openldap-bugs February 2026

openldap-bugs@openldap.org

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119 discussions

[Issue 10442] New: BAD_COPY_PASTE In function 'dds_db_open': Value 'di_max_ttl' might be 'di_min_ttl'
by openldap-its＠openldap.org 09 Mar '26

09 Mar '26

https://bugs.openldap.org/show_bug.cgi?id=10442 Issue ID: 10442 Summary: BAD_COPY_PASTE In function 'dds_db_open': Value 'di_max_ttl' might be 'di_min_ttl' Product: OpenLDAP Version: 2.6.8 Hardware: All OS: All Status: UNCONFIRMED Keywords: needs_review Severity: normal Priority: --- Component: build Assignee: bugs(a)openldap.org Reporter: tarasov.mv(a)ksb-soft.ru Target Milestone: --- Based on the description in the link, the logic is as follows: https://www.opennet.ru/cgi-bin/opennet/man.cgi?topic=slapo-dds&category=5 Both values can be specified in the slapd.conf configuration file, from where they will be read, but if neither is specified, then: dds-max-ttl will default to 86400 seconds = 1 day (i.e., DDS_RF2589_DEFAULT_TTL). dds-min-ttl will default to 0, indicating that the lower TTL limit is not set. What we see in the implementation code: If di->di_max_ttl == 0 (does this mean "di->di_max_ttl is not defined"?), then di->di_max_ttl will receive DDS_RF2589_DEFAULT_TTL. That is, the implementation actually sets what should be the default if the value is undefined. If di->di_min_ttl == 0 (does this mean "di->di_min_ttl is undefined"?), then di->di_max_ttl receives DDS_RF2589_DEFAULT_TTL. That is, if the value is undefined (is 0 at the time of checking), the implementation sets di->di_max_ttl to the default value. I believe there will be incorrect behavior in the following scenario: if, before these conditions are met, di->di_max_ttl == 100000, and di->di_min_ttl == 0, then di->di_max_ttl will be overwritten with the default 86400 for no apparent reason. Besides this: The current dds_db_open is executed after dds_db_init, where di->di_min_ttl is missing from the definition, but instead is written twice: di->di_max_ttl = DDS_RF2589_DEFAULT_TTL; di->di_max_ttl = DDS_RF2589_DEFAULT_TTL; This, in my opinion, is also a sign of bad_copy_paste. I think the status is Confirmed+Major. -- You are receiving this mail because: You are on the CC list for the issue.

1 5

[Issue 10258] New: test050 failure: connection_close race?
by openldap-its＠openldap.org 09 Mar '26

09 Mar '26

https://bugs.openldap.org/show_bug.cgi?id=10258 Issue ID: 10258 Summary: test050 failure: connection_close race? Product: OpenLDAP Version: unspecified Hardware: All OS: All Status: UNCONFIRMED Keywords: needs_review Severity: normal Priority: --- Component: slapd Assignee: bugs(a)openldap.org Reporter: ondra(a)mistotebe.net Target Milestone: --- Created attachment 1032 --> https://bugs.openldap.org/attachment.cgi?id=1032&action=edit tail of slapd log Running test050 repeatedly, the slapd managed to get itself into an apparent inconsistency in the connections structure. The logs suggest that there might be a race closing the connection. Unfortunately the sanitiser didn't initiate a core dump in this case. -- You are receiving this mail because: You are on the CC list for the issue.

1 10

[Issue 10449] New: memory leak in parseReadAttrs
by openldap-its＠openldap.org 09 Mar '26

09 Mar '26

https://bugs.openldap.org/show_bug.cgi?id=10449 Issue ID: 10449 Summary: memory leak in parseReadAttrs Product: OpenLDAP Version: 2.6.12 Hardware: x86_64 OS: Linux Status: UNCONFIRMED Keywords: needs_review Severity: normal Priority: --- Component: slapd Assignee: bugs(a)openldap.org Reporter: kangyang126(a)gmail.com Target Milestone: --- # ASAN Leak Report: Pre-read / Post-read Control Attributes ## Component * **File:** `servers/slapd/controls.c` * **Function:** `parseReadAttrs` ## Issue Description **LeakSanitizer Error:** Memory leak detected in `AttributeName` array. ```plaintext ==202371==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks Direct leak of 80 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x555555963614 in malloc /src/llvm-project/compiler-rt/lib/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:67:3 #1 0x555555f578d4 in ber_memalloc_x /src/openldap/libraries/liblber/memory.c:228:9 #2 0x555555f4c5e2 in ber_get_stringbvl /src/openldap/libraries/liblber/decode.c:421:14 #3 0x555555f4ac2f in ber_scanf /src/openldap/libraries/liblber/decode.c:815:9 #4 0x555555b150e4 in parseReadAttrs /src/openldap/servers/slapd/controls.c:1514:7 #5 0x555555b0d13c in slap_parse_ctrl /src/openldap/servers/slapd/controls.c:738:10 #6 0x555555b0e101 in get_ctrls2 /src/openldap/servers/slapd/controls.c:929:16 #7 0x555555a35c0e in do_modrdn /src/openldap/servers/slapd/modrdn.c:129:6 #8 0x5555559e055d in connection_operation /src/openldap/servers/slapd/connection.c:1137:7 #9 0x5555559df327 in connection_read_thread /src/openldap/servers/slapd/connection.c:1289:14 #10 0x5555559a769a in LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput /src/fuzz_slapd.c:88:5 ``` The function `parseReadAttrs` uses `ber_scanf` with the `M` format specifier to allocate an array of `AttributeName` structures. 1. **Memory Leak:** This array was not freed if the function encountered an error (e.g., critical control verification failure) after the allocation. 2. **Invalid Free:** Attempting to free `bv_val` strings inside the array caused an "attempting free on address which was not malloc()-ed" error, because these pointers refer to the internal `BerElement` buffer. 3. **Segmentation Fault:** Accessing the array to write a terminator without checking for `NULL` caused a crash on empty attribute lists. ## Fix * **Leak Fix:** Added comprehensive cleanup logic at the `done` label to free the `AttributeName` array if an error occurs. * **Logic Fix:** Refactored the loop to filter attributes without attempting to free the internal string pointers, avoiding the `Invalid Free` error. ## Diff ```diff diff --git a/servers/slapd/controls.c b/servers/slapd/controls.c index 3d18345..3c90884 100644 --- a/servers/slapd/controls.c +++ b/servers/slapd/controls.c @@ -1476,7 +1476,7 @@ parseReadAttrs( LDAPControl *ctrl, int post ) { - ber_len_t siz, off, i; + ber_len_t siz, off, i, good_i = 0; BerElement *ber; AttributeName *an = NULL; @@ -1520,14 +1520,16 @@ parseReadAttrs( for ( i = 0; i < siz; i++ ) { const char *dummy = NULL; int rc; + struct berval name = an[i].an_name; an[i].an_desc = NULL; an[i].an_oc = NULL; an[i].an_flags = 0; - rc = slap_bv2ad( &an[i].an_name, &an[i].an_desc, &dummy ); + rc = slap_bv2ad( &name, &an[i].an_desc, &dummy ); if ( rc == LDAP_SUCCESS ) { - an[i].an_name = an[i].an_desc->ad_cname; - + an[good_i] = an[i]; + an[good_i].an_name = an[good_i].an_desc->ad_cname; + good_i++; } else { int j; static struct berval special_attrs[] = { @@ -1537,23 +1539,29 @@ parseReadAttrs( BER_BVNULL }; - /* deal with special attribute types */ for ( j = 0; !BER_BVISNULL( &special_attrs[ j ] ); j++ ) { - if ( bvmatch( &an[i].an_name, &special_attrs[ j ] ) ) { - an[i].an_name = special_attrs[ j ]; + if ( bvmatch( &name, &special_attrs[ j ] ) ) { + an[good_i] = an[i]; + an[good_i].an_name = special_attrs[ j ]; + good_i++; break; } } - if ( BER_BVISNULL( &special_attrs[ j ] ) && ctrl->ldctl_iscritical ) { - rs->sr_err = rc; - rs->sr_text = dummy ? dummy - : READMSG( post, "unknown attributeType" ); - goto done; + if ( BER_BVISNULL( &special_attrs[ j ] ) ) { + if ( ctrl->ldctl_iscritical ) { + rs->sr_err = rc; + rs->sr_text = dummy ? dummy + : READMSG( post, "unknown attributeType" ); + goto done; + } } } } + if ( an ) + BER_BVZERO( &an[good_i].an_name ); + if ( post ) { op->o_postread_attrs = an; op->o_postread = ctrl->ldctl_iscritical @@ -1568,6 +1576,9 @@ parseReadAttrs( done: (void) ber_free( ber, 1 ); + if ( rs->sr_err != LDAP_SUCCESS && an ) { + ber_memfree( an ); + } return rs->sr_err; } ``` ## Harness ``` #define _GNU_SOURCE /* For memfd_create */ #include "portable.h" #include <stdio.h> #include <string.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <fcntl.h> #include <sys/mman.h> #include <sys/types.h> #include <signal.h> #include "slap.h" /* 1. Fix function declarations to match return types in OpenLDAP source code */ extern void slap_sl_mem_init( void ); extern int slapd_daemon_init( const char *urls ); extern int extops_init( void ); /* Returns int */ extern void lutil_passwd_init( void ); extern int slap_init( int mode, const char *name ); extern int read_config( const char *fname, const char *dname ); extern int connections_init( void ); /* Returns int */ extern int slap_startup( Backend *be ); void slapd_daemon_nothread( void ) {} extern int ldap_pvt_thread_initialize( void ); /* Returns int */ extern void* ldap_pvt_thread_pool_context( void ); extern void* connection_read_thread( void *ctx, void *arg ); extern void connection_closing( Connection *c, const char *why ); extern int connection_resched( Connection *c ); extern Connection* connection_init( int sfd, Listener *l, const char *authid, const char *dns, int flags, slap_ssf_t ssf, struct berval *authid_out ); extern ldap_pvt_thread_pool_t connection_pool; static Listener *global_listener = NULL; static struct berval authid_bv = {0, ""}; int LLVMFuzzerInitialize(int *argc, char ***argv) { signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN); slap_debug = 0; slap_sl_mem_init(); if ( 0 != slapd_daemon_init("ldapi://%2Ftmp%2Ffuzz.sock") ) return 1; extops_init(); lutil_passwd_init(); if ( slap_init(SLAP_SERVER_MODE, "slapd-fuzz") ) return 2; read_config( NULL, NULL ); connections_init(); slap_startup(NULL); slapd_daemon_nothread(); ldap_pvt_thread_initialize(); global_listener = slapd_get_listeners()[0]; if (!global_listener) return 3; return 0; } #include <sys/socket.h> int LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput(const uint8_t *Data, size_t Size) { if (Size < 2 || Size > 65536) return 0; /* 2. Use socketpair to simulate socket read/write */ int sv[2]; if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, sv) < 0) return 0; if (write(sv[0], Data, Size) != (ssize_t)Size) { close(sv[0]); close(sv[1]); return 0; } /* Close write end so server receives EOF after reading data */ close(sv[0]); /* 3. Create connection (server uses sv[1]) */ Connection *c = connection_init(sv[1], global_listener, "fuzz", "IP=127.0.0.1", 0, 0, &authid_bv); if (!c) { close(sv[1]); return 0; } void* ctx = ldap_pvt_thread_pool_context(); /* Execute parsing logic */ connection_read_thread(ctx, (void*)(long)sv[1]); /* Wait for thread pool to complete all tasks to prevent background threads from accessing freed connection */ int active = 0, pending = 0; do { ldap_pvt_thread_pool_query(&connection_pool, LDAP_PVT_THREAD_POOL_PARAM_PENDING, &pending); ldap_pvt_thread_pool_query(&connection_pool, LDAP_PVT_THREAD_POOL_PARAM_ACTIVE, &active); if (active == 0 && pending == 0) break; ldap_pvt_thread_yield(); } while (1); /* 4. Thoroughly clean up manually, avoiding unstable macros * Directly manipulate queue pointers to ensure no 'error: use of undeclared identifier o_next' */ Operation *op; while ((op = LDAP_STAILQ_FIRST(&c->c_ops)) != NULL) { LDAP_STAILQ_REMOVE_HEAD(&c->c_ops, o_next); LDAP_STAILQ_NEXT(op, o_next) = NULL; slap_op_free(op, ctx); } LDAP_STAILQ_INIT(&c->c_ops); /* Close and reclaim Connection memory */ connection_closing(c, "fuzz complete"); connection_resched(c); /* ldap_pvt_thread_pool_resume(&connection_pool); */ return 0; } ``` -- You are receiving this mail because: You are on the CC list for the issue.

1 6

[Issue 10446] New: memory leak in authzPrettyNormal
by openldap-its＠openldap.org 09 Mar '26

09 Mar '26

https://bugs.openldap.org/show_bug.cgi?id=10446 Issue ID: 10446 Summary: memory leak in authzPrettyNormal Product: OpenLDAP Version: 2.6.12 Hardware: x86_64 OS: Linux Status: UNCONFIRMED Keywords: needs_review Severity: normal Priority: --- Component: slapd Assignee: bugs(a)openldap.org Reporter: kangyang126(a)gmail.com Target Milestone: --- # Memory Leak Fix Report: saslauthz.c ## Executive Summary A memory leak of 14 bytes per search operation was identified and fixed in the `authzPrettyNormal()` function. The leak occurred during LDAP search filter parsing when processing authorization values (authzDN/authzTo/authzFrom attributes). ## Issue Description ### Symptoms - LeakSanitizer detected a 14-byte memory leak per affected operation - Leak occurred during search operations with authorization filters - Memory allocated by `ldap_url_desc2str()` was never freed ### Detection ``` ==50210==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks Direct leak of 14 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x55d5617e1614 in malloc /src/llvm-project/compiler-rt/lib/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:67:3 #1 0x55d561dd5f04 in ber_memalloc_x /src/openldap/libraries/liblber/memory.c:228:9 #2 0x55d561d6f2ba in ldap_url_desc2str /src/openldap/libraries/libldap/url.c:803:6 #3 0x55d5619df587 in authzPrettyNormal /src/openldap/servers/slapd/saslauthz.c:843:23 #4 0x55d5619ddf5e in authzNormalize /src/openldap/servers/slapd/saslauthz.c:885:7 #5 0x55d561902b22 in asserted_value_validate_normalize /src/openldap/servers/slapd/value.c:170:8 #6 0x55d5618f8ac4 in get_ava /src/openldap/servers/slapd/ava.c:121:7 #7 0x55d5618688d0 in get_filter0 /src/openldap/servers/slapd/filter.c:151:9 #8 0x55d561872cc7 in get_filter_list /src/openldap/servers/slapd/filter.c:350:9 #9 0x55d561868595 in get_filter0 /src/openldap/servers/slapd/filter.c:231:9 #10 0x55d561872cc7 in get_filter_list /src/openldap/servers/slapd/filter.c:350:9 #11 0x55d561868595 in get_filter0 /src/openldap/servers/slapd/filter.c:231:9 #12 0x55d561872cc7 in get_filter_list /src/openldap/servers/slapd/filter.c:350:9 #13 0x55d561868595 in get_filter0 /src/openldap/servers/slapd/filter.c:231:9 #14 0x55d5618ad657 in do_search /src/openldap/servers/slapd/search.c:126:15 ``` ## Root Cause Analysis ### Memory Allocation Mismatch The issue stems from a mismatch between memory allocation strategies: 1. **Function Call Chain:** ``` get_ava() → asserted_value_validate_normalize() [with ctx=op->o_tmpmemctx] → authzNormalize() → authzPrettyNormal() → ldap_url_desc2str() ``` 2. **The Problem:** - `ldap_url_desc2str()` allocates memory using `LDAP_MALLOC()` (global heap) - The calling code expects memory allocated via `slap_sl_malloc(ctx)` (context-aware) - Context-aware memory is automatically freed when the operation completes - Global heap memory requires explicit `ber_memfree()` call - No explicit free was performed, causing the leak ### Code Location **File:** `servers/slapd/saslauthz.c` **Function:** `authzPrettyNormal()` **Lines:** 842-849 (original code) ```c // BEFORE (leaked memory): ludp->lud_port = 0; normalized->bv_val = ldap_url_desc2str( ludp ); // ← Allocates with LDAP_MALLOC if ( normalized->bv_val ) { normalized->bv_len = strlen( normalized->bv_val ); } else { rc = LDAP_INVALID_SYNTAX; } ``` ## Fix Implementation ### Solution Strategy Copy the result from `ldap_url_desc2str()` into context-allocated memory, then free the original allocation. ### Modified Code ```diff diff --git a/servers/slapd/saslauthz.c b/servers/slapd/saslauthz.c index 86ef944..1833921 100644 --- a/servers/slapd/saslauthz.c +++ b/servers/slapd/saslauthz.c @@ -840,12 +840,16 @@ is_dn: bv.bv_len = val->bv_len - ( bv.bv_val - val->bv_val ); } ludp->lud_port = 0; - normalized->bv_val = ldap_url_desc2str( ludp ); - if ( normalized->bv_val ) { - normalized->bv_len = strlen( normalized->bv_val ); - - } else { - rc = LDAP_INVALID_SYNTAX; + { + char *tmpstr = ldap_url_desc2str( ludp ); + if ( tmpstr ) { + normalized->bv_len = strlen( tmpstr ); + normalized->bv_val = slap_sl_malloc( normalized->bv_len + 1, ctx ); + strcpy( normalized->bv_val, tmpstr ); + ber_memfree( tmpstr ); + } else { + rc = LDAP_INVALID_SYNTAX; + } } done: ``` ### Fix Details 1. Store `ldap_url_desc2str()` result in temporary variable `tmpstr` 2. Allocate new memory using `slap_sl_malloc(ctx)` (context-aware allocator) 3. Copy the string content to the new memory 4. Free the original allocation using `ber_memfree()` 5. Result: `normalized->bv_val` now contains context-managed memory ## Impact Assessment ### Affected Operations - LDAP search operations with authorization filters - Filters containing authzDN, authzTo, or authzFrom attributes - Any operation using authz URL normalization ## Harness ``` #define _GNU_SOURCE /* For memfd_create */ #include "portable.h" #include <stdio.h> #include <string.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <fcntl.h> #include <sys/mman.h> #include <sys/types.h> #include <signal.h> #include "slap.h" /* 1. Fix function declarations to match return types in OpenLDAP source code */ extern void slap_sl_mem_init( void ); extern int slapd_daemon_init( const char *urls ); extern int extops_init( void ); /* Returns int */ extern void lutil_passwd_init( void ); extern int slap_init( int mode, const char *name ); extern int read_config( const char *fname, const char *dname ); extern int connections_init( void ); /* Returns int */ extern int slap_startup( Backend *be ); void slapd_daemon_nothread( void ) {} extern int ldap_pvt_thread_initialize( void ); /* Returns int */ extern void* ldap_pvt_thread_pool_context( void ); extern void* connection_read_thread( void *ctx, void *arg ); extern void connection_closing( Connection *c, const char *why ); extern int connection_resched( Connection *c ); extern Connection* connection_init( int sfd, Listener *l, const char *authid, const char *dns, int flags, slap_ssf_t ssf, struct berval *authid_out ); extern ldap_pvt_thread_pool_t connection_pool; static Listener *global_listener = NULL; static struct berval authid_bv = {0, ""}; int LLVMFuzzerInitialize(int *argc, char ***argv) { signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN); slap_debug = 0; slap_sl_mem_init(); if ( 0 != slapd_daemon_init("ldapi://%2Ftmp%2Ffuzz.sock") ) return 1; extops_init(); lutil_passwd_init(); if ( slap_init(SLAP_SERVER_MODE, "slapd-fuzz") ) return 2; read_config( NULL, NULL ); connections_init(); slap_startup(NULL); slapd_daemon_nothread(); ldap_pvt_thread_initialize(); global_listener = slapd_get_listeners()[0]; if (!global_listener) return 3; return 0; } #include <sys/socket.h> int LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput(const uint8_t *Data, size_t Size) { if (Size < 2 || Size > 65536) return 0; /* 2. Use socketpair to simulate socket read/write */ int sv[2]; if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, sv) < 0) return 0; if (write(sv[0], Data, Size) != (ssize_t)Size) { close(sv[0]); close(sv[1]); return 0; } /* Close write end so server receives EOF after reading data */ close(sv[0]); /* 3. Create connection (server uses sv[1]) */ Connection *c = connection_init(sv[1], global_listener, "fuzz", "IP=127.0.0.1", 0, 0, &authid_bv); if (!c) { close(sv[1]); return 0; } void* ctx = ldap_pvt_thread_pool_context(); /* Execute parsing logic */ connection_read_thread(ctx, (void*)(long)sv[1]); /* Wait for thread pool to complete all tasks to prevent background threads from accessing freed connection */ int active = 0, pending = 0; do { ldap_pvt_thread_pool_query(&connection_pool, LDAP_PVT_THREAD_POOL_PARAM_PENDING, &pending); ldap_pvt_thread_pool_query(&connection_pool, LDAP_PVT_THREAD_POOL_PARAM_ACTIVE, &active); if (active == 0 && pending == 0) break; ldap_pvt_thread_yield(); } while (1); /* 4. Thoroughly clean up manually, avoiding unstable macros * Directly manipulate queue pointers to ensure no 'error: use of undeclared identifier o_next' */ Operation *op; while ((op = LDAP_STAILQ_FIRST(&c->c_ops)) != NULL) { LDAP_STAILQ_REMOVE_HEAD(&c->c_ops, o_next); LDAP_STAILQ_NEXT(op, o_next) = NULL; slap_op_free(op, ctx); } LDAP_STAILQ_INIT(&c->c_ops); /* Close and reclaim Connection memory */ connection_closing(c, "fuzz complete"); connection_resched(c); /* ldap_pvt_thread_pool_resume(&connection_pool); */ return 0; } ``` -- You are receiving this mail because: You are on the CC list for the issue.

1 5

[Issue 10430] New: Heap Buffer Overflow in parse_whsp causes Out-of-Bounds Read
by openldap-its＠openldap.org 09 Mar '26

09 Mar '26

https://bugs.openldap.org/show_bug.cgi?id=10430 Issue ID: 10430 Summary: Heap Buffer Overflow in parse_whsp causes Out-of-Bounds Read Product: OpenLDAP Version: unspecified Hardware: x86_64 OS: Linux Status: UNCONFIRMED Keywords: needs_review Severity: normal Priority: --- Component: libraries Assignee: bugs(a)openldap.org Reporter: zesheng(a)tamu.edu Target Milestone: --- ## Summary A heap buffer overflow vulnerability in OpenLDAP's `parse_whsp()` function allows an attacker to trigger out-of-bounds memory reads when parsing malformed LDAP schema definitions, potentially leading to information disclosure or crashes. ## Root Cause The vulnerability exists in `libraries/libldap/schema.c` at line 1090. The `parse_whsp()` function iterates through a string checking for whitespace characters using `LDAP_SPACE()` macro, but does not verify that the pointer stays within the allocated buffer bounds. When parsing malformed schema strings that end unexpectedly, the function reads beyond the heap buffer. ### Vulnerable Code (schema.c:1086-1092) ```c /* Gobble optional whitespace */ static void parse_whsp(const char **sp) { while (LDAP_SPACE(**sp)) // BUG: no bounds check, can read past buffer (*sp)++; } ``` ### LDAP_SPACE Macro (ldap_pvt.h:255) ```c #define LDAP_SPACE(c) ((c) == ' ' || (c) == '\t' || (c) == '\n') ``` The macro checks for space/tab/newline but does NOT check for null terminator. If the heap memory immediately after the allocated buffer happens to contain whitespace bytes (0x20, 0x09, 0x0a), the function continues reading out of bounds. ## PoC ### Trigger file A crafted schema string (`poc`, 49 bytes) that triggers the overflow: ``` (13.5 NAME 'caseExactMatch' SYNTAX 'nooideithe1r. ``` ``` hexdump -C poc: 00000000 28 31 33 2e 35 20 4e 41 4d 45 20 27 63 61 73 65 |(13.5 NAME 'case| 00000010 45 78 61 63 74 4d 61 74 63 68 27 20 53 59 4e 54 |ExactMatch' SYNT| 00000020 41 58 20 27 6e 6f 6f 69 64 65 69 74 68 65 31 72 |AX 'nooideithe1r| 00000030 2e |.| ``` ### How to generate poc ```python # generate_poc.py data = b"(13.5 NAME 'caseExactMatch' SYNTAX 'nooideithe1r." with open("poc", "wb") as f: f.write(data) ``` --- ## Trigger Method 1: Direct API Call ```c // test_schema.c #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <string.h> #include <ldap.h> #include <ldap_schema.h> int main(int argc, char **argv) { FILE *f = fopen("poc", "rb"); fseek(f, 0, SEEK_END); long size = ftell(f); fseek(f, 0, SEEK_SET); char *input = malloc(size + 1); fread(input, 1, size, f); input[size] = '\0'; fclose(f); int code = 0; const char *errp = NULL; // This triggers the vulnerability LDAPAttributeType *at = ldap_str2attributetype(input, &code, &errp, LDAP_SCHEMA_ALLOW_ALL); if (at) { ldap_attributetype_free(at); } free(input); return 0; } ``` **Build and run:** ```bash # Build OpenLDAP with AddressSanitizer cd openldap ./configure CC=clang CFLAGS="-fsanitize=address -g" --without-tls make # Compile and run test clang -fsanitize=address -g -I include \ -L libraries/libldap/.libs -L libraries/liblber/.libs \ test_schema.c -o test_schema -lldap -llber \ -Wl,-rpath,libraries/libldap/.libs:libraries/liblber/.libs ./test_schema ``` **Output:** ``` ==PID==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x506000000052 at pc 0x... bp 0x... sp 0x... READ of size 1 at 0x506000000052 thread T0 #0 0x... in parse_whsp libraries/libldap/schema.c:1090:9 #1 0x... in ldap_str2attributetype libraries/libldap/schema.c:2313:5 0x506000000052 is located 0 bytes after 50-byte region [0x506000000020,0x506000000052) allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0x... in malloc #1 0x... in main test_schema.c:... SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow schema.c:1090:9 in parse_whsp ``` --- ## Trigger Method 2: Fuzzer ```c // fuzz_schema.c #include <stdint.h> #include <stddef.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <string.h> #include <ldap.h> #include <ldap_schema.h> static const unsigned int flags[] = { LDAP_SCHEMA_ALLOW_NONE, LDAP_SCHEMA_ALLOW_NO_OID, LDAP_SCHEMA_ALLOW_QUOTED, LDAP_SCHEMA_ALLOW_DESCR, LDAP_SCHEMA_ALLOW_ALL, }; #define NUM_FLAGS (sizeof(flags) / sizeof(flags[0])) int LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput(const uint8_t *data, size_t size) { if (size == 0 || size > 16384) return 0; char *input = (char *)malloc(size + 1); if (!input) return 0; memcpy(input, data, size); input[size] = '\0'; int code = 0; const char *errp = NULL; // Test ldap_str2attributetype with different flags for (size_t i = 0; i < NUM_FLAGS; i++) { code = 0; errp = NULL; LDAPAttributeType *at = ldap_str2attributetype(input, &code, &errp, flags[i]); if (at) { ldap_attributetype_free(at); } } // Test ldap_str2objectclass for (size_t i = 0; i < NUM_FLAGS; i++) { code = 0; errp = NULL; LDAPObjectClass *oc = ldap_str2objectclass(input, &code, &errp, flags[i]); if (oc) { ldap_objectclass_free(oc); } } free(input); return 0; } ``` **Build and run:** ```bash clang -fsanitize=fuzzer,address -g -I include \ -L libraries/libldap/.libs -L libraries/liblber/.libs \ fuzz_schema.c -o fuzz_schema -lldap -llber \ -Wl,-rpath,libraries/libldap/.libs:libraries/liblber/.libs mkdir corpus && cp poc corpus/ ./fuzz_schema corpus/ ``` --- ## Impact | Aspect | Details | |--------|---------| | **Type** | Out-of-Bounds Read / Information Disclosure | | **Severity** | High | | **Attack Vector** | Malicious schema definition string | | **Affected Components** | `parse_whsp()`, `ldap_str2attributetype()`, `ldap_str2objectclass()`, libldap | | **Affected Applications** | Any application using libldap to parse LDAP schema definitions | | **CWE** | CWE-125 (Out-of-bounds Read) | --- ## Suggested Fix Add bounds checking in `parse_whsp()` to ensure it doesn't read past the null terminator: ```c static void parse_whsp(const char **sp) { while (**sp && LDAP_SPACE(**sp)) // Add null check (*sp)++; } ``` Note: `LDAP_SPACE('\0')` is false (0x00 is not space/tab/newline), so the issue only occurs when adjacent heap memory contains whitespace bytes. However, adding an explicit null check makes the code more robust and clearly documents the termination condition. -- You are receiving this mail because: You are on the CC list for the issue.

1 15

[Issue 10413] New: Consumer prepares cookie too early
by openldap-its＠openldap.org 09 Mar '26

09 Mar '26

https://bugs.openldap.org/show_bug.cgi?id=10413 Issue ID: 10413 Summary: Consumer prepares cookie too early Product: OpenLDAP Version: unspecified Hardware: All OS: All Status: UNCONFIRMED Keywords: needs_review Severity: normal Priority: --- Component: slapd Assignee: bugs(a)openldap.org Reporter: ondra(a)mistotebe.net Target Milestone: --- A consumer prepares its cookie at the moment its task is started (in do_syncrep1), then calls ldap_sync_search, but this is where we can figure out if there's another refresh running already and suspend the task. When that other refresh finishes and tells another one to resume, we just call ldap_sync_search so keep the old cookie rather than update it to match what we now know. This doesn't affect correctness but forces the other provider(s) to reiterate something the consumer already knows, this can be very expensive for both. -- You are receiving this mail because: You are on the CC list for the issue.

1 6

[Issue 10448] New: Memory leak in syncprov_parseCtrl
by openldap-its＠openldap.org 09 Mar '26

09 Mar '26

https://bugs.openldap.org/show_bug.cgi?id=10448 Issue ID: 10448 Summary: Memory leak in syncprov_parseCtrl Product: OpenLDAP Version: 2.6.12 Hardware: x86_64 OS: Linux Status: UNCONFIRMED Keywords: needs_review Severity: normal Priority: --- Component: overlays Assignee: bugs(a)openldap.org Reporter: kangyang126(a)gmail.com Target Milestone: --- # ASAN Leak Report: Sync Provider Control ## Component * **File:** `servers/slapd/overlays/syncprov.c` * **Function:** `syncprov_parseCtrl` ## Issue Description **LeakSanitizer Error:** Memory leak of `sync_control` structure. ```plaintext ==266290==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks Direct leak of 80 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x555555964614 in malloc /src/llvm-project/compiler-rt/lib/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:67:3 #1 0x555555f58a04 in ber_memalloc_x /src/openldap/libraries/liblber/memory.c:228:9 #2 0x555555a7cb06 in ch_malloc /src/openldap/servers/slapd/ch_malloc.c:54:23 #3 0x555555b3ba6c in slap_sl_calloc /src/openldap/servers/slapd/sl_malloc.c:401:12 #4 0x555555ca1734 in syncprov_parseCtrl /src/openldap/servers/slapd/overlays/syncprov.c:4333:7 #5 0x555555b0e13c in slap_parse_ctrl /src/openldap/servers/slapd/controls.c:738:10 #6 0x555555b0f101 in get_ctrls2 /src/openldap/servers/slapd/controls.c:929:16 #7 0x555555a30eae in do_search /src/openldap/servers/slapd/search.c:194:6 #8 0x5555559e155d in connection_operation /src/openldap/servers/slapd/connection.c:1137:7 #9 0x5555559e0327 in connection_read_thread /src/openldap/servers/slapd/connection.c:1289:14 #10 0x5555559a869a in LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput /src/fuzz_slapd.c:88:5 ``` The `syncprov` overlay allocates a specific `sync_control` structure and attaches it to the operation's control list (`op->o_controls`) when parsing the `LDAP_CONTROL_SYNC`. * **Leak:** The core server's cleanup routine (`slap_free_ctrls`) is unaware of this overlay-specific structure. If the operation is abandoned or fails (e.g., during parsing of subsequent controls), the `sync_control` and its internal allocations (context CSNs, session IDs) are never freed. ## Fix * **Cleanup Callback:** Defined a new callback function `syncprov_ctrl_cleanup` that properly frees the `sync_control` structure. * **Registration:** Updated `syncprov_parseCtrl` to register this callback (`op->o_callback`) immediately after allocating the control. This ensures `slap_cleanup_play` invokes the cleanup routine during operation teardown, preventing the leak. ## Diff ```diff diff --git a/servers/slapd/overlays/syncprov.c b/servers/slapd/overlays/syncprov.c index 042d742..7257f79 100644 --- a/servers/slapd/overlays/syncprov.c +++ b/servers/slapd/overlays/syncprov.c @@ -4246,6 +4246,26 @@ syncprov_db_destroy( return 0; } +static int +syncprov_ctrl_cleanup( Operation *op, SlapReply *rs ) +{ + if ( op->o_controls[slap_cids.sc_LDAPsync] ) { + sync_control *sr = op->o_controls[slap_cids.sc_LDAPsync]; + op->o_controls[slap_cids.sc_LDAPsync] = NULL; + if ( sr->sr_state.ctxcsn ) { + ber_bvarray_free_x( sr->sr_state.ctxcsn, op->o_tmpmemctx ); + } + if ( sr->sr_state.sids ) { + op->o_tmpfree( sr->sr_state.sids, op->o_tmpmemctx ); + } + if ( sr->sr_state.octet_str.bv_val ) { + op->o_tmpfree( sr->sr_state.octet_str.bv_val, op->o_tmpmemctx ); + } + op->o_tmpfree( sr, op->o_tmpmemctx ); + } + return slap_freeself_cb( op, rs ); +} + static int syncprov_parseCtrl ( Operation *op, SlapReply *rs, @@ -4353,6 +4373,13 @@ static int syncprov_parseCtrl ( op->o_sync_mode |= mode; /* o_sync_mode shares o_sync */ + { + slap_callback *cb = op->o_tmpcalloc( 1, sizeof(slap_callback), op->o_tmpmemctx ); + cb->sc_cleanup = syncprov_ctrl_cleanup; + cb->sc_next = op->o_callback; + op->o_callback = cb; + } + return LDAP_SUCCESS; } ``` ## Harness ``` #define _GNU_SOURCE /* For memfd_create */ #include "portable.h" #include <stdio.h> #include <string.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <fcntl.h> #include <sys/mman.h> #include <sys/types.h> #include <signal.h> #include "slap.h" /* 1. Fix function declarations to match return types in OpenLDAP source code */ extern void slap_sl_mem_init( void ); extern int slapd_daemon_init( const char *urls ); extern int extops_init( void ); /* Returns int */ extern void lutil_passwd_init( void ); extern int slap_init( int mode, const char *name ); extern int read_config( const char *fname, const char *dname ); extern int connections_init( void ); /* Returns int */ extern int slap_startup( Backend *be ); void slapd_daemon_nothread( void ) {} extern int ldap_pvt_thread_initialize( void ); /* Returns int */ extern void* ldap_pvt_thread_pool_context( void ); extern void* connection_read_thread( void *ctx, void *arg ); extern void connection_closing( Connection *c, const char *why ); extern int connection_resched( Connection *c ); extern Connection* connection_init( int sfd, Listener *l, const char *authid, const char *dns, int flags, slap_ssf_t ssf, struct berval *authid_out ); extern ldap_pvt_thread_pool_t connection_pool; static Listener *global_listener = NULL; static struct berval authid_bv = {0, ""}; int LLVMFuzzerInitialize(int *argc, char ***argv) { signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN); slap_debug = 0; slap_sl_mem_init(); if ( 0 != slapd_daemon_init("ldapi://%2Ftmp%2Ffuzz.sock") ) return 1; extops_init(); lutil_passwd_init(); if ( slap_init(SLAP_SERVER_MODE, "slapd-fuzz") ) return 2; read_config( NULL, NULL ); connections_init(); slap_startup(NULL); slapd_daemon_nothread(); ldap_pvt_thread_initialize(); global_listener = slapd_get_listeners()[0]; if (!global_listener) return 3; return 0; } #include <sys/socket.h> int LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput(const uint8_t *Data, size_t Size) { if (Size < 2 || Size > 65536) return 0; /* 2. Use socketpair to simulate socket read/write */ int sv[2]; if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, sv) < 0) return 0; if (write(sv[0], Data, Size) != (ssize_t)Size) { close(sv[0]); close(sv[1]); return 0; } /* Close write end so server receives EOF after reading data */ close(sv[0]); /* 3. Create connection (server uses sv[1]) */ Connection *c = connection_init(sv[1], global_listener, "fuzz", "IP=127.0.0.1", 0, 0, &authid_bv); if (!c) { close(sv[1]); return 0; } void* ctx = ldap_pvt_thread_pool_context(); /* Execute parsing logic */ connection_read_thread(ctx, (void*)(long)sv[1]); /* Wait for thread pool to complete all tasks to prevent background threads from accessing freed connection */ int active = 0, pending = 0; do { ldap_pvt_thread_pool_query(&connection_pool, LDAP_PVT_THREAD_POOL_PARAM_PENDING, &pending); ldap_pvt_thread_pool_query(&connection_pool, LDAP_PVT_THREAD_POOL_PARAM_ACTIVE, &active); if (active == 0 && pending == 0) break; ldap_pvt_thread_yield(); } while (1); /* 4. Thoroughly clean up manually, avoiding unstable macros * Directly manipulate queue pointers to ensure no 'error: use of undeclared identifier o_next' */ Operation *op; while ((op = LDAP_STAILQ_FIRST(&c->c_ops)) != NULL) { LDAP_STAILQ_REMOVE_HEAD(&c->c_ops, o_next); LDAP_STAILQ_NEXT(op, o_next) = NULL; slap_op_free(op, ctx); } LDAP_STAILQ_INIT(&c->c_ops); /* Close and reclaim Connection memory */ connection_closing(c, "fuzz complete"); connection_resched(c); /* ldap_pvt_thread_pool_resume(&connection_pool); */ return 0; } ``` -- You are receiving this mail because: You are on the CC list for the issue.

1 7

[Issue 10307] New: Regression when searching for nonexistent entries and no access to DB
by openldap-its＠openldap.org 05 Mar '26

05 Mar '26

https://bugs.openldap.org/show_bug.cgi?id=10307 Issue ID: 10307 Summary: Regression when searching for nonexistent entries and no access to DB Product: OpenLDAP Version: 2.5.17 Hardware: All OS: All Status: UNCONFIRMED Keywords: needs_review Severity: normal Priority: --- Component: slapd Assignee: bugs(a)openldap.org Reporter: ondra(a)mistotebe.net Target Milestone: --- Patch incoming -- You are receiving this mail because: You are on the CC list for the issue.

1 7

[Bug 9244] New: API calls blocking after async connect
by openldap-its＠openldap.org 02 Mar '26

02 Mar '26

https://bugs.openldap.org/show_bug.cgi?id=9244 Bug ID: 9244 Summary: API calls blocking after async connect Product: OpenLDAP Version: 2.4.49 Hardware: All OS: All Status: UNCONFIRMED Severity: normal Priority: --- Component: libraries Assignee: bugs(a)openldap.org Reporter: ryan(a)openldap.org Target Milestone: --- Created attachment 721 --> https://bugs.openldap.org/attachment.cgi?id=721&action=edit async connect test without TLS My understanding of LDAP_OPT_CONNECT_ASYNC is that the attached program should not block. If the connection does not establish fast enough, the bind call is supposed to return LDAP_X_CONNECTING. (At least that's how I understand it, based on the original behaviour (circa 2.4.23 up to 2.4.40) as well as the bind loop in back-meta. On the other hand, the man page does "Subsequent calls to library routines will poll for completion of the connect before performing further operations" which might be interpreted as meaning they would block...) In current releases it does block, as demonstrated by strace on Linux (latency added using 'tc qdisc'): [...] connect(3, {sa_family=AF_INET, sin_port=htons(389), sin_addr=inet_addr("192.168.1.204")}, 16) = -1 EINPROGRESS (Operation now in progress) write(3, "0\f\2\1\1`\7\2\1\3\4\0\200\0", 14) = -1 EAGAIN (Resource temporarily unavailable) poll([{fd=3, events=POLLOUT|POLLERR|POLLHUP}], 1, -1) = 1 ([{fd=3, revents=POLLOUT}]) write(3, "0\f\2\1\1`\7\2\1\3\4\0\200\0", 14) = 14 poll([{fd=3, events=POLLIN|POLLPRI}], 1, -1) = 1 ([{fd=3, revents=POLLIN}]) read(3, "0\f\2\1\1a\7\n", 8) = 8 read(3, "\1\0\4\0\4\0", 6) = 6 write(2, "OK: ldap_simple_bind_returned 0 "..., 42OK: ldap_simple_bind_returned 0 (Success) ) = 42 [...] As discussed in IRC, I believe I bisected this down to commit ae6347bac, from bug 8022. The reasoning is sound, but ldap_int_open_connection does not actually return -2, only -1 or 0. The patch is simple enough, but I'm also looking at some later commits that were probably done to work around this, and might not be needed now (bug 8957, bug 8968, bug 8980). Also need to test all setups thoroughly (ldap, ldaps, STARTTLS, not to mention back-meta/asyncmeta). I also notice that LDAP_OPT_CONNECT_ASYNC is not effective unless LDAP_OPT_NETWORK_TIMEOUT is also set. It might be intentional, but the man page doesn't mention this specifically, and I don't see why it would be necessary... -- You are receiving this mail because: You are on the CC list for the bug.

1 17

[Issue 9886] New: At "sync" logging, nothing shows how long a write op took on consumers
by openldap-its＠openldap.org 02 Mar '26

02 Mar '26

https://bugs.openldap.org/show_bug.cgi?id=9886 Issue ID: 9886 Summary: At "sync" logging, nothing shows how long a write op took on consumers Product: OpenLDAP Version: unspecified Hardware: All OS: All Status: UNCONFIRMED Keywords: needs_review Severity: normal Priority: --- Component: slapd Assignee: bugs(a)openldap.org Reporter: quanah(a)openldap.org Target Milestone: --- If sync logging is enabled on a consumer, there's no etime logged which means it is not possible to see how long a write op took on that consumer. This can be useful information to see how the node is performing, particularly if it is a read only node where there will be no general MOD timing logged. -- You are receiving this mail because: You are on the CC list for the issue.

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