richard.larrieu-manan(a)cgi.com wrote:
> Ok.
>
> Here is the command line to do the research with the client ldapsearch :
> /opt/openldap/bin/ldapsearch -xLLL -h ldapp02 -p 389 -D cn=3Dadmin,ou=3Dsys=
> tem,dc=3Dent,dc=3Dfr -b ou=3Dsupp,ou=3Dpersonnes,ou=3DCRRA,dc=3Dent,dc=3Dfr=
> -w jungle dn | wc -l
>
> After 1 or 2 search the slapd server goes.
I believe this was fixed as ITS#8203 in 2.4.42. Please try that and followup
again, thanks.
>
> Thx.
>
> -----Message d'origine-----
> De=A0: Michael Str=F6der [mailto:michael@stroeder.com]=20
> Envoy=E9=A0: vendredi 10 juillet 2015 12:35
> =C0=A0: LARRIEU-MANAN, Richard; openldap-its(a)OpenLDAP.org
> Objet=A0: Re: (ITS#8194) Service slapd falldown in a search with client lda=
> psearch
>
> Maybe I missed something but I can't which search requests are causing this=
> .
>
> Could you please also add some information about your ldapsearch commands?
>
> Ciao, Michael.
>
>
>
>
--
-- Howard Chu
CTO, Symas Corp. http://www.symas.com
Director, Highland Sun http://highlandsun.com/hyc/
Chief Architect, OpenLDAP http://www.openldap.org/project/
h.b.furuseth(a)usit.uio.no wrote:
> On 07/07/15 21:44, h.b.furuseth(a)usit.uio.no wrote:
>> My feeling is that this is a quirk the user should not need to
>> know about, and it's cleaner to sy r rather than to document it.
>
> ...cleaner to sync rather than...
The doc should say that committing an empty txn is a no-op. If you want to do
a sync without writing data, use mdb_env_sync() yourself.
--
-- Howard Chu
CTO, Symas Corp. http://www.symas.com
Director, Highland Sun http://highlandsun.com/hyc/
Chief Architect, OpenLDAP http://www.openldap.org/project/
hkario(a)redhat.com wrote:
> Full_Name: Hubert Kario
> Version: all
> OS: Linux
> URL:
> Submission from: (NULL) (213.175.37.10)
>
>
> Section "14.2.1. Security Strength Factors"[1] states "A SSF greater than one
> (>1) roughly correlates to the effective encryption key length.". This is not
> the case more often than not.
>
> Problem is that ssf as it is calculated now doesn't take into consideration
> all the cryptographic primitives in use.
>
> In other words, a connection that uses a 512 bit RSA certificates and
> negotiates TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA (AES256-SHA) certainly does not
> provide security equivalent to "modern strong ciphers"[2][3] and should be
> awarded "256".
>
> Similarly a connection that uses 512 bit DH parameters and negotiates
> TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA (DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA) does not provide
> security that should be awarded "256"[5].
>
> In fact, recommending use of high key sizes[2] will cause the connection to
> use _less_ secure CBC ciphersuites[5] with clients that support AEAD
> ciphersuites with AES-128 only (like Thunderbird and Firefox do).
>
> Section 8.4.9[2] also calls RC4 a "modern strong cipher", most cryptographers
> disagree[6].
>
>
> So I think either:
> 1). ssf needs to be redefined to consider any value higher that "2" to be
> equal, and requiring the server administrators to enable only
> ciphersuites they consider secure, or
> 2). the whole code that calculates ssf needs to be updated to take into
> account many more things:
> * use of AEAD
> * use of Encrypt-then-MAC
> * the protocol version used (both because TLS1.0 specific attacks[7] as
> wewell as the use of SHA1+MD5 for signatures which limits the connection
> security to 80 bits[8] (optimistically) if client certificates are in
> use in TLS < 1.2)
> * encryption algorithm on session tickets
> * current state of attacks on a given ciphersuite
> * the size of ECDHE curve, FFDHE prime or server certificate key size,
> depending on ciphersuite negotiated
> * the signature algorithm used in Certificate Verify message
> * the key size of client certificate
> * the signature on the client certificate and key sizes in CA
> certificates
> * the HMAC used
> * key size of the symmetric cipher
> * (probably other things I didn't think about)
>
> 1 - http://www.openldap.org/doc/admin24/security.html
> 2 - http://w.w.openldap.org/doc/admin24/access-control.html section 8.4.9
> 3 - https://freakattack.com/
> 4 - https://weakdh.org/
> 5 - http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/tls/Lucky13.html
> 6 - https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7465
> 7 - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transport_Layer_Security#BEAST_attack
> 8 - https://www.iacr.org/cryptodb/archive/2004/CRYPTO/1472/1472.pdf
Patch welcome. Either a doc patch describing your option (1) or a code patch
for your (2). Note that SSF generally comes to us from SASL, so a code patch
most likely needs to be submitted to the Cyrus-SASL Project, not us.
Overall the definition of SSF has been in use in the industry for many years;
it's not something we created or control. Changing the description or
definition of it likely needs to also happen elsewhere.
--
-- Howard Chu
CTO, Symas Corp. http://www.symas.com
Director, Highland Sun http://highlandsun.com/hyc/
Chief Architect, OpenLDAP http://www.openldap.org/project/
ondra(a)mistotebe.net wrote:
> Full_Name: Ond&#345;ej Kuzn.k
> Version: master
> OS:
> URL: ftp://ftp.openldap.org/incoming/Ondrej-Kuznik-20150811-slapmodify-delete-su…
> Submission from: (NULL) (62.84.155.99)
>
>
> It is only possible to delete entries in a back-ldif database. This patchset
> implements the equivalent functionality in the other core databases, enables the
> same in back-config and adds a slapmodify manpage. With that in place,
> test007-slapmodify is switched to fail on errors now. ModRDN stays unimplemented
> at this point.
>
> An outstanding issue is that valgrind complains about a memory leak in bdb on
> entry delete, which I have not been able to pinpoint nor fix.
Thanks. Committed to master. We'll keep this ITS open until the leak is fixed.
>
> The above patch is derived from OpenLDAP Software. All of the
> modifications to OpenLDAP Software represented in the above patches were
> developed by Ondřej KuznÃk <ondra(a)mistotebe.net>. I have not assigned
> rights and/or interest in this work to any party.
>
> I, Ondřej KuznÃk, hereby place the above modifications to OpenLDAP
> Software (and only these modifications) into the public domain. Hence,
> these modifications may be freely used and/or redistributed for any
> purpose with or without attribution and/or other notice.
>
>
--
-- Howard Chu
CTO, Symas Corp. http://www.symas.com
Director, Highland Sun http://highlandsun.com/hyc/
Chief Architect, OpenLDAP http://www.openldap.org/project/
mhardin(a)symas.com wrote:
> Full_Name: Matthew Hardin
> Version: 2.4.40
> OS: Windows 7/64
> URL: ftp://ftp.openldap.org/incoming/
> Submission from: (NULL) (69.43.206.100)
>
>
> Many 'make test' test fail, for a variety of reasons, with LMDB and BDB/HDB
> backends.
>
> OpenLDAP 2.4.40
> Berkeley DB 4.8.30
>
>
> Environment:
> MSYS from MinGW/MSYS 2013072300
> Win-Builds MinGW 32- and 64-bit toolchain
>
> The following tests fail:
> test0-c-concurrency: problems reported by slapd-tester
> test039-glue-ldap-concurrency: seems to fail for the same reasons as test008
libtool incompatibility; it leaves shell scripts for the actual tester
programs in the progs directory, with the real executables under progs/.libs.
Windows' spawn can't execute shell scripts. Solution is to manually copy the
real executables from .libs before running the test.
Simple workaround. Won't fix this.
> test043-delta-syncrepl: lmdb always fails, hdb/bdb sometimes
Attribute ordering, the replicated data is correct. Won't fix this.
> test049-sync-config: config parsing problems
> test050-syncrepl-multimaster: config parsing problems
Fixed as ITS#8273
> test056-monitor: incorrect monitor output
Fixed as ITS#8280
> test058-syncrepl-asymmetric: parsing problems
> test059-slave-config: parsing problems
> test061-syncreplication-initiation: parsing prlelems
> test063-delta-multimaster: undetermined
> test064-constraint: include file processing (parsing?)
All ITS#8273.
Closing this ITS.
--
-- Howard Chu
CTO, Symas Corp. http://www.symas.com
Director, Highland Sun http://highlandsun.com/hyc/
Chief Architect, OpenLDAP http://www.openldap.org/project/
Ingo Voss wrote:
>
>
> Am 17.10.2015 um 20:58 schrieb Howard Chu:
>> ingo.voss(a)gmail.com wrote:
>>> Full_Name: Ingo Voss
>>> Version:
>>> OS:
>>> URL: ftp://ftp.openldap.org/incoming/contrib-slapd-modules-unicodepw.tar
>>> Submission from: (NULL) (78.53.86.212)
>>>
>>>
>>> Hello,
>>>
>>> I wrote a small overlay, that restricts all LDAP modification requests, so
>>> that
>>> only password changes for MS unicodePwd are possible.
>>> All other LDAP requests will not be observed.
>>> If someone needs a read-only proxy (in a e.g. dmz) for an MS Active Directory,
>>> but password changes must be possible, then unicodepw is the right overlay.
>>> For more informations, a manual page is included.
>>
>> If you want a read-only proxy, shouldn't this overlay also intercept and
>> deny all Add/Delete/ModDN requests?
>>
>
> Yes, you are right! But such overlay (denyop) exist already and it is working
> well.
> The manual page for unicodepw refers to denyop and describes the complete
> configuration in detail.
OK.
This code is full of C++ comments. OpenLDAP uses C comments only.
This code is full of SPACEs for indentation. OpenLDAP uses TAB characters for
indentation, with 4-column tab stops.
Your debug messages are using STATS debug level. STATS is reserved for LDAP
operation/parameter logging only and is the default level. Code should be
silent at the default level unless major errors have occurred.
This code cannot be accepted in its current form.
--
-- Howard Chu
CTO, Symas Corp. http://www.symas.com
Director, Highland Sun http://highlandsun.com/hyc/
Chief Architect, OpenLDAP http://www.openldap.org/project/
Michael Ströder wrote:
> hyc(a)symas.com wrote:
>> Michael Ströder wrote:
>>> hyc(a)symas.com wrote:
>>>> Michael Ströder wrote:
>>>>> hyc(a)symas.com wrote:
>>>>>> Generating a new contextCSN at startup is of questionable worth. We discussed
>>>>>> this a bit 'way back in 2004
>>>>>> http://www.openldap.org/lists/openldap-devel/200408/msg00035.html Perhaps we
>>>>>> should just not do it;
>>>>>
>>>>> +1
>>>>>
>>>>>> if a single-master provider starts up empty and a
>>>>>> consumer tries to talk to it and both have an empty cookie, the provider
>>>>>> should just respond "you're up to date".
>>>>>
>>>>> Why not return an error to the consumer?
>>>>
>>>> Typically if a consumer receives an error it will disconnect and retry later.
>>>> There's not much point making the consumer reconnect - which may be costly for
>>>> a TCP session. If it's a refreshAndPersist consumer, it just needs to hang on
>>>> and wait for some real data to arrive.
>>>
>>> Is the cost really that high compared to the rest of the initialization?
>>
>> I meant "TLS" there.
>
> As I'm solely using TLS secured LDAP connection *everywhere* I also implied
> TLS. Still I assume opening the syncrepl connection a few times again is
> nothing compared to the majority LDAP clients opening connections for every
> single LDAP simple bind request. So if it simplifies error handling which
> likely results in more robustness, I'd strongly prefer that.
As it turns out, it greatly simplified things to handle this condition as you
suggest. Fixed now in git master.
--
-- Howard Chu
CTO, Symas Corp. http://www.symas.com
Director, Highland Sun http://highlandsun.com/hyc/
Chief Architect, OpenLDAP http://www.openldap.org/project/