nick.hudson@isode.com wrote:

Full_Name: nick hudson Version: 2.3.38 OS: linux URL: Submission from: (NULL) (62.3.217.250)

I am looking at the code in tls.c, function ldap_pvt_tls_check_hostname (although the code has been refactored in recent versions, into e.g. tls_o.c, but the same is true of the new code)

I think the code is doing something that RFC 4513 says that it should not do. Specifically, ref RFC 4513 section 3.1.3 says:

The server's identity may also be verified by comparing the reference
identity to the Common Name (CN) [RFC4519] value in the leaf Relative
Distinguished Name (RDN) of the subjectName field of the server's
certificate.  This comparison is performed using the rules for
comparison of DNS names in Section 3.1.3.1, below, with the exception
that no wildcard matching is allowed.

In tls.c (and the refactored code), you can see it's first attempting an exact comparison on subjectAltName, and if that fails it tries a wildcard match (which is ok, as per section 3.1.3.1)

But if no subjectAltName match is found, there's another section which looks at the certificate's subjectname, in which it also does a wildcard match, although the RFC says this shouldn't be done.

I recall having a long argument against adding this, but we went with it in the end. The original patch was in ITS#3134.

Some of the discussion surfaced here http://www.openldap.org/lists/openldap-software/200404/msg00434.html

It carried on here http://www.openldap.org/lists/openldap-devel/200405/msg00002.html

I'll also note ITS#5789, we allow matching an IP address against the CN too, and according to the spec that's only allowed for subjectAltName. But obviously there are lots of people out there misusing X.509, and we're tired of telling them to go do it right. It's a losing battle, we just get blamed for being broken...