openldap-bugs August 2023

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[Issue 9952] New: Crash on exit with OpenSSL 3
by openldap-its＠openldap.org 22 Oct '24

22 Oct '24

https://bugs.openldap.org/show_bug.cgi?id=9952 Issue ID: 9952 Summary: Crash on exit with OpenSSL 3 Product: OpenLDAP Version: 2.6.2 Hardware: All OS: Linux Status: UNCONFIRMED Keywords: needs_review Severity: normal Priority: --- Component: libraries Assignee: bugs(a)openldap.org Reporter: artur.zaprzala(a)gmail.com Target Milestone: --- A program using libldap will crash on exit after using SSL connection. How to reproduce on CentOS 9: Uncomment the following lines in /etc/pki/tls/openssl.cnf: [provider_sect] legacy = legacy_sect [legacy_sect] activate = 1 Run the command (you must enter a valid LDAP server address): python3 -c "import ldap; ldap.initialize('ldaps://<LDAP SERVER ADDRESS>').whoami_s()" Another example (no server required): python3 -c "import ctypes; ctypes.CDLL('libldap.so.2').ldap_pvt_tls_init_def_ctx(0)" Results: Segmentation fault (core dumped) Backtrace from gdb: Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault. 0 ___pthread_rwlock_rdlock (rwlock=0x0) at pthread_rwlock_rdlock.c:27 1 0x00007ffff7c92f3d in CRYPTO_THREAD_read_lock (lock=<optimized out>) at crypto/threads_pthread.c:85 2 0x00007ffff7c8b126 in ossl_lib_ctx_get_data (ctx=0x7ffff7eff540 <default_context_int.lto_priv>, index=1, meth=0x7ffff7eb8a00 <provider_store_method.lto_priv>) at crypto/context.c:398 3 0x00007ffff7c98bea in get_provider_store (libctx=<optimized out>) at crypto/provider_core.c:334 4 ossl_provider_deregister_child_cb (handle=0x5555555ed620) at crypto/provider_core.c:1752 5 0x00007ffff7c8bf2f in ossl_provider_deinit_child (ctx=0x5555555d2650) at crypto/provider_child.c:279 6 OSSL_LIB_CTX_free (ctx=0x5555555d2650) at crypto/context.c:283 7 OSSL_LIB_CTX_free (ctx=0x5555555d2650) at crypto/context.c:276 8 0x00007ffff7634af6 in legacy_teardown (provctx=0x5555555ee9f0) at providers/legacyprov.c:168 9 0x00007ffff7c9901b in ossl_provider_teardown (prov=0x5555555ed620) at crypto/provider_core.c:1477 10 ossl_provider_free (prov=0x5555555ed620) at crypto/provider_core.c:683 11 0x00007ffff7c63956 in ossl_provider_free (prov=<optimized out>) at crypto/provider_core.c:668 12 evp_cipher_free_int (cipher=0x555555916c10) at crypto/evp/evp_enc.c:1632 13 EVP_CIPHER_free (cipher=0x555555916c10) at crypto/evp/evp_enc.c:1647 14 0x00007ffff7a6bc1d in ssl_evp_cipher_free (cipher=0x555555916c10) at ssl/ssl_lib.c:5925 15 ssl_evp_cipher_free (cipher=0x555555916c10) at ssl/ssl_lib.c:5915 16 SSL_CTX_free (a=0x555555ec1020) at ssl/ssl_lib.c:3455 17 SSL_CTX_free (a=0x555555ec1020) at ssl/ssl_lib.c:3392 18 0x00007fffe95edb89 in ldap_int_tls_destroy (lo=0x7fffe9616000 <ldap_int_global_options>) at /usr/src/debug/openldap-2.6.2-1.el9_0.x86_64/openldap-2.6.2/libraries/libldap/tls2.c:104 19 0x00007ffff7fd100b in _dl_fini () at dl-fini.c:138 20 0x00007ffff7873475 in __run_exit_handlers (status=0, listp=0x7ffff7a11658 <__exit_funcs>, run_list_atexit=run_list_atexit@entry=true, run_dtors=run_dtors@entry=true) at exit.c:113 21 0x00007ffff78735f0 in __GI_exit (status=<optimized out>) at exit.c:143 22 0x00007ffff785be57 in __libc_start_call_main (main=main@entry=0x55555556aa20 <main>, argc=argc@entry=4, argv=argv@entry=0x7fffffffe2b8) at ../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:74 23 0x00007ffff785befc in __libc_start_main_impl (main=0x55555556aa20 <main>, argc=4, argv=0x7fffffffe2b8, init=<optimized out>, fini=<optimized out>, rtld_fini=<optimized out>, stack_end=0x7fffffffe2a8) at ../csu/libc-start.c:409 24 0x000055555556b575 in _start () The problem is that ldap_int_tls_destroy() is called after the clean up of libssl. On program exit, at first default_context_int is cleaned up (OPENSSL_cleanup() was registered with atexit()): 0 ossl_lib_ctx_default_deinit () at crypto/context.c:196 1 OPENSSL_cleanup () at crypto/init.c:424 2 OPENSSL_cleanup () at crypto/init.c:338 3 0x00007ffff7873475 in __run_exit_handlers (status=0, listp=0x7ffff7a11658 <__exit_funcs>, run_list_atexit=run_list_atexit@entry=true, run_dtors=run_dtors@entry=true) at exit.c:113 4 0x00007ffff78735f0 in __GI_exit (status=<optimized out>) at exit.c:143 5 0x00007ffff785be57 in __libc_start_call_main (main=main@entry=0x55555556aa20 <main>, argc=argc@entry=4, argv=argv@entry=0x7fffffffe2c8) at ../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:74 6 0x00007ffff785befc in __libc_start_main_impl (main=0x55555556aa20 <main>, argc=4, argv=0x7fffffffe2c8, init=<optimized out>, fini=<optimized out>, rtld_fini=<optimized out>, stack_end=0x7fffffffe2b8) at ../csu/libc-start.c:409 7 0x000055555556b575 in _start () Then ossl_lib_ctx_get_data() tries to use default_context_int.lock, which is NULL. ldap_int_tls_destroy() is called by ldap_int_destroy_global_options(), registered by "__attribute__ ((destructor))". It seems that shared library destructors are always called before functions registered with atexit(). A solution may be to modify libraries/libldap/init.c to use atexit() instead of "__attribute__ ((destructor))". atexit() manual page says: "Since glibc 2.2.3, atexit() can be used within a shared library to establish functions that are called when the shared library is unloaded.". Functions registered with atexit() are called in the reverse order of their registration, so libssl must by initialized before libldap. If the order is wrong, libldap should detect it somehow and exit with abort(). -- You are receiving this mail because: You are on the CC list for the issue.

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[Issue 9881] New: Ability to track last authentication for database objects
by openldap-its＠openldap.org 15 Oct '24

15 Oct '24

https://bugs.openldap.org/show_bug.cgi?id=9881 Issue ID: 9881 Summary: Ability to track last authentication for database objects Product: OpenLDAP Version: unspecified Hardware: All OS: All Status: UNCONFIRMED Keywords: needs_review Severity: normal Priority: --- Component: slapd Assignee: bugs(a)openldap.org Reporter: quanah(a)openldap.org Target Milestone: --- For simple binds, we have the ability to track the last success via the lastbind functionality (pwdLastSuccess attribute). However this doesn't allow one to see when an object that exists in a database last authenticated via SASL. It would be useful to add similar functionality for SASL binds. This can be useful information that allows one to tell if an object is being actively authenticated to (generally, users and system accounts, etc). Obviously if something is directly mapped to an identity that doesn't exist in the underlying DB, that cannot be tracked. -- You are receiving this mail because: You are on the CC list for the issue.

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[Bug 9220] New: Rewrite Bind and Exop result handling
by openldap-its＠openldap.org 15 Oct '24

15 Oct '24

https://bugs.openldap.org/show_bug.cgi?id=9220 Bug ID: 9220 Summary: Rewrite Bind and Exop result handling Product: OpenLDAP Version: 2.5 Hardware: All OS: All Status: UNCONFIRMED Severity: normal Priority: --- Component: slapd Assignee: bugs(a)openldap.org Reporter: quanah(a)openldap.org Target Milestone: --- Bind and Exop result handling needs a rewrite so it is no longer a special case for overlays. -- You are receiving this mail because: You are on the CC list for the bug.

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[Issue 9640] New: ACL privilege for MOD_INCREMENT
by openldap-its＠openldap.org 15 Oct '24

15 Oct '24

https://bugs.openldap.org/show_bug.cgi?id=9640 Issue ID: 9640 Summary: ACL privilege for MOD_INCREMENT Product: OpenLDAP Version: unspecified Hardware: All OS: All Status: UNCONFIRMED Severity: normal Priority: --- Component: slapd Assignee: bugs(a)openldap.org Reporter: michael(a)stroeder.com Target Milestone: --- I'm using LDAP write operations with MOD_INCREMENT with pre-read-control for uidNumber/gidNumber generation. I'd like to limit write access to an Integer attribute "nextID" to MOD_INCREMENT, ideally even restricting the de-/increment value. (Uniqueness is achieved with slapo-unique anyway but still I'd like to avoid users messing with this attribute). IMHO the ideal solution would be a new privilege "i". Example for limiting write access to increment by one and grant read access for using read control: access to attrs=nextID val=1 by group=... =ri Example for decrementing by two without read: access to attrs=nextID val=-2 by group=... =i -- You are receiving this mail because: You are on the CC list for the issue.

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[Issue 9356] New: Add list of peerSIDs to consumer cookie to reduce cross traffic
by openldap-its＠openldap.org 15 Oct '24

15 Oct '24

https://bugs.openldap.org/show_bug.cgi?id=9356 Issue ID: 9356 Summary: Add list of peerSIDs to consumer cookie to reduce cross traffic Product: OpenLDAP Version: 2.5 Hardware: All OS: All Status: UNCONFIRMED Severity: normal Priority: --- Component: slapd Assignee: bugs(a)openldap.org Reporter: quanah(a)openldap.org Target Milestone: --- If we add a list of peersids to the cookie, each consumer can tell the providers who else the consumers talk to and then the provider can omit sending updates to that consumer, originating from those peers There's some special handling needed if a connection dies If a consumer loses one of its peer connections, and after N retries is still not connected, it should send a new cookie to its remaining peers saying "here's my new peer list" with the missing one removed. Likewise, if a retry eventually connects again, it can send a new cookie again Make that peer list reset configurable in the syncrepl config stanza. This can help account for end admin knowledge that some links may be more or less stable than other ones. The idea here is that if one of your other peers can still see the missing peer, they can start routing updates to you again It should abandon all existing persist sessions and send a new sync search with the new cookie to all remaining peers For consumer side, also means adding the sid for a given provider into the syncrepl stanza to save on having to try and discover the peer sid. -- You are receiving this mail because: You are on the CC list for the issue.

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[Issue 9272] New: Invalid search results for subordinate/glued database
by openldap-its＠openldap.org 15 Oct '24

15 Oct '24

https://bugs.openldap.org/show_bug.cgi?id=9272 Issue ID: 9272 Summary: Invalid search results for subordinate/glued database Product: OpenLDAP Version: 2.4.47 Hardware: All OS: All Status: UNCONFIRMED Severity: normal Priority: --- Component: overlays Assignee: bugs(a)openldap.org Reporter: grapvar(a)gmail.com Target Milestone: --- Here is a trivial test case. Look at the following bunch of glued dit's/databases, declared in this order: | suffix ou=a,ou=1,ou=T # subordinate; contains only one (top-level) entry | suffix ou=2,ou=T # subordinate; contains only one (top-level) entry | suffix ou=b,ou=1,ou=T # subordinate; contains only one (top-level) entry | suffix ou=T # master database, has two entries, top-level | ` ou=1 # ... and this child entry let's query the united database: | $ ldapsearch -b ou=1,ou=T -s sub '' nx | dn: ou=1,ou=T | dn: ou=a,ou=1,ou=T | dn: ou=b,ou=1,ou=T Nice! But wait, what if ... | $ ldapsearch -b ou=1,ou=T -s sub -E\!pr=2/noprompt '' nx | dn: ou=1,ou=T | dn: ou=a,ou=1,ou=T | | # pagedresults: cookie=//////////8= ... BANG! ... | Server is unwilling to perform (53) The problem is the glue_op_search(), which has issues * different parts of code make different assumptions about data structures * different parts of code track state inconsistently * code that looks like a highly probably dead code I mean that likely possible to build another bug-triggering test cases, and glue_op_search() needs not just a fix of the bug above, but intense cleaning and structuring. -- You are receiving this mail because: You are on the CC list for the issue.

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[Bug 9219] New: Streamline tool API for 2.5
by openldap-its＠openldap.org 15 Oct '24

15 Oct '24

https://bugs.openldap.org/show_bug.cgi?id=9219 Bug ID: 9219 Summary: Streamline tool API for 2.5 Product: OpenLDAP Version: 2.5 Hardware: All OS: All Status: UNCONFIRMED Severity: normal Priority: --- Component: slapd Assignee: bugs(a)openldap.org Reporter: quanah(a)openldap.org Target Milestone: --- The current tool API is a mess and needs fixing for 2.5. This affects things like slapacl (The fix for bug#7920 was a kludge to deal with this, needs revisiting). -- You are receiving this mail because: You are on the CC list for the bug.

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[Issue 9367] New: back-mdb: encryption support
by openldap-its＠openldap.org 14 Oct '24

14 Oct '24

https://bugs.openldap.org/show_bug.cgi?id=9367 Issue ID: 9367 Summary: back-mdb: encryption support Product: OpenLDAP Version: unspecified Hardware: All OS: All Status: UNCONFIRMED Severity: normal Priority: --- Component: backends Assignee: bugs(a)openldap.org Reporter: quanah(a)openldap.org Target Milestone: --- Need to add encryption support to the back-mdb backend, depends on issue#9364 -- You are receiving this mail because: You are on the CC list for the issue.

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[Bug 9204] New: slapo-constraint allows anyone to apply Relax control
by openldap-its＠openldap.org 08 Oct '24

08 Oct '24

https://bugs.openldap.org/show_bug.cgi?id=9204 Bug ID: 9204 Summary: slapo-constraint allows anyone to apply Relax control Product: OpenLDAP Version: 2.4.49 Hardware: All OS: All Status: UNCONFIRMED Severity: normal Priority: --- Component: overlays Assignee: bugs(a)openldap.org Reporter: ryan(a)openldap.org Target Milestone: --- slapo-constraint doesn't limit who can use the Relax control, beyond the global limits applied by slapd. In practice, for many modifications this means any configured constraints are advisory only. In my opinion this should be considered a bug, in design if not implementation. I expect many admins would not read the man page closely enough to realize the behaviour does technically adhere to the letter of what's written there. Either slapd should require manage privileges for the Relax control globally, or slapo-constraint should perform a check for manage privilege itself, like slapo-unique does. Quoting ando in https://bugs.openldap.org/show_bug.cgi?id=5705#c4: > Well, a user with "manage" privileges on related data could bypass > constraints enforced by slapo-constraint(5) by using the "relax" > control. The rationale is that a user with manage privileges could be > able to repair an entry that needs to violate a constraint for good > reasons. Note that the user: > > - must have enough privileges to do it (manage) > > - must inform the DSA that intends to violate the constraint (by using > the control) but such privileges are currently not being required. -- You are receiving this mail because: You are on the CC list for the bug.

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[Issue 9303] New: Add support for WolfSSL as an alternative to OpenSSL
by openldap-its＠openldap.org 03 Oct '24

03 Oct '24

https://bugs.openldap.org/show_bug.cgi?id=9303 Issue ID: 9303 Summary: Add support for WolfSSL as an alternative to OpenSSL Product: OpenLDAP Version: unspecified Hardware: All OS: All Status: UNCONFIRMED Severity: normal Priority: --- Component: libraries Assignee: bugs(a)openldap.org Reporter: quanah(a)openldap.org Target Milestone: --- For OpenLDAP 2.6, we should investigate adding support for WolfSSL as an alternative to OpenSSL. -- You are receiving this mail because: You are on the CC list for the issue.

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openldap-bugs August 2023