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[Issue 10421] New: mdb_load can crash on malicious input
by openldap-its＠openldap.org 29 Jan '26

29 Jan '26

https://bugs.openldap.org/show_bug.cgi?id=10421 Issue ID: 10421 Summary: mdb_load can crash on malicious input Product: LMDB Version: 0.9.14 Hardware: All OS: All Status: UNCONFIRMED Keywords: needs_review Severity: minor Priority: --- Component: tools Assignee: bugs(a)openldap.org Reporter: hyc(a)openldap.org Target Milestone: --- This is being reported as a DOS vulnerability, which is incorrect. https://www.socdefenders.ai/item/01d72f7a-9622-4384-a936-d99925a19a8f mdb_load is a command-line tool, not a server nor a library function that could be run in a server. There is no service to deny. Reading a line containing an embedded NUL byte may cause mdb_load to crash, but as it's a one-shot commandline tool such crashes have no consequences. The report claims "heap metadata leak" which is also irrelevant since this is a one-shot tool and the only potential metadata is that which was contained in the input file, whose contents are already known to the attacker. The report is supposedly released under "responsible disclosure" and yet it was never reported directly to the OpenLDAP Project (not in this bug tracker nor anywhere else). This despite the fact that the reporter clearly knows that mdb_load is a piece of OpenLDAP software. https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Jan/5 The malicious input file must be constructed with a valid header and a line containing a single space followed by a single NUL byte. The dump/load file format only uses printable characters, so an embedded NUL byte never occurs in valid files. It is unclear why any DB admin would ever fall victim to such a malicious input. The mdb_load utility is only used to load files generated by mdb_dump, and mdb_dump will never produce such an invalid file. If an attacker went to the trouble to binary patch a dump file to create this crashing character sequence, they clearly have enough privileges to read and alter any other relevant files, so this crash doesn't give them any particular advantage. Nor does the crash reveal any memory content that they don't already know. -- You are receiving this mail because: You are on the CC list for the issue.

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[Issue 10355] New: mplay doesn't compile on musl
by openldap-its＠openldap.org 29 Jan '26

29 Jan '26

https://bugs.openldap.org/show_bug.cgi?id=10355 Issue ID: 10355 Summary: mplay doesn't compile on musl Product: LMDB Version: 0.9.33 Hardware: All OS: All Status: UNCONFIRMED Keywords: needs_review Severity: normal Priority: --- Component: tools Assignee: bugs(a)openldap.org Reporter: bgilbert(a)backtick.net Target Milestone: --- With the musl C library (e.g. Alpine Linux) mplay doesn't compile: gcc -pthread -O2 -g -W -Wall -Wno-unused-parameter -Wbad-function-cast -Wuninitialized -c mplay.c mplay.c: In function 'addpid': mplay.c:490:23: error: assignment of read-only variable 'stdin' 490 | stdin = fdopen(0, "r"); | ^ mplay.c:491:24: error: assignment of read-only variable 'stdout' 491 | stdout = fdopen(1, "w"); | ^ make: *** [Makefile:99: mplay.o] Error 1 -- You are receiving this mail because: You are on the CC list for the issue.

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[Issue 10341] New: Two potential buffer overruns in function mdb_cmp_cint.
by openldap-its＠openldap.org 29 Jan '26

29 Jan '26

https://bugs.openldap.org/show_bug.cgi?id=10341 Issue ID: 10341 Summary: Two potential buffer overruns in function mdb_cmp_cint. Product: OpenLDAP Version: unspecified Hardware: All OS: All Status: UNCONFIRMED Keywords: needs_review Severity: normal Priority: --- Component: libraries Assignee: bugs(a)openldap.org Reporter: alexguo1023(a)gmail.com Target Milestone: --- Created attachment 1068 --> https://bugs.openldap.org/attachment.cgi?id=1068&action=edit Patch: Fix buffer overrun in function mdb_cmp_cint We found two potential bugs in `mdb_cmp_cint`’s backward‐scan loop: ```c u = (unsigned short *)((char *)a->mv_data + a->mv_size); c = (unsigned short *)((char *)b->mv_data + a->mv_size); do { x = *--u - *--c; } while (!x && u > (unsigned short *)a->mv_data); ``` 1. **Underflow when `a->mv_size == 0`** If `a->mv_size` is zero, `u` is initialized to point one past the end of the zero‐length buffer. The first `--u` then moves it before `a->mv_data`, and the subsequent dereference is undefined. The original API allows lengths from 0 to `0xFFFFFFFF`, so a zero length is possible can could lead to pointer underflow here. 2. **Overflow of `b->mv_data` when `b->mv_size < a->mv_size`** The code uses `a->mv_size` to advance both `u` and `c`, and only bounds‐checks `u`. If `b->mv_size` is smaller than `a->mv_size`, `c` may run past the end of its buffer before the loop terminates, causing a buffer overrun. -- You are receiving this mail because: You are on the CC list for the issue.

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[Issue 10340] New: Potential Buffer Overflow in mdb_rebalance
by openldap-its＠openldap.org 29 Jan '26

29 Jan '26

https://bugs.openldap.org/show_bug.cgi?id=10340 Issue ID: 10340 Summary: Potential Buffer Overflow in mdb_rebalance Product: OpenLDAP Version: unspecified Hardware: All OS: All Status: UNCONFIRMED Keywords: needs_review Severity: normal Priority: --- Component: libraries Assignee: bugs(a)openldap.org Reporter: alexguo1023(a)gmail.com Target Milestone: --- Created attachment 1067 --> https://bugs.openldap.org/attachment.cgi?id=1067&action=edit Add an early return when `mc->mc_top == 0` In `mdb_rebalance`, we do: ```c int ptop = mc->mc_top - 1; node = mc->mc_pg[ptop]; ``` However, `mc->mc_top` defaults to 0 in many contexts, so `ptop` can become `-1`. Indexing `mc->mc_pg[-1]` causes invalid memory access. Elsewhere this is handled by checking `mc->mc_top > 0` before decrementing. To fix this, we add an early return when `mc->mc_top == 0`. A root page (or one without a parent) doesn’t need rebalancing, so this guard prevents `ptop` from ever being negative and eliminates the out-of-bounds access. -- You are receiving this mail because: You are on the CC list for the issue.

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[Issue 10132] New: manage syncrepl as a cn=config entry
by openldap-its＠openldap.org 27 Jan '26

27 Jan '26

https://bugs.openldap.org/show_bug.cgi?id=10132 Issue ID: 10132 Summary: manage syncrepl as a cn=config entry Product: OpenLDAP Version: unspecified Hardware: All OS: All Status: UNCONFIRMED Keywords: needs_review Severity: normal Priority: --- Component: slapd Assignee: bugs(a)openldap.org Reporter: ondra(a)mistotebe.net Target Milestone: --- Maybe it being exposed through both places (olcSyncrepl and the entry) could be a way to manage the transition (unless we have a way to handle cn=config schema upgrades internally). Uncertain as to how that affects cn=config replication. -- You are receiving this mail because: You are on the CC list for the issue.

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[Issue 7392] ACL a_dn.a_self is skipped in case of "acl_mask: to all values ..."
by openldap-its＠openldap.org 27 Jan '26

27 Jan '26

1 0

[Issue 10426] New: liblber: ber_get_stringbvl integer overflow enables heap buffer overflow via {M} parsing (32-bit builds)
by openldap-its＠openldap.org 20 Jan '26

20 Jan '26

https://bugs.openldap.org/show_bug.cgi?id=10426 Issue ID: 10426 Summary: liblber: ber_get_stringbvl integer overflow enables heap buffer overflow via {M} parsing (32-bit builds) Product: OpenLDAP Version: 2.6.10 Hardware: All OS: All Status: UNCONFIRMED Keywords: needs_review Severity: normal Priority: --- Component: libraries Assignee: bugs(a)openldap.org Reporter: lukas(a)artiphishell.com Target Milestone: --- Created attachment 1105 --> https://bugs.openldap.org/attachment.cgi?id=1105&action=edit build.sh ## Issue description Vulnerable location: `libraries/liblber/decode.c` in `ber_get_stringbvl()` Root cause: in the first pass that counts elements, `tot_size += siz` is performed with `ber_len_t` and no overflow check. On 32-bit builds, a large BER sequence (e.g., SearchRequest attributes parsed via `{M}`) wraps `tot_size`. The allocation uses the wrapped value (`ber_memalloc_x(tot_size + siz, ...)`), producing an undersized buffer. The second pass then writes `i` elements into the vector (BvOff mode for `{M}`), advancing `tot_size` by `siz` and storing `struct berval` at `res.bo + tot_size`, which overruns the allocation. Call path observed in the ASAN trace: `slapd` -> `do_search` (`servers/slapd/search.c:145`, `ber_scanf("{M}}")`) -> `ber_scanf` (`libraries/liblber/decode.c:815`) -> `ber_get_stringbvl` (`libraries/liblber/decode.c:471`) -> heap buffer overflow. ## Reproduction Steps Build instructions: ```bash mkdir /tmp/openldap-ber-get-stringbvl-overflow cd /tmp/openldap-ber-get-stringbvl-overflow # create the following files in this directory chmod +x build.sh poc.sh git clone https://github.com/openldap/openldap ./build.sh ./openldap # Run the PoC ./poc.sh ``` -- You are receiving this mail because: You are on the CC list for the issue.

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[Issue 8988] Undefined Behavior in slapadd
by openldap-its＠openldap.org 12 Jan '26

12 Jan '26

https://bugs.openldap.org/show_bug.cgi?id=8988 --- Comment #29 from Quanah Gibson-Mount <quanah(a)openldap.org> --- • 8ba07ad7 by Howard Chu at 2025-12-16T17:33:38+00:00 ITS#8988 lmdb: make all keys and data 2-byte aligned -- You are receiving this mail because: You are on the CC list for the issue.

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[Issue 8178] back-sock: Timeout to avoid locking
by openldap-its＠openldap.org 07 Jan '26

07 Jan '26

https://bugs.openldap.org/show_bug.cgi?id=8178 --- Comment #2 from Ondřej Kuzník <ondra(a)mistotebe.net> --- back-sock currently uses stdio (fgets()) to read from the socket, the thing would need to be reworked to move away from STDIO towards non-blocking read() and select(). -- You are receiving this mail because: You are on the CC list for the issue.

1 0

[Issue 9884] New: Document "set" patterns in ACLs
by openldap-its＠openldap.org 06 Jan '26

06 Jan '26

https://bugs.openldap.org/show_bug.cgi?id=9884 Issue ID: 9884 Summary: Document "set" patterns in ACLs Product: OpenLDAP Version: unspecified Hardware: All OS: All Status: UNCONFIRMED Keywords: needs_review Severity: normal Priority: --- Component: documentation Assignee: bugs(a)openldap.org Reporter: quanah(a)openldap.org Target Milestone: --- The slapd.access(5) man page has this exceptionally unhelpful line where sets are concerned: "The statement set=<pattern> is undocumented yet." Even if it is an experimental feature, it should still be documented on how it is meant to operate. -- You are receiving this mail because: You are on the CC list for the issue.

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