max size:
$ ./lmdb_repro -c test.lmdb $((2 * 1024 * 1024 * 1024 - 16)) testbak.lmdb
LMDB Version: LMDB 0.9.70: (December 19, 2015)
Set LMDB map size to 21474836320 bytes
Successfully inserted key with 2147483632 bytes of zero-filled data
Retrieved 2147483632 bytes of data
First 16 bytes (hex): 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ...
Copying database to testbak.lmdb (with compaction)...
Database copy completed successfully.
Opening copied database and reading value...
Retrieved 2147483632 bytes of data from copied database
First 16 bytes from copy (hex): 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 ...
Data size matches between original and copy
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https://bugs.openldap.org/show_bug.cgi?id=10342
Issue ID: 10342
Summary: Potential Memory Leak in function mdb_txn_begin
Product: OpenLDAP
Version: unspecified
Hardware: All
OS: All
Status: UNCONFIRMED
Keywords: needs_review
Severity: normal
Priority: ---
Component: libraries
Assignee: bugs(a)openldap.org
Reporter: alexguo1023(a)gmail.com
Target Milestone: ---
Created attachment 1069
--> https://bugs.openldap.org/attachment.cgi?id=1069&action=edit
Free txn->mt_u.dirty_list before freeing txn
The function `mdb_txn_begin` allocates the dirty list via
```c
txn->mt_u.dirty_list = malloc(sizeof(MDB_ID2) * MDB_IDL_UM_SIZE);
```
Later, when `txn != env->me_txn0`, it calls
```c
free(txn);
```
without first freeing `txn->mt_u.dirty_list`. This orphaned allocation leads to
a memory leak.
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