On Thu, 2007-10-25 at 05:18 -0700, Howard Chu wrote:
Using ACLs to enforce this requirement is the wrong approach though.
should just use the "security" directive instead. With your approach you're
missing the fact that SASL may not have sent any password at all to slapd
(e.g., when using DIGEST-MD5 or an OTP mechanism). As such, you're imposing a
constraint that makes no sense.
So you are saying:
security sasl=128 simple_bind=128
would achieve that? I guess it would.
However, with the patch applied this would have the same
effect, with the addition that if some other authorisation
mechanism were introduced (eg pam), it would fail unless
it was encrypted or I explicitly allowed it.
by tls_ssf=128 ... read
by sasl_ssf=128 ... read
by * none
This may look icky to you, but to someone who is just
trying to deploy slapd it means there is one less
slapd.conf option I have to get my head around.
Perhaps ease of configuration doesn't seem so important.
But I was at a talk given by Andrew Tridgell about why
he wrote tdb instead of using just using openldap.
Answer: because it took him 3 days to get slapd
configured and working. 3 days is an impressively
short time going on my experiences with it. He actually
said it wasn't because slapd had bugs, or slapd was too
slow, or slapd didn't have a feature. It was just
because in the final analysis, he could not see the
typical samba user being able to make the thing work.
When something is hard to configure typically the doco
is blamed. But that is often wrong and is wrong in the
case of openldap. The blame lies with the design of
the system. The programmers fail to see the
configuration of the system as another interface. They
will put hours of work into designing an API, and
devote 100's of lines of code to making sure that API
is easy to use, that it hides the complexities of its
implementation. Yet they ignore configuration, which
in effect another API - it is the interface between
the users and the program.
Like most projects openldap uses many libraries to do
its thing. But makes no attempt to hide that from the
user. In order to configure openldap you have to
understand ldap, sasl, tls, berkley db, but whats
worse you have to understand how they interact with
each other within openldap. For example, ssf is a sasl
concept. simple_bind is an ldap concept. But the
"security" option has "simple_bind=<ssf_factor>", so
suddenly you have to know both, even if you have no
intention of using one of them. Ick, ick, ick.
If it had of been an API presented to other
programmers, I bet the original designer who of thought
"how can I hide all this behind a simple, clean, easy
to understand interface". But he didn't, and so now
openldap deservedly has the reputation as one of the
harder pieces of open source software to get up and
going. As a consequence it is deployed a lot less
than it should be.