Re: (ITS#5005) test017 fails
by ando＠sys-net.it
dieter(a)dkluenter.de wrote:
The problem is in slap_parse_sync_cookie(); when no cookie is passed, a
string containing "rid=001" is parsed. The parser expects it to end
with a comma. If passing "rid=001" is correct, the fix is trivial:
instead of checking for (*next != ','), check for (*next && *next != ',').
Index: servers/slapd/ldapsync.c
===================================================================
RCS file: /repo/OpenLDAP/pkg/ldap/servers/slapd/ldapsync.c,v
retrieving revision 1.42
diff -u -r1.42 ldapsync.c
--- servers/slapd/ldapsync.c 18 May 2007 12:46:52 -0000 1.42
+++ servers/slapd/ldapsync.c 9 Jun 2007 09:42:24 -0000
@@ -180,7 +180,10 @@
if ( !strncmp( next, "rid=", STRLENOF("rid=") )) {
rid_ptr = next;
cookie->rid = strtoul( &rid_ptr[ STRLENOF(
"rid=" ) ], &next, 10 );
- if ( next == rid_ptr || next > end || *next !=
',' ) {
+ if ( next == rid_ptr
+ || next > end
+ || ( *next && *next != ',' ) )
+ {
return -1;
}
if ( *next == ',' ) {
@@ -194,7 +197,10 @@
if ( !strncmp( next, "sid=", STRLENOF("sid=") )) {
rid_ptr = next;
cookie->sid = strtoul( &rid_ptr[ STRLENOF(
"sid=" ) ], &next, 16 );
- if ( next == rid_ptr || next > end || *next !=
',' ) {
+ if ( next == rid_ptr
+ || next > end
+ || ( *next && *next != ',' ) )
+ {
return -1;
}
if ( *next == ',' ) {
I'm not committing this fix because I'm not sure it doesn't break
anything else.
p.
Ing. Pierangelo Masarati
OpenLDAP Core Team
SysNet s.r.l.
via Dossi, 8 - 27100 Pavia - ITALIA
http://www.sys-net.it
---------------------------------------
Office: +39 02 23998309
Mobile: +39 333 4963172
Email: pierangelo.masarati(a)sys-net.it
---------------------------------------
16 years, 5 months
Re: (ITS#4965) slapd stops if access to cn=monitor is restricted
by ando＠sys-net.it
ando(a)sys-net.it wrote:
> The difference is that if the monitor database comes first, it's already
> open when the bdb tries to register its custom monitor stuff. So it can
> barf out when the addition fails because of no enough permissions.
>
> If it comes later, back-bdb's custom monitor stuff ends up in the limbo,
> which is then flushed when the monitor database starts up. At this
> point, a failure in flushing the limbo is not considered critical.
>
> I see two/three solutions:
>
> 1) allow databases to fail monitor info registration without aborting
>
> 2) make startup fail also when limbo flushing fails
>
> 3) let the monitor database have a default rootdn.
>
> I'm not oriented towards any of the above, yet.
I think the point is: if one explicitly requests monitoring support (by
default on) in back-bdb, then it must either succeed or slapd should not
start.
If one does not explicitly request it, giving up monitoring with a
warning should be fine.
This is complicated by the need to support run-time configuration: in
fact, if monitoring is explicitly requested but it cannot be registered,
the creation of that database should fail, but the daemon should not stop.
p.
Ing. Pierangelo Masarati
OpenLDAP Core Team
SysNet s.r.l.
via Dossi, 8 - 27100 Pavia - ITALIA
http://www.sys-net.it
---------------------------------------
Office: +39 02 23998309
Mobile: +39 333 4963172
Email: pierangelo.masarati(a)sys-net.it
---------------------------------------
16 years, 5 months
Re: (ITS#4943) tpool.c pause vs. finish
by hyc＠symas.com
h.b.furuseth(a)usit.uio.no wrote:
> OK, here's where we stand now, with my TODOs, questions and some
> new issues. 3+ pages. I thought this would be a brief message:-(
> Hopefully I'll get to some of it this weekend, but no promises.
>
>
> TODOs (unless someone protests) and questions:
>
> * When a thread is finishing, make it go active for context_reset().
> Should make slapi module destructors safer, and I don't see that it
> can hurt.
I don't understand this.
> * I'd like to rename thread contexts to tasks(?) and user contexts back
> to contexts (as in RE23). The current terminology is confusing.
I don't care about this either way.
>
> * Save and restore the old data for key slap_sasl_bind, and just in case
> (I can't tell if it is needed) smbk5pwd.
>
> Might as well do it everywhere we have setkey - do something - delete
> key in one function call. Since setkey(non-null) isn't supposed to
> overwrite existing keys, the change should not be able to hurt. It
> could protect something I didn't think of or a future slapd change.
>
> API: the smallest change would be to call pool_getkey() first,
> but I prefer a pool_swapkey(ctx, key, &data, &kfree) function.
> Then in RE24, maybe remove the &kfree parameter to pool_getkey().
>
> Could omit the &kfree parameter to swapkey() if new data was
> guaranteed non-NULL, but that'd require a malloc in bdb (silly says
> Howard) or passing data in a &union{integer, ptr} (cumbersome say I).
Never use malloc unless absolutely necessary. We have enough problems
with heap fragmentation already.
> * Axe semaphore code in tpool.c, the ldap_lazy_sem_init() call in
> slapd/daemon.c, and with them LDAP_PVT_THREAD_POOL_SEM_LOAD_CONTROL
> in ldap_pvt_thread.h and SLAP_SEM_LOAD_CONTROL in slap.h.
OK.
> * Is the ldap_pvt_thread_pool_context_reset() call in slapd/init.c
> indeed safe - ie. its slap_sl_mem_destroy() call? That's not during
> startup, but in slap_destroy(). Slapd does various stuff after that.
Yes.
> * API changes:
>
> Do we include the assert(no multiple pools) in the import to RE23?
> Remove keys from ltu_key[] _before_ calling ltk_free() with them?
> That prevents functions called from ltk_free from seeing freed thread
> data, but it can also break ltk_free functions that call such
> functions _before_ freeing it. Probably not for RE23.
>
> * Scheduling: If several threads call pool_pause(), then once there is a
> pause tpool does not schedule them all. They could get handled then,
> or another thread could undo the pause so tpool would wait to pause
> again. Is that deliberate?
I don't understand the question. The point of the pause is to prevent
any other thread (in the pool) from running. Why should tpool schedule
any other threads at this point?
> Dubious code, new issues, old ones I'm not sure we finished with:
>
> * thread_keys[] still has problems.
>
> - pool_context() breaks if several ldap_pvt_thread_t bit patterns can
> represent the same thread ID: TID_HASH() would give different hashes
> for the same thread, and pool_context() stops searching when it hits
> a slot with ctx == NULL. (My previous bug report was a bit wrong.)
How can a single thread ID be represented by multiple bit patterns?
> The best fix would be to use use real thread-specific data instead.
> Just one key with the ctx for now, that minimizes the changes. OTOH
> it also means we'll do thread-specific key lookup twice - first in
> pthread to get the ctx, and then in ltu_key[] to find our data.
> Anyway, I said I'd do that later but might as well get on with it,
> at least for pthreads. Except I don't know if that's OS-dependent
> enough that it should wait for RE24?
The best fix may be to just use the address of the thread's stack as the
thread ID. That's actually perfect for our purpose.
> When that's not implemented, I'd prefer to cast the thread ID to an
> integer when that is safe, and hash that instead of its bytes.
> Won't work for structs/unions, and is not formally guaranteed for
> pointers or in case of pthreads even integers. BTW, when it doesn't
> work, we've got a problem in ITS#4983 (tls.c id_callback) as well.
>
> When that's not possible, we could search the entire table before
> giving up. Could make thread_keys[] smaller and reduce the maximum
> allowed #threads on such hosts. (What should the limit be?)
>
> - thread_keys is a poor hash table implementation with a poor hash
> function.
Ideally it would not be a hash table at all, but a direct lookup based
on the thread ID.
> Oops - for caching, maybe I shouldn't have removed the thread id
> from thread_keys[]. Or maybe the hash value should be stored there
> instead, so we can compare with == instead of ldap_pvt_thread_equal.
>
> * I wonder if there are long-lived ldap_pvt_thread_cond_wait(),
> [r]mutex_lock() or rdwr_[rw]lock() calls which should make the thread
> go inactive first (after waiting for any pause to finish), so that
> (a) a pool_pause() will not block waiting for them, and
> (b) all threads in the pool can't be blocked in long waits without
> tpool knowing about it.
Long-lived lock calls would be a quite noticeable bug. This seems to be
a non-issue.
> * back-bdb/tools.c uses pool_submit() to start long-lived threads:
> bdb_tool_trickle_task() and bdb_tool_index_task(). They don't exit
> until slapd is stopping, so they'll block slapd if a thread requests
> a pause. Also the pool thinks its has more available threads that it
> does, so scheduled tasks might never be executed.
>
> Possibly that's not a problem with slaptools. As complex as slapd is
> now with overlays and plugins and whatnot, I have no idea.
Tool threads are completely separate from slapd threads. This is not an
issue.
> * slapd/bconfig.c maintains its own idea of the max number of threads
> in connection_pool_max and slap_tool_thread_max, which does not match
> tpool's idea if the limit is <=0 or larger than LDAP_MAXTHR.
>
> Since slapd acts on its own count, I imagine that can cause breakage.
> Simplest fix might be to set max #threads and then read it back,
> I haven't checked. Would need to return LDAP_MAXTHR instead of 0
> for "as many as allowed". Note however also the issue above:
> tpool's idea of actually available threads can be too high too.
The practical limits are actually pretty low. Even if you're on a 1024
processor machine with many terabytes of RAM, it's not a good idea to
have many thousands of threads... Scheduler overhead would overshadow
any useful work.
> * I said my new ltp_pause waits might be too aggressive. Maybe I should
> clarify: I don't see any instances where they can be dropped, but it's
> possible that slapd expects pauses to be less aggressive somewhere.
I don't understand this comment.
>
> About pool_submit() and the ltp_mutex unlock-relock:
>
> Some history and notes, just to finish up previous discussion.
> Some possible TODOs, but they are not needed since it's not broken:
>
> Originally, pool_submit() unlocked ltp_mutex before thread_create()
> and re-locked it afterwards for further maintenance. That was not
> because of the semaphore code. It looks like it could work even in
> non-threaded mode where thread_create(,,fn,arg) just called fn(arg),
> though tpool.c was always wrapped in an #ifndef <--without-threads>.
>
> I don't think non-threaded would have worked anyway since rev 1.24
> (apr 2003), which introduced thread_keys[]. Caller and callee would
> have gotten the same thread ID, so tpool would have confused their
> contexts. Previously the new context was pushed onto ltp_active_list,
> and would have temporarily hid the old context.
>
> That's also when thread_create() was moved after the ltp_mutex
> re-lock, which would mean the mutex was locked while pool_wrapper()
> was running and tried to re-lock the mutex. And now, my rev.171 has
> removed the unlock-relock.
>
> With that I can also remove the search for ctx in ltp_pending_list
> when backing out of pool_submit, it will be at the head of that list.
>
> With tpool only supporting threaded mode, another cleanup could be for
> pool_submit to start a thread before inserting ctx in ltp_pending_list
> instead of after. That done, it can fail if ltp_open_count is still
> 0, and we won't need the code for backing out of pool_submit().
OK.
> Oh, the comment /* no open threads at all?!? */: That's not strange.
> Happens in the first pool_submit() call(s) if thread_create() fails.
> Though in that case there was no danger of removing the wrong ctx
> from ltp_pending_list after all (fixed in rev 1.63).
(Sure, but thread_create() should never fail if you have a sane
configuration.)
--
-- Howard Chu
Chief Architect, Symas Corp. http://www.symas.com
Director, Highland Sun http://highlandsun.com/hyc/
Chief Architect, OpenLDAP http://www.openldap.org/project/
16 years, 5 months
Re: (ITS#4943) tpool.c pause vs. finish
by h.b.furuseth＠usit.uio.no
OK, here's where we stand now, with my TODOs, questions and some
new issues. 3+ pages. I thought this would be a brief message:-(
Hopefully I'll get to some of it this weekend, but no promises.
TODOs (unless someone protests) and questions:
* When a thread is finishing, make it go active for context_reset().
Should make slapi module destructors safer, and I don't see that it
can hurt.
* I'd like to rename thread contexts to tasks(?) and user contexts back
to contexts (as in RE23). The current terminology is confusing.
* Save and restore the old data for key slap_sasl_bind, and just in case
(I can't tell if it is needed) smbk5pwd.
Might as well do it everywhere we have setkey - do something - delete
key in one function call. Since setkey(non-null) isn't supposed to
overwrite existing keys, the change should not be able to hurt. It
could protect something I didn't think of or a future slapd change.
API: the smallest change would be to call pool_getkey() first,
but I prefer a pool_swapkey(ctx, key, &data, &kfree) function.
Then in RE24, maybe remove the &kfree parameter to pool_getkey().
Could omit the &kfree parameter to swapkey() if new data was
guaranteed non-NULL, but that'd require a malloc in bdb (silly says
Howard) or passing data in a &union{integer, ptr} (cumbersome say I).
* Axe semaphore code in tpool.c, the ldap_lazy_sem_init() call in
slapd/daemon.c, and with them LDAP_PVT_THREAD_POOL_SEM_LOAD_CONTROL
in ldap_pvt_thread.h and SLAP_SEM_LOAD_CONTROL in slap.h.
* Is the ldap_pvt_thread_pool_context_reset() call in slapd/init.c
indeed safe - ie. its slap_sl_mem_destroy() call? That's not during
startup, but in slap_destroy(). Slapd does various stuff after that.
* API changes:
Do we include the assert(no multiple pools) in the import to RE23?
Remove keys from ltu_key[] _before_ calling ltk_free() with them?
That prevents functions called from ltk_free from seeing freed thread
data, but it can also break ltk_free functions that call such
functions _before_ freeing it. Probably not for RE23.
* Scheduling: If several threads call pool_pause(), then once there is a
pause tpool does not schedule them all. They could get handled then,
or another thread could undo the pause so tpool would wait to pause
again. Is that deliberate?
Dubious code, new issues, old ones I'm not sure we finished with:
* thread_keys[] still has problems.
- pool_context() breaks if several ldap_pvt_thread_t bit patterns can
represent the same thread ID: TID_HASH() would give different hashes
for the same thread, and pool_context() stops searching when it hits
a slot with ctx == NULL. (My previous bug report was a bit wrong.)
The best fix would be to use use real thread-specific data instead.
Just one key with the ctx for now, that minimizes the changes. OTOH
it also means we'll do thread-specific key lookup twice - first in
pthread to get the ctx, and then in ltu_key[] to find our data.
Anyway, I said I'd do that later but might as well get on with it,
at least for pthreads. Except I don't know if that's OS-dependent
enough that it should wait for RE24?
When that's not implemented, I'd prefer to cast the thread ID to an
integer when that is safe, and hash that instead of its bytes.
Won't work for structs/unions, and is not formally guaranteed for
pointers or in case of pthreads even integers. BTW, when it doesn't
work, we've got a problem in ITS#4983 (tls.c id_callback) as well.
When that's not possible, we could search the entire table before
giving up. Could make thread_keys[] smaller and reduce the maximum
allowed #threads on such hosts. (What should the limit be?)
- thread_keys is a poor hash table implementation with a poor hash
function.
For the hash function, I'll insert a variant of Paul Hsieh's
SuperFastHash() instead, or something simpler if we hash an integer.
For the hash table, the real fix would be to grab a proper hash
table implementation and use that. We might find use for it
elsewhere too. Though simple fixes will handle all but some rare
cases, and I don't know how much we care:
The table is never resized and will slow down lookup when it gets
full. A quick fix would be to allow max (70% table size) threads or
something. And double the size of the table, if we still want to
allow 1024 threads.
However if the admin experiments with ltp_max_count for a while so
many threads stop/start/stop/start, the table slowly fills up with
DELETED_THREAD_CTX entries. Longer search chains, longer thread ID
lookup time. Should happen rarely, but we don't advise against it
in the docs either. Do we care, beyond documenting it? If yes, we
need a real hash table implementation, or at least to re-hash the
table when there are too many DELETED_THREAD_CTX entries. Or use a
chained hash table. No malloc needed, use the thread's stack space.
For open addressing, I was thinking quadric probing would be better
than linear, but maybe not with a proper hash function. I don't
know what that does to cache issues.
Oops - for caching, maybe I shouldn't have removed the thread id
from thread_keys[]. Or maybe the hash value should be stored there
instead, so we can compare with == instead of ldap_pvt_thread_equal.
* I wonder if there are long-lived ldap_pvt_thread_cond_wait(),
[r]mutex_lock() or rdwr_[rw]lock() calls which should make the thread
go inactive first (after waiting for any pause to finish), so that
(a) a pool_pause() will not block waiting for them, and
(b) all threads in the pool can't be blocked in long waits without
tpool knowing about it.
* back-bdb/tools.c uses pool_submit() to start long-lived threads:
bdb_tool_trickle_task() and bdb_tool_index_task(). They don't exit
until slapd is stopping, so they'll block slapd if a thread requests
a pause. Also the pool thinks its has more available threads that it
does, so scheduled tasks might never be executed.
Possibly that's not a problem with slaptools. As complex as slapd is
now with overlays and plugins and whatnot, I have no idea.
If it's a problem, it is not enough for them to regularly reschedule
themselves and exit: They have long-lived waits. See previous issue.
* slapd/bconfig.c maintains its own idea of the max number of threads
in connection_pool_max and slap_tool_thread_max, which does not match
tpool's idea if the limit is <=0 or larger than LDAP_MAXTHR.
Since slapd acts on its own count, I imagine that can cause breakage.
Simplest fix might be to set max #threads and then read it back,
I haven't checked. Would need to return LDAP_MAXTHR instead of 0
for "as many as allowed". Note however also the issue above:
tpool's idea of actually available threads can be too high too.
* I said my new ltp_pause waits might be too aggressive. Maybe I should
clarify: I don't see any instances where they can be dropped, but it's
possible that slapd expects pauses to be less aggressive somewhere.
About pool_submit() and the ltp_mutex unlock-relock:
Some history and notes, just to finish up previous discussion.
Some possible TODOs, but they are not needed since it's not broken:
Originally, pool_submit() unlocked ltp_mutex before thread_create()
and re-locked it afterwards for further maintenance. That was not
because of the semaphore code. It looks like it could work even in
non-threaded mode where thread_create(,,fn,arg) just called fn(arg),
though tpool.c was always wrapped in an #ifndef <--without-threads>.
I don't think non-threaded would have worked anyway since rev 1.24
(apr 2003), which introduced thread_keys[]. Caller and callee would
have gotten the same thread ID, so tpool would have confused their
contexts. Previously the new context was pushed onto ltp_active_list,
and would have temporarily hid the old context.
That's also when thread_create() was moved after the ltp_mutex
re-lock, which would mean the mutex was locked while pool_wrapper()
was running and tried to re-lock the mutex. And now, my rev.171 has
removed the unlock-relock.
With that I can also remove the search for ctx in ltp_pending_list
when backing out of pool_submit, it will be at the head of that list.
With tpool only supporting threaded mode, another cleanup could be for
pool_submit to start a thread before inserting ctx in ltp_pending_list
instead of after. That done, it can fail if ltp_open_count is still
0, and we won't need the code for backing out of pool_submit().
Oh, the comment /* no open threads at all?!? */: That's not strange.
Happens in the first pool_submit() call(s) if thread_create() fails.
Though in that case there was no danger of removing the wrong ctx
from ltp_pending_list after all (fixed in rev 1.63).
--
Regards,
Hallvard
16 years, 5 months
Re: (ITS#5005) test017 fails
by quanah＠zimbra.com
--On June 8, 2007 6:43:50 PM +0000 dieter(a)dkluenter.de wrote:
> Full_Name: Dieter Kluenter
> Version: HEAD
> OS: Linux
> URL: ftp://ftp.openldap.org/incoming/
> Submission from: (NULL) (84.142.196.121)
>
>
> here the output of test017 logfiles
>
> ---slapd.1.log----------------
> ber_scanf fmt (}) ber:
> <= get_ctrls: n=1 rc=2 err="Sync control : cookie parsing error"
> send_ldap_result: conn=7 op=1 p=3
> send_ldap_result: err=2 matched="" text="Sync control : cookie parsing
> error" send_ldap_response: msgid=2 tag=101 err=2
Hm, is this possibly related to the fix for ITS#4977? If you revert that
checkin for syncprov.c today, does the test pass?
<http://www.openldap.org/devel/cvsweb.cgi/servers/slapd/overlays/syncprov....>
--Quanah
--
Quanah Gibson-Mount
Principal Software Engineer
Zimbra, Inc
--------------------
Zimbra :: the leader in open source messaging and collaboration
16 years, 5 months
(ITS#5005) test017 fails
by dieter＠dkluenter.de
Full_Name: Dieter Kluenter
Version: HEAD
OS: Linux
URL: ftp://ftp.openldap.org/incoming/
Submission from: (NULL) (84.142.196.121)
here the output of test017 logfiles
---slapd.1.log----------------
>>> slap_listener(ldap://localhost:9011/)
conn=7 fd=13 ACCEPT from IP=127.0.0.1:13352 (IP=127.0.0.1:9011)
connection_get(13)
connection_get(13): got connid=7
connection_read(13): checking for input on id=7
ber_get_next
ber_get_next: tag 0x30 len 46 contents:
ber_get_next
do_bind
ber_scanf fmt ({imt) ber:
ber_scanf fmt (m}) ber:
>>> dnPrettyNormal: <cn=manager,dc=example,dc=com>
=> ldap_bv2dn(cn=manager,dc=example,dc=com,0)
<= ldap_bv2dn(cn=manager,dc=example,dc=com)=0
=> ldap_dn2bv(272)
<= ldap_dn2bv(cn=manager,dc=example,dc=com)=0
=> ldap_dn2bv(272)
<= ldap_dn2bv(cn=manager,dc=example,dc=com)=0
<<< dnPrettyNormal: <cn=manager,dc=example,dc=com>,
<cn=manager,dc=example,dc=com>
do_bind: version=3 dn="cn=manager,dc=example,dc=com" method=128
conn=7 op=0 BIND dn="cn=manager,dc=example,dc=com" method=128
==> bdb_bind: dn: cn=manager,dc=example,dc=com
conn=7 op=0 BIND dn="cn=Manager,dc=example,dc=com" mech=SIMPLE ssf=0
do_bind: v3 bind: "cn=manager,dc=example,dc=com" to
"cn=Manager,dc=example,dc=com"
send_ldap_result: conn=7 op=0 p=3
send_ldap_result: err=0 matched="" text=""
send_ldap_response: msgid=1 tag=97 err=0
ber_flush2: 14 bytes to sd 13
conn=7 op=0 RESULT tag=97 err=0 text=
connection_get(13)
connection_get(13): got connid=7
connection_read(13): checking for input on id=7
ber_get_next
ber_get_next: tag 0x30 len 109 contents:
ber_get_next
do_search
ber_scanf fmt ({miiiib) ber:
>>> dnPrettyNormal: <dc=example,dc=com>
=> ldap_bv2dn(dc=example,dc=com,0)
<= ldap_bv2dn(dc=example,dc=com)=0
=> ldap_dn2bv(272)
<= ldap_dn2bv(dc=example,dc=com)=0
=> ldap_dn2bv(272)
<= ldap_dn2bv(dc=example,dc=com)=0
<<< dnPrettyNormal: <dc=example,dc=com>, <dc=example,dc=com>
SRCH "dc=example,dc=com" 2 0 0 0 0
ber_scanf fmt (m) ber:
filter: (objectClass=*)
ber_scanf fmt ({M}}) ber:
=> get_ctrls
ber_scanf fmt ({m) ber:
ber_scanf fmt (m) ber:
=> get_ctrls: oid="1.3.6.1.4.1.4203.1.9.1.1" (noncritical)
ber_scanf fmt ({i) ber:
ber_scanf fmt (m) ber:
ber_scanf fmt (b) ber:
ber_scanf fmt (}) ber:
<= get_ctrls: n=1 rc=2 err="Sync control : cookie parsing error"
send_ldap_result: conn=7 op=1 p=3
send_ldap_result: err=2 matched="" text="Sync control : cookie parsing error"
send_ldap_response: msgid=2 tag=101 err=2
ber_flush2: 49 bytes to sd 13
conn=7 op=1 SEARCH RESULT tag=101 err=2 nentries=0 text=Sync control : cookie
parsing error
do_search: get_ctrls failed
connection_get(13)
connection_get(13): got connid=7
connection_read(13): checking for input on id=7
ber_get_next
ber_get_next: tag 0x30 len 5 contents:
ber_get_next
ber_get_next on fd 13 failed errno=0 (Success)
connection_closing: readying conn=7 sd=13 for close
connection_close: deferring conn=7 sd=13
do_unbind
conn=7 op=2 UNBIND
connection_resched: attempting closing conn=7 sd=13
connection_close: conn=7 sd=13
conn=7 fd=13 closed
daemon: shutdown requested and initiated.
---------------------------------------
---- slapd.2.log ----------------------
>>> slap_listener(ldap://localhost:9012/)
conn=1 fd=13 ACCEPT from IP=127.0.0.1:3877 (IP=127.0.0.1:9012)
connection_get(13)
connection_get(13): got connid=1
connection_read(13): checking for input on id=1
ber_get_next
ber_get_next: tag 0x30 len 46 contents:
ber_get_next
do_bind
ber_scanf fmt ({imt) ber:
ber_scanf fmt (m}) ber:
>>> dnPrettyNormal: <cn=Manager,dc=example,dc=com>
=> ldap_bv2dn(cn=Manager,dc=example,dc=com,0)
<= ldap_bv2dn(cn=Manager,dc=example,dc=com)=0
=> ldap_dn2bv(272)
<= ldap_dn2bv(cn=Manager,dc=example,dc=com)=0
=> ldap_dn2bv(272)
<= ldap_dn2bv(cn=manager,dc=example,dc=com)=0
<<< dnPrettyNormal: <cn=Manager,dc=example,dc=com>,
<cn=manager,dc=example,dc=com>
do_bind: version=3 dn="cn=Manager,dc=example,dc=com" method=128
conn=1 op=0 BIND dn="cn=Manager,dc=example,dc=com" method=128
==> bdb_bind: dn: cn=Manager,dc=example,dc=com
bdb_dn2entry("cn=manager,dc=example,dc=com")
=> bdb_dn2id("dc=example,dc=com")
<= bdb_dn2id: get failed: DB_NOTFOUND: No matching key/data pair found (-30989)
send_ldap_result: conn=1 op=0 p=3
send_ldap_result: err=49 matched="" text=""
send_ldap_response: msgid=1 tag=97 err=49
ber_flush2: 14 bytes to sd 13
conn=1 op=0 RESULT tag=97 err=49 text=
connection_get(13)
connection_get(13): got connid=1
connection_read(13): checking for input on id=1
ber_get_next
ber_get_next on fd 13 failed errno=0 (Success)
connection_closing: readying conn=1 sd=13 for close
connection_close: conn=1 sd=13
conn=1 fd=13 closed (connection lost)
daemon: shutdown requested and initiated.
slapd shutdown: waiting for 0 threads to terminate
lt-slapd shutdown: initiated
====> bdb_cache_release_all
lt-slapd destroy: freeing system resources.
slapd stopped.
--------------------------------------------------------
---test.out---------------
ldap_initialize( ldap://localhost:9012 )
ldap_bind: Invalid credentials (49)
------------------------------
-Dieter
16 years, 5 months
Re: (ITS#4983) libldap_r/tls.c compile failure
by h.b.furuseth＠usit.uio.no
h.b.furuseth(a)usit.uio.no writes:
>kurt(a)OpenLDAP.org writes:
>> tls.c: In function `tls_thread_self':
>> tls.c:412: error: invalid operands to binary /
>> tls.c:415: warning: comparison between pointer and integer
>
> Well, that was quick... my tls.c rev 1.154 patch, tls_thread_self(),
> deliberately causes that for non-integer thread types.
What to do? I found this in ITS#4723, from Howard Chu at 29 Nov 2006:
> In the current OpenSSL, the address of errno is tested as well. Since
> this is always unique per thread, there's really no need to set the id
> callback any more. The problem with just using CRYPTO_set_id_callback
> is that it doesn't work on platforms where a thread ID is not an
> integer (e.g. OS/390). I don't think CRYPTO_set_idptr_callback was
> available in earlier OpenSSL releases.
Yet Howard added CRYPTO_set_id_callback to tls.c (rev.144) the next day.
Why? Should we wrap CRYPTO_set_id_callback() in #if (OpenSSL is old)?
Well, I can think of a way the &errno hack can break: The OS could
create a small virtual address space which maps to different physical
memory for different threads, and put things like errno there.
OpenSSL 0.9.9 will apparently have CRYPTO_set_idptr_callback, so we
can use an #ifdef for that.
For whatever isn't handled above, my suggestion for now is to keep the
failure if ldap_pvt_thread_t is a struct/union or wider than long, and
see if anyone still complains.
--
Regards,
Hallvard
16 years, 5 months
Re: (ITS#4965) slapd stops if access to cn=monitor is restricted
by ando＠sys-net.it
ali.pouya(a)free.fr wrote:
> OK Pierangelo;
> Now I have an explanation :
> If you declare the monitor database AFTER bdb slapd starts well.
> But if you decalre monitor BEFORE bdb slapd cannot start.
> You can test it.
OK, I see.
The difference is that if the monitor database comes first, it's already
open when the bdb tries to register its custom monitor stuff. So it can
barf out when the addition fails because of no enough permissions.
If it comes later, back-bdb's custom monitor stuff ends up in the limbo,
which is then flushed when the monitor database starts up. At this
point, a failure in flushing the limbo is not considered critical.
I see two/three solutions:
1) allow databases to fail monitor info registration without aborting
2) make startup fail also when limbo flushing fails
3) let the monitor database have a default rootdn.
I'm not oriented towards any of the above, yet.
p.
Ing. Pierangelo Masarati
OpenLDAP Core Team
SysNet s.r.l.
via Dossi, 8 - 27100 Pavia - ITALIA
http://www.sys-net.it
---------------------------------------
Office: +39 02 23998309
Mobile: +39 333 4963172
Email: pierangelo.masarati(a)sys-net.it
---------------------------------------
16 years, 5 months
(ITS#5003) issue about upper_needs_cast
by caojunliang＠huawei.com
Full_Name: Cao Junliang
Version: openldap-2.3.35
OS: windows xp
URL: ftp://ftp.openldap.org/incoming/
Submission from: (NULL) (210.21.230.126)
Hello,
when I set the option upper_needs_cast as Yes.It only takes effect on id_query
when adding an entry,but does not take effect on child id query when deleting an
entry.
I found that in the src file back-sql/init.c
line 374 --379
there are not operation about upper cast.
I want to know if what I think is right.
Cao Junliang
16 years, 5 months
