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Re: (ITS#7367) [PATCH] MozNSS: update list of supported cipher suites
by quanah＠zimbra.com 03 Oct '12

03 Oct '12

--On Wednesday, October 03, 2012 8:33 AM +0000 jvcelak(a)redhat.com wrote: > I understand that you don't want to support older OpenLDAP versions, > builds with non-default libraries, etc. But the users will rather use > the package from their distribution, instead of compiling it by > themselves. And we cannot support users' builds, because we do not have > the sources and the build environment under control. And we cannot > rebase the packages freely. Redhat needs to come up with a solution to this problem, because they are putting their users in a catch-22 situation. Either they get support from RedHat for a package that will not work, or they build their own, and can't get support from RedHat. There are reasons new *patch* level releases are made. I see zero reason why RedHat cannot update the versions of OpenLDAP they ship since the fixes are incremental. No one should be running OpenLDAP 2.4.23 as a *production server*. Keep the RPM version string the same, and note the upstream release in the RPM patchlevel, if that is necessary, but fix the actual code to be current. This is why the Debian folks *wisely* recommend that people do *not* use the distribution build for a production server. As long as RedHat keeps up this policy, the only advice ever for RedHat customers is to build their own RPMs, and get support elsewhere, since RedHat clearly can't keep working server versions together for their customers. And then that leads to the question of what exactly they are paying RedHat for support for in the first place. --Quanah -- Quanah Gibson-Mount Sr. Member of Technical Staff Zimbra, Inc A Division of VMware, Inc. -------------------- Zimbra :: the leader in open source messaging and collaboration

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Re: (ITS#7367) [PATCH] MozNSS: update list of supported cipher suites
by richm＠stanfordalumni.org 03 Oct '12

03 Oct '12

On 10/03/2012 10:18 AM, Howard Chu wrote: > Thanks for your comments, Rich. > > richm(a)stanfordalumni.org wrote: >>> On Tuesday 02 of October 2012 14:18:49, hyc(a)symas.com wrote: >>>> Back to this point - surely OpenLDAP libldap is not the only piece of >>>> software that expects to use OpenSSL-style cipher suite names. >>>> libldap is >>>> certainly not the best place to put this translation. >>> I'm not sure about that. We tried to go a "compatible" way with >>> OpenLDAP, >>> don't know about other projects. I will take a look. >> This is the nss_compat_ossl library approach, which attempts to make >> moznss look as much like openssl as possible to applications. I thought >> about trying to use that with openldap a few years ago when we first >> started looking at having openldap support moznss, but Howard had >> already done a great deal of work to make the tls code "pluggable" with >> tls2.c and tls_m.c, which takes the approach of using the moznss code >> directly rather than indirectly through another layer . This has been >> the preferred approach of the Red Hat and Fedora teams that were >> attempting to replace openssl with moznss. nss_compat_ossl has not been >> actively worked on for a couple of years, and would require many changes >> to support multi-init, multiple key/cert databases, and other fixes that >> have gone into tls_m.c. >> >> I suppose we could try to get some sort of openssl cipher name support >> directly in upstream moznss, but they would probably assert that it >> doesn't belong there either. >> >> Maybe we could use nss_compat_ossl to do the mapping of cipher names >> from openssl to moznss? > > That makes sense to me, although if as you say it hasn't been actively > maintained, that sounds like another problem. But certainly if other > apps are using it, then aren't they going to want new cipher suite > support too? > Yes, and imho nss_compat_ossl is the place to do this. But, would it be possible to update the cipher suite list in tls_m.c first, to bring it up to date, then work on updating the compat library?

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Re: (ITS#7367) [PATCH] MozNSS: update list of supported cipher suites
by hyc＠symas.com 03 Oct '12

03 Oct '12

Thanks for your comments, Rich. richm(a)stanfordalumni.org wrote: >> On Tuesday 02 of October 2012 14:18:49, hyc(a)symas.com wrote: >>> Back to this point - surely OpenLDAP libldap is not the only piece of >>> software that expects to use OpenSSL-style cipher suite names. libldap is >>> certainly not the best place to put this translation. >> I'm not sure about that. We tried to go a "compatible" way with OpenLDAP, >> don't know about other projects. I will take a look. > This is the nss_compat_ossl library approach, which attempts to make > moznss look as much like openssl as possible to applications. I thought > about trying to use that with openldap a few years ago when we first > started looking at having openldap support moznss, but Howard had > already done a great deal of work to make the tls code "pluggable" with > tls2.c and tls_m.c, which takes the approach of using the moznss code > directly rather than indirectly through another layer . This has been > the preferred approach of the Red Hat and Fedora teams that were > attempting to replace openssl with moznss. nss_compat_ossl has not been > actively worked on for a couple of years, and would require many changes > to support multi-init, multiple key/cert databases, and other fixes that > have gone into tls_m.c. > > I suppose we could try to get some sort of openssl cipher name support > directly in upstream moznss, but they would probably assert that it > doesn't belong there either. > > Maybe we could use nss_compat_ossl to do the mapping of cipher names > from openssl to moznss? That makes sense to me, although if as you say it hasn't been actively maintained, that sounds like another problem. But certainly if other apps are using it, then aren't they going to want new cipher suite support too? -- -- Howard Chu CTO, Symas Corp. http://www.symas.com Director, Highland Sun http://highlandsun.com/hyc/ Chief Architect, OpenLDAP http://www.openldap.org/project/

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Re: (ITS#7367) [PATCH] MozNSS: update list of supported cipher suites
by richm＠stanfordalumni.org 03 Oct '12

03 Oct '12

On 10/03/2012 02:33 AM, jvcelak(a)redhat.com wrote: > Hello, > > On Tuesday 02 of October 2012 14:01:16, hyc(a)symas.com wrote: >> Let's be very clear. I'm not rejecting patches because they come from Red >> Hat. Anyone can plainly see that we have accepted many patches from Red >> Hat. I'm rejecting patches because the relevant code sucks, and when things >> related to them break, the OpenLDAP Project takes the heat even though >> we're not responsible for the breakage. There are CVEs issued against >> OpenLDAP security holes, even though the bugs are in MozNSS, not OpenLDAP. >> I wouldn't have a problem with these patches if they actually worked, or if >> Red Hat took the blame when they don't work, but that's not what has >> happened. Instead we get CVE-2012-2668. This was my fault - just a straight up coding error. I take the blame for this. >> We get users asking why their TLS >> connections don't work after upgrading from one RedHat release to the next. >> We get a pointless support burden because users say "we have to run the Red >> Hat packages otherwise they won't support us" but then they don't actually >> ask Red Hat for support, they ask us. I have been active in the openldap community - mailing lists, irc - in answering questions about openldap + moznss. My assumption is that any TLS/SSL problems with openldap on RHEL/Fedora/CentOS are problems with the moznss code. I realize that it is a support burden because the first instinct of a user is to blame openldap. I try to deflect as much of that as possible towards Red Hat. I try to get people who are paid RHEL users to go through support. I try to get "free" users to file bugs. > Sometimes a security bug appears. We are not flawless. I do not know how we > should take the blame. The CVE clearly stated that this is a problem only with > Mozilla NSS backend. Which is used only by Fedora, RHEL, and their derivates. > And the affected code was from RH, anyone can see it in VCS. Tell me what did > you expect us to do and we can try to do it next time. > > If our users have a problem, they should first contact our support. Or create > a bug in our issue tracker. We cannot prevent them from contacting upstream. > And you can always say them 'Sorry, we cannot help you.' if the question is > not general enough or the problem depends on our build. > I understand that you don't want to support older OpenLDAP versions, builds > with non-default libraries, etc. But the users will rather use the package > from their distribution, instead of compiling it by themselves. And we cannot > support users' builds, because we do not have the sources and the build > environment under control. And we cannot rebase the packages freely. > > On Tuesday 02 of October 2012 14:18:49, hyc(a)symas.com wrote: >> Back to this point - surely OpenLDAP libldap is not the only piece of >> software that expects to use OpenSSL-style cipher suite names. libldap is >> certainly not the best place to put this translation. > I'm not sure about that. We tried to go a "compatible" way with OpenLDAP, > don't know about other projects. I will take a look. This is the nss_compat_ossl library approach, which attempts to make moznss look as much like openssl as possible to applications. I thought about trying to use that with openldap a few years ago when we first started looking at having openldap support moznss, but Howard had already done a great deal of work to make the tls code "pluggable" with tls2.c and tls_m.c, which takes the approach of using the moznss code directly rather than indirectly through another layer . This has been the preferred approach of the Red Hat and Fedora teams that were attempting to replace openssl with moznss. nss_compat_ossl has not been actively worked on for a couple of years, and would require many changes to support multi-init, multiple key/cert databases, and other fixes that have gone into tls_m.c. I suppose we could try to get some sort of openssl cipher name support directly in upstream moznss, but they would probably assert that it doesn't belong there either. Maybe we could use nss_compat_ossl to do the mapping of cipher names from openssl to moznss? > > Jan > >

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Re: (ITS#7367) [PATCH] MozNSS: update list of supported cipher suites
by jvcelak＠redhat.com 03 Oct '12

03 Oct '12

Hello, On Tuesday 02 of October 2012 14:01:16, hyc(a)symas.com wrote: > Let's be very clear. I'm not rejecting patches because they come from Red > Hat. Anyone can plainly see that we have accepted many patches from Red > Hat. I'm rejecting patches because the relevant code sucks, and when things > related to them break, the OpenLDAP Project takes the heat even though > we're not responsible for the breakage. There are CVEs issued against > OpenLDAP security holes, even though the bugs are in MozNSS, not OpenLDAP. > I wouldn't have a problem with these patches if they actually worked, or if > Red Hat took the blame when they don't work, but that's not what has > happened. Instead we get CVE-2012-2668. We get users asking why their TLS > connections don't work after upgrading from one RedHat release to the next. > We get a pointless support burden because users say "we have to run the Red > Hat packages otherwise they won't support us" but then they don't actually > ask Red Hat for support, they ask us. Sometimes a security bug appears. We are not flawless. I do not know how we should take the blame. The CVE clearly stated that this is a problem only with Mozilla NSS backend. Which is used only by Fedora, RHEL, and their derivates. And the affected code was from RH, anyone can see it in VCS. Tell me what did you expect us to do and we can try to do it next time. If our users have a problem, they should first contact our support. Or create a bug in our issue tracker. We cannot prevent them from contacting upstream. And you can always say them 'Sorry, we cannot help you.' if the question is not general enough or the problem depends on our build. I understand that you don't want to support older OpenLDAP versions, builds with non-default libraries, etc. But the users will rather use the package from their distribution, instead of compiling it by themselves. And we cannot support users' builds, because we do not have the sources and the build environment under control. And we cannot rebase the packages freely. On Tuesday 02 of October 2012 14:18:49, hyc(a)symas.com wrote: > Back to this point - surely OpenLDAP libldap is not the only piece of > software that expects to use OpenSSL-style cipher suite names. libldap is > certainly not the best place to put this translation. I'm not sure about that. We tried to go a "compatible" way with OpenLDAP, don't know about other projects. I will take a look. Jan

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Re: (ITS#7367) [PATCH] MozNSS: update list of supported cipher suites
by hyc＠symas.com 02 Oct '12

02 Oct '12

hyc(a)symas.com wrote: > Jan Vcelak wrote: >> Of course, cipher suite enumeration in MozNSS is possible. But >> translation from OpenSSL names without the translation table would be >> very messy. I still think this is a better solution. Back to this point - surely OpenLDAP libldap is not the only piece of software that expects to use OpenSSL-style cipher suite names. libldap is certainly not the best place to put this translation. -- -- Howard Chu CTO, Symas Corp. http://www.symas.com Director, Highland Sun http://highlandsun.com/hyc/ Chief Architect, OpenLDAP http://www.openldap.org/project/

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Re: (ITS#7367) [PATCH] MozNSS: update list of supported cipher suites
by hyc＠symas.com 02 Oct '12

02 Oct '12

Jan Vcelak wrote: > Of course, cipher suite enumeration in MozNSS is possible. But > translation from OpenSSL names without the translation table would be > very messy. I still think this is a better solution. > >> There were 11 MozNSS patches in 2.4.32. Looks like 5 more waiting for >> review >> here, plus 2 already committed for 2.4.33. We will not accept patches >> that >> require constant revisiting every time NSS updates. This is too much. >> No more. > > I'm sending one patch per change. And looking at the patches, I do not > think I'm introducing new bugs. It's mostly a fixes for issues present > in the code before I started sending my first patches. And be sure that > I'm testing the TLS heavily before submitting anything. > > I do not understand why you strictly refuse anything which comes from > Fedora or Red Hat. We decided to use MozNSS and you can disagree. We > still want to fix the problems with that backend to use it without any > pain. Sorry, I really do not feel like your feedback is constructive. Let's be very clear. I'm not rejecting patches because they come from Red Hat. Anyone can plainly see that we have accepted many patches from Red Hat. I'm rejecting patches because the relevant code sucks, and when things related to them break, the OpenLDAP Project takes the heat even though we're not responsible for the breakage. There are CVEs issued against OpenLDAP security holes, even though the bugs are in MozNSS, not OpenLDAP. I wouldn't have a problem with these patches if they actually worked, or if Red Hat took the blame when they don't work, but that's not what has happened. Instead we get CVE-2012-2668. We get users asking why their TLS connections don't work after upgrading from one RedHat release to the next. We get a pointless support burden because users say "we have to run the Red Hat packages otherwise they won't support us" but then they don't actually ask Red Hat for support, they ask us. It may seem like this feedback is not constructive, but to me it is not productive for the Project to support a crypto library that was designed for use in a web browser and still assumes that its callers always have a human user sitting in front. Bugs like #7316 shouldn't ever have happened. None of this should come as a surprise to you since I've been stating this from the very first moment MozNSS support was ever mentioned. The NSS crypto architecture was never suited for any setting other than a single user application. It is completely inappropriate for use as a multi-user system library, or in a headless server environment. That was true 4 years ago when we first started working with it and it clearly hasn't improved by today. -- -- Howard Chu CTO, Symas Corp. http://www.symas.com Director, Highland Sun http://highlandsun.com/hyc/ Chief Architect, OpenLDAP http://www.openldap.org/project/

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Re: (ITS#7367) [PATCH] MozNSS: update list of supported cipher suites
by jvcelak＠redhat.com 02 Oct '12

02 Oct '12

> This is completely the wrong approach. There is no way you should be > putting > hardcoded constants in libldap that are tied to specific MozNSS > versions. The > MozNSS library needs to provide a cipher enumerator API. Let me quote OpenLDAP documentation: | When using Mozilla NSS, the OpenSSL cipher suite specifications are | used and translated into the format used internally by Mozilla NSS. And FAQ page about Mozilla NSS in OpenLDAP: | OpenLDAP can use Mozilla NSS as the TLS/SSL implementation. If you | previously used OpenLDAP with OpenSSL, and have certificate files, | cipher suites, and other TLS settings specified in your configuration | files, those settings should work exactly the same way with Mozilla | NSS - OpenLDAP with Mozilla NSS knows how to read those settings, | files, etc. and apply them in the same way. The goal is that you | will not be able to tell you are using OpenLDAP with Mozilla NSS | because it will work exactly the same as OpenLDAP with OpenSSL. Which means that if we decided at some point to make the MozNSS layer compatible with OpenSSL, we have to keep up with it now. Of course, cipher suite enumeration in MozNSS is possible. But translation from OpenSSL names without the translation table would be very messy. I still think this is a better solution. > There were 11 MozNSS patches in 2.4.32. Looks like 5 more waiting for > review > here, plus 2 already committed for 2.4.33. We will not accept patches > that > require constant revisiting every time NSS updates. This is too much. > No more. I'm sending one patch per change. And looking at the patches, I do not think I'm introducing new bugs. It's mostly a fixes for issues present in the code before I started sending my first patches. And be sure that I'm testing the TLS heavily before submitting anything. I do not understand why you strictly refuse anything which comes from Fedora or Red Hat. We decided to use MozNSS and you can disagree. We still want to fix the problems with that backend to use it without any pain. Sorry, I really do not feel like your feedback is constructive. Jan

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Re: (ITS#7367) [PATCH] MozNSS: update list of supported cipher suites
by hyc＠symas.com 01 Oct '12

01 Oct '12

jvcelak(a)redhat.com wrote: > Full_Name: Jan Vcelak > Version: git master > OS: Linux > URL: ftp://ftp.openldap.org/incoming/jvcelak-20120823-moznss-update-list-of-ciph… > Submission from: (NULL) (209.132.186.34) > > > I'm attaching patch which updates the list of supported cipher suites for > Mozilla NSS backend. All ciphers currently implemented in NSS (3.13.5) are > included. Recall what I said in ITS#7388 about an endless stream of patches to an unmaintainable code base... This is completely the wrong approach. There is no way you should be putting hardcoded constants in libldap that are tied to specific MozNSS versions. The MozNSS library needs to provide a cipher enumerator API. There were 11 MozNSS patches in 2.4.32. Looks like 5 more waiting for review here, plus 2 already committed for 2.4.33. We will not accept patches that require constant revisiting every time NSS updates. This is too much. No more. Tell the NSS guys to fix their design, or tell Red Hat to use a crypto library that actually works for the intended purpose. MozNSS clearly doesn't. > Default ciphers are selected on the same basis as in OpenSSL. > NULL/EXPORT/LOW/MEDIUM/HIGH classification is taken from OpenSSL as well. > > > The attached file is derived from OpenLDAP Software. All of the modifications to > OpenLDAP Software represented in the following patch(es) were developed by Red > Hat. Red Hat has not assigned rights and/or interest in this work to any party. > I, Jan Vcelak am authorized by Red Hat, my employer, to release this work under > the following terms. > > Red Hat hereby place the following modifications to OpenLDAP Software (and only > these modifications) into the public domain. Hence, these modifications may be > freely used and/or redistributed for any purpose with or without attribution > and/or other notice. > > -- -- Howard Chu CTO, Symas Corp. http://www.symas.com Director, Highland Sun http://highlandsun.com/hyc/ Chief Architect, OpenLDAP http://www.openldap.org/project/

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Re: (ITS#7400) Memberof and Syncrepl incompatibility
by hyc＠symas.com 01 Oct '12

01 Oct '12

arun s wrote: > Hi, > Yes, I am able to reproduce the issue with 2.4.32 > > Making sense of the logs for the exact reproduction is hard since it needs a > lot of operations in a short time. But this will probably help: > > 1. At the start of the test, the group temp_group existed. > > 2. I created a user temp_user and added temp_user to temp_group. > > 3. During replication, the group was replicated first and I got an error 32 > (NO_SUCH_OBJECT) when it tried to modify the memberOf of the temp_user object > (This does not exist in the readslave yet). > > 4. The temp_user object was replicated next, and as you see, querying it does > show a memberOf attribute, proving that this field was replicated. (Note that > I have run OpenLDAP with debug as -1 and verified that the replicated data has > the memberOf field in it. I can provide this too if needed.) I see. The current code drops the memberOf attribute if it was not explicitly requested in the search. However, by default the consumer requests "+" which means "all operational attributes" and so slapd considers memberOf to have been requested. We need to reconsider this aspect of the design. > > 5. The more serious problem occurs when the sequence is reversed and the group > has been deleted as a last operation - The user is replicated first, but since > the group is deleted, it is never replicated and a stale memberOf entry stays > with the user. -- -- Howard Chu CTO, Symas Corp. http://www.symas.com Director, Highland Sun http://highlandsun.com/hyc/ Chief Architect, OpenLDAP http://www.openldap.org/project/

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