A paper and presentation making the rounds, claiming to show how webapps using LDAP are vulnerable to search filter spoofing attacks.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wtahzm_R8e4 http://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-europe-08/Alonso-Parada/Whitepaper/...
Can't imagine that work like this gets peer-reviewed, because it's mostly garbage. They concoct a scenario in section 4.1.1 of their paper, supposedly showing how filter manipulation can allow a webapp user to bypass LDAP-based authentication. It's ridiculous drivel though, since LDAP-based authentication uses Bind requests and not search filters. Most LDAP deployments don't even give search/compare access to userPassword attributes in the first place.
Just in case anybody out there might be bitten by this info - client-enforced security is no security at all. This is why slapd has such an extensive ACL engine - you enforce access controls on the server, and then it doesn't matter what kind of garbage requests your clients send to you, they can only ever access information that they were allowed to access. This is also why the old pam_ldap authorization scheme was such a bad idea, it relied on the LDAP client (pam_ldap) to correctly implement authorization, instead of the server. (Multiply that by hundreds or thousands of clients and you have an unmanageable, insecurable mess.) This is why we have nssov today.
Of course, this is no excuse to be sloppy when writing your web apps. But if you've configured ACLs to adequately protect your data, then it doesn't matter how sloppy your clients are.