https://bugs.openldap.org/show_bug.cgi?id=8125
--- Comment #19 from Ondřej Kuzník <ondra(a)mistotebe.net> ---
(In reply to Ondřej Kuzník from comment #12)
> This is my understanding of the above discussion:
> - deltasync consumer has just switched to full refresh (but is ahead
> from this provider in some ways)
> - provider sends the present list
> - consumer deletes extra entries, builds a new cookie
> - problem is that the new cookie is built to reflect the union of both
> the local and received cookies even though we may have undone some of
> the changes which we then ignore
>
> If that's accurate, there are some approaches that could fix it:
>
> 1. Simple one is to remember the actual cookie we got from the server
> and refuse to delete entries with entryCSN ahead of the provided CSN
> set. Problem is that we get even further from being able to replicate
> from a generic RFC4533 provider.
This has actually been done in ITS#9282.
> 2. Instead, when present phase is initiated, we might terminate all
> other sessions, adopt the complete CSN set and restart them only once
> the new CSN set has been fully established.
>
> Also, whenever we fall back from deltasync into plain syncrepl, we
> should make sure that the accesslog entries we generate from this are
> never used for further replication which might be thought to be a
> separate issue. Maybe the ITS#8486 work might be useful for this if
> we have a way of signalling to accesslog to reset minCSN accordingly
> to the new CSN set.
>
> The former is simpler, but the latter feels like the only one that
> actually addresses these problems in full.
I have some code to do this, terminate only persist sessions when we detect
getting into a present refresh.
Need a way to reproduce this in current master since a lot of the issues would
have been fixed in ITS#9282 and might only be diverging in relayed deltasync,
possibly if we're refreshing from two other providers at the same time.
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https://bugs.openldap.org/show_bug.cgi?id=5808
--- Comment #4 from klasen(a)gmx.net ---
The same problem can be observed, if a non-default SocketFactory (e.g. for
LDAPS connections) is used:
See https://bugs.openldap.org/show_bug.cgi?id=5808 (SocketFactory does not
support a connect timeout.)
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https://bugs.openldap.org/show_bug.cgi?id=9370
--- Comment #4 from Howard Chu <hyc(a)openldap.org> ---
(In reply to Salvatore Bonaccorso from comment #3)
> CVE-2020-25692 was assigned for this issue.
Fyi, the official OpenLDAP Project policy is that only unintended information
disclosures count as security issues, and this item does not qualify.
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https://bugs.openldap.org/show_bug.cgi?id=9370
--- Comment #3 from Salvatore Bonaccorso <carnil(a)debian.org> ---
CVE-2020-25692 was assigned for this issue.
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https://bugs.openldap.org/show_bug.cgi?id=9383
Howard Chu <hyc(a)openldap.org> changed:
What |Removed |Added
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Group|OpenLDAP-devs |
--- Comment #2 from Howard Chu <hyc(a)openldap.org> ---
(In reply to phasip from comment #0)
> A malicious packet can force OpenLDAP to fail an assertion and crash.
> slapd: schema_init.c:419: int certificateListValidate(Syntax *, struct
> berval *): Assertion `tag == LBER_INTEGER' failed.
Note that this code was behind #ifdef LDAP_DEVEL so it is not vulnerable
in any public OpenLDAP releases.
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