openldap-bugs May 2025

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[Issue 10330] New: TIMEOUT and NETWORK_TIMEOUT not respected when receiving bad data during TLS negotiation
by openldap-its＠openldap.org 30 May '25

30 May '25

https://bugs.openldap.org/show_bug.cgi?id=10330 Issue ID: 10330 Summary: TIMEOUT and NETWORK_TIMEOUT not respected when receiving bad data during TLS negotiation Product: OpenLDAP Version: 2.6.9 Hardware: x86_64 OS: Linux Status: UNCONFIRMED Keywords: needs_review Severity: normal Priority: --- Component: libraries Assignee: bugs(a)openldap.org Reporter: michael.kourlas(a)solace.com Target Milestone: --- Created attachment 1063 --> https://bugs.openldap.org/attachment.cgi?id=1063&action=edit Test program This seems related to bug 8047. Steps to reproduce: 1. Setup a netcat server on a host: "nc -l -k -p 636". 2. On a different host, attempt to connect to the host running "nc" as if it were an LDAP server via ldaps: "ldapsearch -o NETWORK_TIMEOUT=5 -o TIMEOUT=5 -H ldaps://<ip>:636". 3. During the 5 second timeout period, switch back to the netcat server and transmit a newline by pressing enter. 4. ldapsearch will hang forever until the TCP connection is closed (e.g. by killing the netcat server). My expectation would be that ldapsearch would exit after 5 seconds, per the NETWORK_TIMEOUT and TIMEOUT options. I'm using the following version of ldapsearch on Fedora 41 (x86-64): > ldapsearch: @(#) $OpenLDAP: ldapsearch 2.6.9 (Mar 27 2025 00:00:00) $ > openldap > (LDAP library: OpenLDAP 20609) This problem is also observable when directly using the OpenLDAP C API. This is more of an issue, since any application using the API could become unresponsive if these timeout values aren't respected. I've attached a short test program which can be used instead of ldapsearch. If I abort the test program while it is stuck in this state, the traceback looks like this: > #0 0x00007f50b7a25811 in __GI___libc_read (fd=3, buf=0x2aaf9ac5, nbytes=3) at ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/read.c:26 > #1 0x00007f50b792f8b9 in sb_debug_read (sbiod=0x2aadf390, buf=0x2aaf9ac5, len=3) > at /usr/src/debug/openldap-2.6.9-1.fc41.x86_64/openldap-2.6.9/libraries/liblber/sockbuf.c:829 > #2 0x00007f50b7b61156 in tlso_bio_read (b=0x2aadf9c0, buf=0x2aaf9ac5 "", len=3) > at /usr/src/debug/openldap-2.6.9-1.fc41.x86_64/openldap-2.6.9/libraries/libldap/tls_o.c:1279 > #3 0x00007f50b7221ea3 in bread_conv (bio=<optimized out>, data=<optimized out>, datal=<optimized out>, readbytes=0x7ffd1cf2e3f0) > at crypto/bio/bio_meth.c:121 > #4 0x00007f50b7226047 in bio_read_intern (b=b@entry=0x2aadf9c0, data=0x2aaf9ac5, data@entry=0x555f3588, dlen=3, dlen@entry=18446744072487067717, > readbytes=readbytes@entry=0x7ffd1cf2e3f0) at crypto/bio/bio_lib.c:285 > #5 0x00007f50b72261db in BIO_read (b=0x2aadf9c0, data=0x555f3588, dlen=-1222483899) at crypto/bio/bio_lib.c:311 > #6 BIO_read (b=b@entry=0x2aadf9c0, data=data@entry=0x2aaf9ac5, dlen=dlen@entry=3) at crypto/bio/bio_lib.c:303 > #7 0x00007f50b783ce03 in tls_default_read_n (rl=0x2aaec1c0, n=5, max=<optimized out>, extend=<optimized out>, clearold=<optimized out>, > readbytes=0x7ffd1cf2e4b8) at ssl/record/methods/tls_common.c:406 > #8 0x00007f50b784151b in tls_get_more_records (rl=0x2aaec1c0) at ssl/record/methods/tls_common.c:583 > #9 0x00007f50b783b8ea in tls_read_record (rl=0x2aaec1c0, rechandle=0x2aaeb600, rversion=0x2aaeb608, type=0x2aaeb60c "", data=0x2aaeb610, > datalen=0x2aaeb620, epoch=0x0, seq_num=0x0) at ssl/record/methods/tls_common.c:1130 > #10 0x00007f50b783969a in ssl3_read_bytes (ssl=<optimized out>, type=22 '\026', recvd_type=0x7ffd1cf2e684 "", buf=0x2aaee480 "\001", len=4, > peek=0, readbytes=0x7ffd1cf2e688) at ssl/record/rec_layer_s3.c:689 > #11 0x00007f50b784f5a7 in tls_get_message_header (s=0x2aaea980, mt=<synthetic pointer>) at ssl/statem/statem_lib.c:1554 > --Type <RET> for more, q to quit, c to continue without paging-- > #12 read_state_machine (s=0x2aaea980) at ssl/statem/statem.c:625 > #13 state_machine (s=<optimized out>, server=0) at ssl/statem/statem.c:479 > #14 0x00007f50b7b615c3 in tlso_session_connect (ld=<optimized out>, sess=0x2aaea980, name_in=<optimized out>) > at /usr/src/debug/openldap-2.6.9-1.fc41.x86_64/openldap-2.6.9/libraries/libldap/tls_o.c:693 > #15 0x00007f50b7b65bf2 in ldap_int_tls_connect (ld=ld@entry=0x2a9b2430, conn=conn@entry=0x2a9b25d0, host=host@entry=0x2a9b2550 "192.168.133.56") > at /usr/src/debug/openldap-2.6.9-1.fc41.x86_64/openldap-2.6.9/libraries/libldap/tls2.c:425 > #16 0x00007f50b7b6636f in ldap_int_tls_start (ld=0x2a9b2430, conn=0x2a9b25d0, srv=<optimized out>) > at /usr/src/debug/openldap-2.6.9-1.fc41.x86_64/openldap-2.6.9/libraries/libldap/tls2.c:1245 > #17 0x00007f50b7b3d4c2 in ldap_int_open_connection (ld=0x2a9b2430, conn=0x2a9b25d0, srv=0x2a9b24d0, async=0) > at /usr/src/debug/openldap-2.6.9-1.fc41.x86_64/openldap-2.6.9/libraries/libldap/open.c:515 > #18 0x00007f50b7b5212d in ldap_new_connection (ld=0x2a9b2430, srvlist=0x2a9b2878, use_ldsb=1, connect=<optimized out>, bind=0x0, m_req=0, m_res=0) > at /usr/src/debug/openldap-2.6.9-1.fc41.x86_64/openldap-2.6.9/libraries/libldap/request.c:491 > #19 0x00007f50b7b3c7b4 in ldap_open_defconn (ld=0x2a9b2430) > at /usr/src/debug/openldap-2.6.9-1.fc41.x86_64/openldap-2.6.9/libraries/libldap/open.c:42 > #20 0x00007f50b7b52ed8 in ldap_send_initial_request (ld=0x2a9b2430, msgtype=96, dn=0x4023a9 "cn=admin,dc=solace,dc=com", ber=0x2a9b2570, msgid=1) > at /usr/src/debug/openldap-2.6.9-1.fc41.x86_64/openldap-2.6.9/libraries/libldap/request.c:131 > #21 0x00007f50b7b429b9 in ldap_sasl_bind (ld=0x2a9b2430, dn=0x4023a9 "cn=admin,dc=solace,dc=com", mechanism=0x0, cred=0x7ffd1cf2eb90, sctrls=0x0, > cctrls=0x0, msgidp=0x7ffd1cf2eb8c) at /usr/src/debug/openldap-2.6.9-1.fc41.x86_64/openldap-2.6.9/libraries/libldap/sasl.c:164 -- You are receiving this mail because: You are on the CC list for the issue.

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[Issue 10346] New: mdb_env_copy2 on a database with a value larger than (2GB-16) results in a corrupt copy
by openldap-its＠openldap.org 28 May '25

28 May '25

https://bugs.openldap.org/show_bug.cgi?id=10346 Issue ID: 10346 Summary: mdb_env_copy2 on a database with a value larger than (2GB-16) results in a corrupt copy Product: LMDB Version: 0.9.31 Hardware: x86_64 OS: Linux Status: UNCONFIRMED Keywords: needs_review Severity: normal Priority: --- Component: liblmdb Assignee: bugs(a)openldap.org Reporter: mike.moritz(a)vertex.link Target Milestone: --- Created attachment 1072 --> https://bugs.openldap.org/attachment.cgi?id=1072&action=edit reproduction source code Running mdb_env_copy2 with compaction on a database with a value larger than (2GB-16)bytes appears to complete successfully in that there are no errors, but the copied database cannot be opened and throws an MDB_CORRUPTED error. Looking at the copied database size, it appears that the value is either being skipped or significantly truncated. Running mdb_env_copy2 without compaction also completes successfully, and the copied database can be opened. I initially encountered this while using py-lmdb with v0.9.31 of LMDB, but was able to write up a simple script that uses the library directly. The source for the script is attached, and the results below are from running it with the latest from master. Without compaction: $ ./lmdb_repro test.lmdb $((2 * 1024 * 1024 * 1024 - 16 + 1)) testbak.lmdb LMDB Version: LMDB 0.9.70: (December 19, 2015) Set LMDB map size to 21474836330 bytes Successfully inserted key with 2147483633 bytes of zero-filled data Retrieved 2147483633 bytes of data First 16 bytes (hex): 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ... Copying database to testbak.lmdb... Database copy completed successfully. Opening copied database and reading value... Retrieved 2147483633 bytes of data from copied database First 16 bytes from copy (hex): 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ... Data size matches between original and copy With compaction: $ ./lmdb_repro -c test.lmdb $((2 * 1024 * 1024 * 1024 - 16 + 1)) testbak.lmdb LMDB Version: LMDB 0.9.70: (December 19, 2015) Set LMDB map size to 21474836330 bytes Successfully inserted key with 2147483633 bytes of zero-filled data Retrieved 2147483633 bytes of data First 16 bytes (hex): 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ... Copying database to testbak.lmdb (with compaction)... Database copy completed successfully. Opening copied database and reading value... mdb_get (copy) failed: MDB_CORRUPTED: Located page was wrong type Size difference on corrupt DB: $ du -sh ./* 312K ./lmdb_repro 24K ./testbak.lmdb 2.1G ./test.lmdb With compaction at the perceived max size: $ ./lmdb_repro -c test.lmdb $((2 * 1024 * 1024 * 1024 - 16)) testbak.lmdb LMDB Version: LMDB 0.9.70: (December 19, 2015) Set LMDB map size to 21474836320 bytes Successfully inserted key with 2147483632 bytes of zero-filled data Retrieved 2147483632 bytes of data First 16 bytes (hex): 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ... Copying database to testbak.lmdb (with compaction)... Database copy completed successfully. Opening copied database and reading value... Retrieved 2147483632 bytes of data from copied database First 16 bytes from copy (hex): 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ... Data size matches between original and copy -- You are receiving this mail because: You are on the CC list for the issue.

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[Issue 10345] New: Potential memory leak in function rbac_create_session
by openldap-its＠openldap.org 27 May '25

27 May '25

https://bugs.openldap.org/show_bug.cgi?id=10345 Issue ID: 10345 Summary: Potential memory leak in function rbac_create_session Product: OpenLDAP Version: unspecified Hardware: All OS: All Status: UNCONFIRMED Keywords: needs_review Severity: normal Priority: --- Component: contrib Assignee: bugs(a)openldap.org Reporter: alexguo1023(a)gmail.com Target Milestone: --- In `rbac_create_session`, we have the following code: ```c if ( rc < 0 ) { rs->sr_err = LDAP_OTHER; rs->sr_text = "internal error"; } else { (void)ber_flatten( ber, &rs->sr_rspdata ); rs->sr_rspoid = ch_strdup( slap_EXOP_CREATE_SESSION.bv_val ); // first rs->sr_err = LDAP_SUCCESS; } ber_free_buf(ber); done:; // always put the OID in the response: rs->sr_rspoid = ch_strdup( slap_EXOP_CREATE_SESSION.bv_val ); //second ``` The second `ch_strdup` at the `done` label overwrites `rs->sr_rspoid` without freeing the previous string, resulting in a memory leak. -- You are receiving this mail because: You are on the CC list for the issue.

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[Issue 10344] New: Potential memory leak in function firstComponentNormalize and objectClassPretty.
by openldap-its＠openldap.org 27 May '25

27 May '25

https://bugs.openldap.org/show_bug.cgi?id=10344 Issue ID: 10344 Summary: Potential memory leak in function firstComponentNormalize and objectClassPretty. Product: OpenLDAP Version: unspecified Hardware: All OS: All Status: UNCONFIRMED Keywords: needs_review Severity: normal Priority: --- Component: slapd Assignee: bugs(a)openldap.org Reporter: alexguo1023(a)gmail.com Target Milestone: --- Created attachment 1071 --> https://bugs.openldap.org/attachment.cgi?id=1071&action=edit Patch: Ensure the first argument passed to `ber_dupbv_x` is not `NULL`. In `firstComponentNormalize`, the code calls `ber_dupbv_x` but ignores its return value. ```c ber_dupbv_x(normalized, val, ctx); ``` When `normalized` is `NULL`, `ber_dupbv_x` allocates a new `struct berval` and returns it; failing to capture that pointer means we lose ownership and leak the allocation. The same issue arises in `objectClassPretty`. We should follow the pattern in function `hexNormalize`, which asserts that its `normalized` argument is non-NULL before use: ```c assert(normalized != NULL); ``` -- You are receiving this mail because: You are on the CC list for the issue.

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[Issue 10343] New: Potential Memory Leak in function slap_uuidstr_from_normalized
by openldap-its＠openldap.org 27 May '25

27 May '25

https://bugs.openldap.org/show_bug.cgi?id=10343 Issue ID: 10343 Summary: Potential Memory Leak in function slap_uuidstr_from_normalized Product: OpenLDAP Version: unspecified Hardware: All OS: All Status: UNCONFIRMED Keywords: needs_review Severity: normal Priority: --- Component: slapd Assignee: bugs(a)openldap.org Reporter: alexguo1023(a)gmail.com Target Milestone: --- Created attachment 1070 --> https://bugs.openldap.org/attachment.cgi?id=1070&action=edit Patch: Change 1 to -1. In function slap_uuidstr_from_normalized, the code allocates a new `struct berval` with ```c new = (struct berval *)slap_sl_malloc(sizeof(struct berval), ctx); ``` and then attempt to allocate `new->bv_val`. If that second allocation fails, it sets `rc = 1` and jumps to the `done` cleanup label. However, the cleanup code only runs when `rc == -1`, so the memory pointed by `new` is never freed, causing a memory leak. -- You are receiving this mail because: You are on the CC list for the issue.

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[Issue 10342] New: Potential Memory Leak in function mdb_txn_begin
by openldap-its＠openldap.org 27 May '25

27 May '25

https://bugs.openldap.org/show_bug.cgi?id=10342 Issue ID: 10342 Summary: Potential Memory Leak in function mdb_txn_begin Product: OpenLDAP Version: unspecified Hardware: All OS: All Status: UNCONFIRMED Keywords: needs_review Severity: normal Priority: --- Component: libraries Assignee: bugs(a)openldap.org Reporter: alexguo1023(a)gmail.com Target Milestone: --- Created attachment 1069 --> https://bugs.openldap.org/attachment.cgi?id=1069&action=edit Free txn->mt_u.dirty_list before freeing txn The function `mdb_txn_begin` allocates the dirty list via ```c txn->mt_u.dirty_list = malloc(sizeof(MDB_ID2) * MDB_IDL_UM_SIZE); ``` Later, when `txn != env->me_txn0`, it calls ```c free(txn); ``` without first freeing `txn->mt_u.dirty_list`. This orphaned allocation leads to a memory leak. -- You are receiving this mail because: You are on the CC list for the issue.

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[Issue 10341] New: Two potential buffer overruns in function mdb_cmp_cint.
by openldap-its＠openldap.org 27 May '25

27 May '25

https://bugs.openldap.org/show_bug.cgi?id=10341 Issue ID: 10341 Summary: Two potential buffer overruns in function mdb_cmp_cint. Product: OpenLDAP Version: unspecified Hardware: All OS: All Status: UNCONFIRMED Keywords: needs_review Severity: normal Priority: --- Component: libraries Assignee: bugs(a)openldap.org Reporter: alexguo1023(a)gmail.com Target Milestone: --- Created attachment 1068 --> https://bugs.openldap.org/attachment.cgi?id=1068&action=edit Patch: Fix buffer overrun in function mdb_cmp_cint We found two potential bugs in `mdb_cmp_cint`’s backward‐scan loop: ```c u = (unsigned short *)((char *)a->mv_data + a->mv_size); c = (unsigned short *)((char *)b->mv_data + a->mv_size); do { x = *--u - *--c; } while (!x && u > (unsigned short *)a->mv_data); ``` 1. **Underflow when `a->mv_size == 0`** If `a->mv_size` is zero, `u` is initialized to point one past the end of the zero‐length buffer. The first `--u` then moves it before `a->mv_data`, and the subsequent dereference is undefined. The original API allows lengths from 0 to `0xFFFFFFFF`, so a zero length is possible can could lead to pointer underflow here. 2. **Overflow of `b->mv_data` when `b->mv_size < a->mv_size`** The code uses `a->mv_size` to advance both `u` and `c`, and only bounds‐checks `u`. If `b->mv_size` is smaller than `a->mv_size`, `c` may run past the end of its buffer before the loop terminates, causing a buffer overrun. -- You are receiving this mail because: You are on the CC list for the issue.

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[Issue 10340] New: Potential Buffer Overflow in mdb_rebalance
by openldap-its＠openldap.org 27 May '25

27 May '25

https://bugs.openldap.org/show_bug.cgi?id=10340 Issue ID: 10340 Summary: Potential Buffer Overflow in mdb_rebalance Product: OpenLDAP Version: unspecified Hardware: All OS: All Status: UNCONFIRMED Keywords: needs_review Severity: normal Priority: --- Component: libraries Assignee: bugs(a)openldap.org Reporter: alexguo1023(a)gmail.com Target Milestone: --- Created attachment 1067 --> https://bugs.openldap.org/attachment.cgi?id=1067&action=edit Add an early return when `mc->mc_top == 0` In `mdb_rebalance`, we do: ```c int ptop = mc->mc_top - 1; node = mc->mc_pg[ptop]; ``` However, `mc->mc_top` defaults to 0 in many contexts, so `ptop` can become `-1`. Indexing `mc->mc_pg[-1]` causes invalid memory access. Elsewhere this is handled by checking `mc->mc_top > 0` before decrementing. To fix this, we add an early return when `mc->mc_top == 0`. A root page (or one without a parent) doesn’t need rebalancing, so this guard prevents `ptop` from ever being negative and eliminates the out-of-bounds access. -- You are receiving this mail because: You are on the CC list for the issue.

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[Issue 10339] New: config_add_internal() use-after-free on failed cn=config mod
by openldap-its＠openldap.org 27 May '25

27 May '25

https://bugs.openldap.org/show_bug.cgi?id=10339 Issue ID: 10339 Summary: config_add_internal() use-after-free on failed cn=config mod Product: OpenLDAP Version: unspecified Hardware: All OS: All Status: UNCONFIRMED Keywords: needs_review Severity: normal Priority: --- Component: slapd Assignee: bugs(a)openldap.org Reporter: ondra(a)mistotebe.net Target Milestone: --- If overlay startup/callback fails, bconfig.c:5593 uses the value of ca->argv[1] despite it being freed already. I guess we can just log the entry's DN. -- You are receiving this mail because: You are on the CC list for the issue.

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[Issue 10303] New: Web site still presents the 2.5 version as LTS
by openldap-its＠openldap.org 27 May '25

27 May '25

https://bugs.openldap.org/show_bug.cgi?id=10303 Issue ID: 10303 Summary: Web site still presents the 2.5 version as LTS Product: website Version: unspecified Hardware: All OS: All Status: UNCONFIRMED Keywords: needs_review Severity: normal Priority: --- Component: website Assignee: bugs(a)openldap.org Reporter: elecharny(a)apache.org Target Milestone: --- The OpenLDAP web site still indicates that the OpenLDAP 2.5 version is the LTS, despite a mail announced on August 10, 2024 that starting from January 2025 teh 2.6 branch will be the LTS. -- You are receiving this mail because: You are on the CC list for the issue.

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