hyc@OpenLDAP.org wrote:

Full_Name: Howard Chu Version: any OS: URL: ftp://ftp.openldap.org/incoming/ Submission from: (NULL) (76.91.220.157) Submitted by: hyc

Our chkhost implementation for OpenSSL does a simple strcasecmp on the name obtained from the certificate CN; if the CN has an embedded NUL it is possible for this check to be spoofed. This is now fixed in HEAD.

Our chkhost implementation for GnuTLS is not vulnerable.

We didn't write a chkhost implementation for MozNSS, we just use the default one they provide. Inspecting their code shows that their default checker is also vulnerable. I will be writing a replacement for libldap shortly.

All fixed in HEAD/RE24. Surprisingly, the GnuTLS API got this one right. So did OpenSSL (we just botched our use of their APIs). But the MozNSS APIs all discard the length info of the data instead of returning it, so we had to reimplement some of their basic name-handling code in libldap. Probably should have just done all of this using DER and liblber too, like the other cert parsing code.