- openldap-bugs - openldap.org

ITS#6593 published: SECURITY: Ldapsearch Error while using Back-NDB
by openldap-its＠OpenLDAP.org 21 Jul '10

21 Jul '10

Private ITS#6593 is now publicly readable URL: http://www.OpenLDAP.org/its/?findid=6593

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ITS#6594 published: SECURITY: Ldapsearch Error while using Back-NDB
by openldap-its＠OpenLDAP.org 21 Jul '10

21 Jul '10

Private ITS#6594 is now publicly readable URL: http://www.OpenLDAP.org/its/?findid=6594

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Re: (ITS#6598) EXOP to return number of children of a (sub)tree
by masarati＠aero.polimi.it 21 Jul '10

21 Jul '10

> quanah(a)zimbra.com wrote: >> Full_Name: Quanah Gibson-Mount >> Version: NA >> OS: NA >> URL: ftp://ftp.openldap.org/incoming/ >> Submission from: (NULL) (75.111.45.108) >> >> >> It would be extremely useful to have an extended operation that allows >> querying >> the number of children of a given (sub)tree, so that one can avoid >> iterating >> through the entire subtree to determine this number. >> > Might as well ask for the numSubordinates operational attribute to be > implemented instead, this doesn't seem to merit a new exop. And for > numSubordinates, see the -devel archives for why we chose not to implement > it. > > In either case, the server still needs to iterate over all entries > internally, > and the result has to take ACLs and entry disclosure into account. An exop would allow to easily discriminate between intentional and "catchall" requests, like "+". Moreover, it might make sense to discriminate at least between subtree and onelevel number of subordinates; this would require two distinct operational attributes, or a parameter in the exop. I'm not endorsing either solution, I'm just pointing out possible pros and cons. p.

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Re: (ITS#6598) EXOP to return number of children of a (sub)tree
by hyc＠symas.com 21 Jul '10

21 Jul '10

quanah(a)zimbra.com wrote: > Full_Name: Quanah Gibson-Mount > Version: NA > OS: NA > URL: ftp://ftp.openldap.org/incoming/ > Submission from: (NULL) (75.111.45.108) > > > It would be extremely useful to have an extended operation that allows querying > the number of children of a given (sub)tree, so that one can avoid iterating > through the entire subtree to determine this number. > Might as well ask for the numSubordinates operational attribute to be implemented instead, this doesn't seem to merit a new exop. And for numSubordinates, see the -devel archives for why we chose not to implement it. In either case, the server still needs to iterate over all entries internally, and the result has to take ACLs and entry disclosure into account. -- -- Howard Chu CTO, Symas Corp. http://www.symas.com Director, Highland Sun http://highlandsun.com/hyc/ Chief Architect, OpenLDAP http://www.openldap.org/project/

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(ITS#6598) EXOP to return number of children of a (sub)tree
by quanah＠zimbra.com 21 Jul '10

21 Jul '10

Full_Name: Quanah Gibson-Mount Version: NA OS: NA URL: ftp://ftp.openldap.org/incoming/ Submission from: (NULL) (75.111.45.108) It would be extremely useful to have an extended operation that allows querying the number of children of a given (sub)tree, so that one can avoid iterating through the entire subtree to determine this number.

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(ITS#6595) Patch - Mozilla NSS - delay token auth until needed
by rmeggins＠redhat.com 20 Jul '10

20 Jul '10

Full_Name: Rich Megginson Version: 2.4.23 OS: Fedora URL: ftp://ftp.openldap.org/incoming/openldap-2.4.23-initauthtoken.patch Submission from: (NULL) (76.113.111.209) The code was doing all of the authentications to all of the tokens during the init phase. This was causing problems with NSS cert/key clients, prompting for the cert/key db password, when it isn't needed, since it is only needed to get private key information. The patch is to just remove the token authentication during init. The code already authenticates to the token when private key information is needed e.g. running in TLS/SSL server mode, or using client cert auth. This patch file is derived from OpenLDAP Software. All of the modifications to OpenLDAP Software represented in the following patch(es) were developed by Red Hat. Red Hat has not assigned rights and/or interest in this work to any party. I, Rich Megginson am authorized by Red Hat, my employer, to release this work under the following terms. Red Hat hereby place the following modifications to OpenLDAP Software (and only these modifications) into the public domain. Hence, these modifications may be freely used and/or redistributed for any purpose with or without attribution and/or other notice.

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Re: (ITS#6592) slapadd allows objects with objectClass doublets
by masarati＠aero.polimi.it 20 Jul '10

20 Jul '10

slapd(8) can handle those occurrences. slapadd(8) is intended to load LDIF files generated by slapcat(8), thus presumably consistent. In general, it deals with the most obvious errors. I don't think asking slapadd to perform these checks is a good idea, as it would slow it down without real benefit: if an error is caught, you would need to restart, wasting all the actual write effort. A sanity check tool for unreliable LDIF would probably be more appropriate. p.

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(ITS#6592) slapadd allows objects with objectClass doublets
by kolbjorn.barmen＠uninett.no 20 Jul '10

20 Jul '10

Full_Name: Kolbjørn Barmen Version: 2.4.23 OS: Linux, Debian Lenny URL: ftp://ftp.openldap.org/incoming/ Submission from: (NULL) (2001:700:1:0:158:38:62:199) I had problems getting syncrepl working, and it the culpit turned out to be doublets of "objectClass: organizationalRole" for given objects. This seems to not have been a problem with old 2.3.30 with old replication mechanics, but for syncrepl it seems critical. When upgrading from 2.3.30 to 2.4.23 slapcat/slapadd was used. Example from ldif: dn: cn=admin,dc=foo,dc=no objectClass: organizationalRole objectClass: top objectClass: simpleSecurityObject objectClass: organizationalRole ... It would be very helpfull if slapadd could detect such obvious fail in ldif-data and spit a warning (when not using -q at least).

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Re: (ITS#6591) Openldap 2.4.16 with BDB 4.7.25 slapd 200% issue
by quanah＠zimbra.com 20 Jul '10

20 Jul '10

--On Monday, July 19, 2010 10:37 PM +0000 dsbrar16(a)yahoo.com wrote: > Full_Name: Devender Singh > Version: 2.4.16 > OS: RHEL5 > URL: ftp://ftp.openldap.org/incoming/ > Submission from: (NULL) (122.180.61.218) The ITS system is for submitting bugs, not asking for help. As I already told you in email, use the openldap-technical(a)openldap.org mailing list for your questions about how to properly use and tune OpenLDAP. --Quanah -- Quanah Gibson-Mount Principal Software Engineer Zimbra, Inc -------------------- Zimbra :: the leader in open source messaging and collaboration

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Re: (ITS#6475) SASL OTP and syncrepl
by manu＠netbsd.org 19 Jul '10

19 Jul '10

Daniel Pluta <daniel(a)pluta.biz> wrote: > As I'm not (yet ;-)) an OTP-expert I have not tested any further because > I currently just don't know how to calculate the one-time password based > on the challenge ... skey(1) can do it for you. -- Emmanuel Dreyfus http://hcpnet.free.fr/pubz manu(a)netbsd.org

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(ITS#6591) Openldap 2.4.16 with BDB 4.7.25 slapd 200% issue
by dsbrar16＠yahoo.com 19 Jul '10

19 Jul '10

Full_Name: Devender Singh Version: 2.4.16 OS: RHEL5 URL: ftp://ftp.openldap.org/incoming/ Submission from: (NULL) (122.180.61.218) Hi All, I need help for openldap slapd 200% cpu utilization issue. I have configured three openldap servers(2 Masters and 1 Slave). I have configure PEN load balancer for failover setup on 2 master openldap servers.It means application server first of all hit the loadbalancer port and than PEN LB will forwad that request to Master 1 or 2 openldap server. Hardware configuration on all boxes: OS: RHEL5(x86_64) RAM: 2GB Number of CPU: 2(Intel(R) Xeon(R)2.00GHz) Number of BDB databases: 2 Databse1: Number of users : 830000 Number of dns: 830000 Database2: Number of users: 2000 Number of dns: 800000 My Application1 using Databse1 and Application2 using Databse2. Application2 just authenticating the users and store last 10 password history only, It means Application1 is not using openldap too much. In Application2(90% dependent on openldap) every user have 1000+ sub leafs entries. when I want to do major changes(number of leafs write) into this, its got hanged and got socket closed error in application logs and CPU utilization goes 200% and RAM 52%. My DB_CONFIG file is below: # $OpenLDAP: pkg/ldap/servers/slapd/DB_CONFIG,v 1.3.2.4 2007/12/18 11:53:27 ghenry Exp $ # Example DB_CONFIG file for use with slapd(8) BDB/HDB databases. # # See the Oracle Berkeley DB documentation # <http://www.oracle.com/technology/documentation/berkeley-db/db/ref/env/db_co…> # for detail description of DB_CONFIG syntax and semantics. # # Hints can also be found in the OpenLDAP Software FAQ # <http://www.openldap.org/faq/index.cgi?file=2> # in particular: # <http://www.openldap.org/faq/index.cgi?file=1075> # Note: most DB_CONFIG settings will take effect only upon rebuilding # the DB environment. # one 0.25 GB cache set_cachesize 0 268435456 1 # Data Directory #set_data_dir db # Transaction Log settings set_lg_regionmax 262144 set_lg_bsize 2097152 #set_lg_dir logs # Note: special DB_CONFIG flags are no longer needed for "quick" # slapadd(8) or slapindex(8) access (see their -q option). Please help me here that what I need to do for better performance. Thanks in advance. My contact number is +919650477441

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Re: (ITS#6475) SASL OTP and syncrepl
by daniel＠pluta.biz 19 Jul '10

19 Jul '10

Hi, I've received segmentation faults during some basic SASL OTP testing using CVS HEAD. Below you'll find a small patch (against HEAD) which seems to fix this issue ... Before the patch: root@tingletangle:~/repos/openldap# /usr/local/openldap/bin/ldapsearch -v -Y OTP -U test1 ldap_initialize( <DEFAULT> ) SASL/OTP authentication started ldap_sasl_interactive_bind_s: Can't contact LDAP server (-1) (<== slapd segfault) After the patch has been applied: root@tingletangle:~/repos/openldap# /usr/local/openldap/bin/ldapsearch -v -Y OTP -U test1 ldap_initialize( <DEFAULT> ) SASL/OTP authentication started Challenge: otp-md5 498 ti6311 ext Please enter your one-time password: huhu ldap_sasl_interactive_bind_s: Invalid credentials (49) additional info: SASL(-13): authentication failure: (<== slapd still running ;-) ) As I'm not (yet ;-)) an OTP-expert I have not tested any further because I currently just don't know how to calculate the one-time password based on the challenge ... Best regards, Daniel Index: servers/slapd/sasl.c =================================================================== RCS file: /repo/OpenLDAP/pkg/ldap/servers/slapd/sasl.c,v retrieving revision 1.274 diff -u -r1.274 sasl.c --- servers/slapd/sasl.c 15 Apr 2010 16:13:54 -0000 1.274 +++ servers/slapd/sasl.c 19 Jul 2010 19:55:11 -0000 @@ -548,7 +548,7 @@ op.o_req_ndn.bv_val = (char *)pr[i].values[0]; } #ifdef SLAP_AUXPROP_DONTUSECOPY - { + if ( slap_dontUseCopy_propnames != NULL ) { struct berval bv; ber_str2bv( &pr[i].name[1], 0, 1, &bv ); for ( j = 0; !BER_BVISNULL( &slap_dontUseCopy_propnames[ j ] ); j++ ) {

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(ITS#6590) slaptest ignores slapd.conf's dbconfig statement during conversion into cn=config
by daniel＠pluta.biz 16 Jul '10

16 Jul '10

Full_Name: Daniel Pluta Version: HEAD OS: Lnx URL: ftp://ftp.openldap.org/incoming/ Submission from: (NULL) (2001:4ca0:0:f000:4877:9270:3ab1:2849) slaptest -f -F ignores slapd.conf (bdb/hdb convenience) dbconfig settings. Steps to reproduce: 1.) cat > slapd.conf <<EOF include /tmp/openldap/etc/openldap/schema/core.schema pidfile /tmp/openldap/var/run/slapd.pid argsfile /tmp/openldap/var/run/slapd.args database hdb dbconfig set_cachesize 0 1048576 0 dbconfig set_lg_bsize 2097152 suffix "dc=my-domain,dc=com" rootdn "cn=Manager,dc=my-domain,dc=com" rootpw secret directory /tmp/openldap/var/openldap-data index objectClass eq EOF 2.) convert slapd.conf into cn=config: mkdir slapd.d && slaptest -f slapd.conf -F slapd.d 3.) search slapd.d directory for "olcdbconfig" attribute values: grep -R -i olcDbConfig slapd.d/ the string "olcDbConfig" cannot be found (only in schema definition)...

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ITS#6576
by marco.pizzoli＠gmail.com 15 Jul '10

15 Jul '10

--0016e6de0432b2d346048b6a8223 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable I see only now that my ITS is in closed state, with the note about the use of grep. My initial request is motivated by a heavy trafficated deployment in which access log files are rotated every 3h and the information about the binddn/ip_src fall often in the rotated file. Worst of this, IBM Unix AIX systems permit LDAP integration using a daemon (secldapclntd) which creates a *permanent* pool of connections againts all ldap servers configured. IBM DB2 v9.5+ permit a native ldap integration and the behaviour is analogous to the AIX one. So, if I need to extract specific information about a binddn/ip I have to follow many files and correlate many informations (conn=3D<number>) For my purposes it would be sufficient an extension to slapo-accesslog permitting me to define a filter on the binddn of the activity. Thanks Marco --=20 _________________________________________ Non =E8 forte chi non cade, ma chi cadendo ha la forza di rialzarsi. Jim Morrison --0016e6de0432b2d346048b6a8223 Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable I see only now that my ITS is in closed state, with the note about the use = of grep. My initial request is motivated by a heavy trafficated depl= oyment in which access log files are rotated every 3h and the information a= bout the binddn/ip_src fall often in the rotated file. Worst of this, IBM Unix AIX systems permit LDAP integration using a dae= mon (secldapclntd) which creates a *permanent* pool of connections againts = all ldap servers configured. IBM DB2 v9.5+ permit a native ldap integrat= ion and the behaviour is analogous to the AIX one. So, if I need to extract specific information about a binddn/ip I have = to follow many files and correlate many informations (conn=3D<number>= ) For my purposes it would be sufficient an extension to slapo-acces= slog permitting me to define a filter on the binddn of the activity. Thanks =A0=A0=A0 Marco -- _________= ________________________________ Non =E8 forte chi non cade, ma chi cade= ndo ha la forza di rialzarsi. =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 Ji= m Morrison <div style=3D"visibility: hidden; display: inline;" id=3D"avg_ls_inline_pop= up"></div><style type=3D"text/css">#avg_ls_inline_popup { position:absolut= e; z-index:9999; padding: 0px 0px; margin-left: 0px; margin-top: 0px; = width: 240px; overflow: hidden; word-wrap: break-word; color: black; fo= nt-size: 10px; text-align: left; line-height: 13px;}</style> --0016e6de0432b2d346048b6a8223--

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Re: (ITS#6589) Patch - Mozilla NSS - support use of self signed CA certs as server certs
by rmeggins＠redhat.com 14 Jul '10

14 Jul '10

Howard Chu wrote: > Rich Megginson wrote: >> Howard Chu wrote: >>> Rich Megginson wrote: >>>> Howard Chu wrote: >>>>> rmeggins(a)redhat.com wrote: >>>>>> Full_Name: Rich Megginson >>>>>> Version: 2.4.23 >>>>>> OS: Fedora >>>>>> URL: >>>>>> ftp://ftp.openldap.org/incoming/openldap-2.4.23-selfsignedcacert-20100714.p… >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Submission from: (NULL) (76.113.111.209) >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> MozNSS doesn't like self-signed CA certs that are also used for >>>>>> TLS/SSL server certs (such as generated by openssl req -x509) >>>>>> CERT_VerifyCertificateNow returns SEC_ERROR_UNTRUSTED_ISSUER in that >>>>>> case >>>>>> so, see if the cert and issuer are the same cert, and allow the >>>>>> use of it (with a warning) >>>>> >>>>> If you checked to see if the issuer is already trusted, I guess the >>>>> patch is OK. >>>>> >>>>> But that aside, MozNSS's behavior sounds correct to me, and our >>>>> documentation says to use explicit CA certs, separate from the server >>>>> cert. Is it really a good idea to break this validation check? >>>> Probably not, but openssl seems to allow it. This provides parity >>>> with >>>> the openssl implementation. >>>> >>>> This issue came up when testing openldap with NSS support in Fedora. >>>> The Fedora package creates a self signed CA cert using openssl req >>>> -x509. This works with openldap+openssl, but fails with >>>> openldap+moznss. >>> >>> In the OpenSSL case, it only succeeds if the cert is configured as >>> both a CA cert and a server cert. I.e., the client must have been >>> configured to trust the cert already. I believe for your patch, it >>> should fail when CERT_FindCertIssuer() returns NULL. No? >> You are correct. I've uploaded a new patch. > > OK, committed. Thanks for the patch. And thank you for your help. > >> URL: >> ftp://ftp.openldap.org/incoming/openldap-2.4.23-selfsignedcacert-20100714-2…<ftp://ftp.openldap.org/incoming/openldap-2.4.23-selfsignedcacert-20100714.p…> >> >> >> Here is the diff between the two patches: >> 32,34c32 >> < + /* no issuer - warn and >> allow */ >> < + status = SECSuccess; >> < + rc = 0; >> --- >> > + /* no issuer - fail */ >> 36c34 >> < + "TLS: warning: the >> server certificate %s has no issuer - " >> --- >> > + "TLS: error: the >> server certificate %s has no issuer - " >> >>> >>>>> Also, where does this check occur in the main sequence of >>>>> verification >>>>> - has the BasicConstraints, KeyUsage, and/or NetscapeCertType already >>>>> been checked successfully? >>>> Yes. This check occurs in the cert chain processing, which is done >>>> last. >>> >>> OK. >>> >> >> > >

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Re: (ITS#6589) Patch - Mozilla NSS - support use of self signed CA certs as server certs
by hyc＠symas.com 14 Jul '10

14 Jul '10

Rich Megginson wrote: > Howard Chu wrote: >> Rich Megginson wrote: >>> Howard Chu wrote: >>>> rmeggins(a)redhat.com wrote: >>>>> Full_Name: Rich Megginson >>>>> Version: 2.4.23 >>>>> OS: Fedora >>>>> URL: >>>>> ftp://ftp.openldap.org/incoming/openldap-2.4.23-selfsignedcacert-20100714.p… >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Submission from: (NULL) (76.113.111.209) >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> MozNSS doesn't like self-signed CA certs that are also used for >>>>> TLS/SSL server certs (such as generated by openssl req -x509) >>>>> CERT_VerifyCertificateNow returns SEC_ERROR_UNTRUSTED_ISSUER in that >>>>> case >>>>> so, see if the cert and issuer are the same cert, and allow the >>>>> use of it (with a warning) >>>> >>>> If you checked to see if the issuer is already trusted, I guess the >>>> patch is OK. >>>> >>>> But that aside, MozNSS's behavior sounds correct to me, and our >>>> documentation says to use explicit CA certs, separate from the server >>>> cert. Is it really a good idea to break this validation check? >>> Probably not, but openssl seems to allow it. This provides parity with >>> the openssl implementation. >>> >>> This issue came up when testing openldap with NSS support in Fedora. >>> The Fedora package creates a self signed CA cert using openssl req >>> -x509. This works with openldap+openssl, but fails with >>> openldap+moznss. >> >> In the OpenSSL case, it only succeeds if the cert is configured as >> both a CA cert and a server cert. I.e., the client must have been >> configured to trust the cert already. I believe for your patch, it >> should fail when CERT_FindCertIssuer() returns NULL. No? > You are correct. I've uploaded a new patch. OK, committed. Thanks for the patch. > URL: ftp://ftp.openldap.org/incoming/openldap-2.4.23-selfsignedcacert-20100714-2…<ftp://ftp.openldap.org/incoming/openldap-2.4.23-selfsignedcacert-20100714.p…> > > Here is the diff between the two patches: > 32,34c32 > < + /* no issuer - warn and allow */ > < + status = SECSuccess; > < + rc = 0; > --- > > + /* no issuer - fail */ > 36c34 > < + "TLS: warning: the > server certificate %s has no issuer - " > --- > > + "TLS: error: the > server certificate %s has no issuer - " > >> >>>> Also, where does this check occur in the main sequence of verification >>>> - has the BasicConstraints, KeyUsage, and/or NetscapeCertType already >>>> been checked successfully? >>> Yes. This check occurs in the cert chain processing, which is done >>> last. >> >> OK. >> > > -- -- Howard Chu CTO, Symas Corp. http://www.symas.com Director, Highland Sun http://highlandsun.com/hyc/ Chief Architect, OpenLDAP http://www.openldap.org/project/

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Re: (ITS#6589) Patch - Mozilla NSS - support use of self signed CA certs as server certs
by rmeggins＠redhat.com 14 Jul '10

14 Jul '10

Howard Chu wrote: > Rich Megginson wrote: >> Howard Chu wrote: >>> rmeggins(a)redhat.com wrote: >>>> Full_Name: Rich Megginson >>>> Version: 2.4.23 >>>> OS: Fedora >>>> URL: >>>> ftp://ftp.openldap.org/incoming/openldap-2.4.23-selfsignedcacert-20100714.p… >>>> >>>> >>>> Submission from: (NULL) (76.113.111.209) >>>> >>>> >>>> MozNSS doesn't like self-signed CA certs that are also used for >>>> TLS/SSL server certs (such as generated by openssl req -x509) >>>> CERT_VerifyCertificateNow returns SEC_ERROR_UNTRUSTED_ISSUER in that >>>> case >>>> so, see if the cert and issuer are the same cert, and allow the >>>> use of it (with a warning) >>> >>> If you checked to see if the issuer is already trusted, I guess the >>> patch is OK. >>> >>> But that aside, MozNSS's behavior sounds correct to me, and our >>> documentation says to use explicit CA certs, separate from the server >>> cert. Is it really a good idea to break this validation check? >> Probably not, but openssl seems to allow it. This provides parity with >> the openssl implementation. >> >> This issue came up when testing openldap with NSS support in Fedora. >> The Fedora package creates a self signed CA cert using openssl req >> -x509. This works with openldap+openssl, but fails with >> openldap+moznss. > > In the OpenSSL case, it only succeeds if the cert is configured as > both a CA cert and a server cert. I.e., the client must have been > configured to trust the cert already. I believe for your patch, it > should fail when CERT_FindCertIssuer() returns NULL. No? You are correct. I've uploaded a new patch. URL: ftp://ftp.openldap.org/incoming/openldap-2.4.23-selfsignedcacert-20100714-2… <ftp://ftp.openldap.org/incoming/openldap-2.4.23-selfsignedcacert-20100714.p…> Here is the diff between the two patches: 32,34c32 < + /* no issuer - warn and allow */ < + status = SECSuccess; < + rc = 0; --- > + /* no issuer - fail */ 36c34 < + "TLS: warning: the server certificate %s has no issuer - " --- > + "TLS: error: the server certificate %s has no issuer - " > >>> Also, where does this check occur in the main sequence of verification >>> - has the BasicConstraints, KeyUsage, and/or NetscapeCertType already >>> been checked successfully? >> Yes. This check occurs in the cert chain processing, which is done >> last. > > OK. >

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ITS#6570 published: SECURITY: Two OpenLDAP preauth vulnerabilities
by openldap-its＠OpenLDAP.org 14 Jul '10

14 Jul '10

Private ITS#6570 is now publicly readable URL: http://www.OpenLDAP.org/its/?findid=6570

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Re: (ITS#6589) Patch - Mozilla NSS - support use of self signed CA certs as server certs
by hyc＠symas.com 14 Jul '10

14 Jul '10

Rich Megginson wrote: > Howard Chu wrote: >> rmeggins(a)redhat.com wrote: >>> Full_Name: Rich Megginson >>> Version: 2.4.23 >>> OS: Fedora >>> URL: >>> ftp://ftp.openldap.org/incoming/openldap-2.4.23-selfsignedcacert-20100714.p… >>> >>> Submission from: (NULL) (76.113.111.209) >>> >>> >>> MozNSS doesn't like self-signed CA certs that are also used for >>> TLS/SSL server certs (such as generated by openssl req -x509) >>> CERT_VerifyCertificateNow returns SEC_ERROR_UNTRUSTED_ISSUER in that >>> case >>> so, see if the cert and issuer are the same cert, and allow the >>> use of it (with a warning) >> >> If you checked to see if the issuer is already trusted, I guess the >> patch is OK. >> >> But that aside, MozNSS's behavior sounds correct to me, and our >> documentation says to use explicit CA certs, separate from the server >> cert. Is it really a good idea to break this validation check? > Probably not, but openssl seems to allow it. This provides parity with > the openssl implementation. > > This issue came up when testing openldap with NSS support in Fedora. > The Fedora package creates a self signed CA cert using openssl req > -x509. This works with openldap+openssl, but fails with openldap+moznss. In the OpenSSL case, it only succeeds if the cert is configured as both a CA cert and a server cert. I.e., the client must have been configured to trust the cert already. I believe for your patch, it should fail when CERT_FindCertIssuer() returns NULL. No? >> Also, where does this check occur in the main sequence of verification >> - has the BasicConstraints, KeyUsage, and/or NetscapeCertType already >> been checked successfully? > Yes. This check occurs in the cert chain processing, which is done last. OK. -- -- Howard Chu CTO, Symas Corp. http://www.symas.com Director, Highland Sun http://highlandsun.com/hyc/ Chief Architect, OpenLDAP http://www.openldap.org/project/

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Re: (ITS#6589) Patch - Mozilla NSS - support use of self signed CA certs as server certs
by rmeggins＠redhat.com 14 Jul '10

14 Jul '10

Howard Chu wrote: > rmeggins(a)redhat.com wrote: >> Full_Name: Rich Megginson >> Version: 2.4.23 >> OS: Fedora >> URL: >> ftp://ftp.openldap.org/incoming/openldap-2.4.23-selfsignedcacert-20100714.p… >> >> Submission from: (NULL) (76.113.111.209) >> >> >> MozNSS doesn't like self-signed CA certs that are also used for >> TLS/SSL server certs (such as generated by openssl req -x509) >> CERT_VerifyCertificateNow returns SEC_ERROR_UNTRUSTED_ISSUER in that >> case >> so, see if the cert and issuer are the same cert, and allow the >> use of it (with a warning) > > If you checked to see if the issuer is already trusted, I guess the > patch is OK. > > But that aside, MozNSS's behavior sounds correct to me, and our > documentation says to use explicit CA certs, separate from the server > cert. Is it really a good idea to break this validation check? Probably not, but openssl seems to allow it. This provides parity with the openssl implementation. This issue came up when testing openldap with NSS support in Fedora. The Fedora package creates a self signed CA cert using openssl req -x509. This works with openldap+openssl, but fails with openldap+moznss. > > Also, where does this check occur in the main sequence of verification > - has the BasicConstraints, KeyUsage, and/or NetscapeCertType already > been checked successfully? Yes. This check occurs in the cert chain processing, which is done last. > >> This patch file is derived from OpenLDAP Software. All of the >> modifications to OpenLDAP Software represented in the following >> patch(es) were developed by Red Hat. Red Hat has not assigned rights >> and/or interest in this work to any party. I, Rich Megginson am >> authorized by Red Hat, my employer, to release this work under the >> following terms. >> >> Red Hat hereby place the following modifications to OpenLDAP Software >> (and only these modifications) into the public domain. Hence, these >> modifications may be freely used and/or redistributed for any purpose >> with or without attribution and/or other notice. >

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Re: (ITS#6589) Patch - Mozilla NSS - support use of self signed CA certs as server certs
by hyc＠symas.com 14 Jul '10

14 Jul '10

rmeggins(a)redhat.com wrote: > Full_Name: Rich Megginson > Version: 2.4.23 > OS: Fedora > URL: ftp://ftp.openldap.org/incoming/openldap-2.4.23-selfsignedcacert-20100714.p… > Submission from: (NULL) (76.113.111.209) > > > MozNSS doesn't like self-signed CA certs that are also used for > TLS/SSL server certs (such as generated by openssl req -x509) > CERT_VerifyCertificateNow returns SEC_ERROR_UNTRUSTED_ISSUER in that case > so, see if the cert and issuer are the same cert, and allow the > use of it (with a warning) If you checked to see if the issuer is already trusted, I guess the patch is OK. But that aside, MozNSS's behavior sounds correct to me, and our documentation says to use explicit CA certs, separate from the server cert. Is it really a good idea to break this validation check? Also, where does this check occur in the main sequence of verification - has the BasicConstraints, KeyUsage, and/or NetscapeCertType already been checked successfully? > This patch file is derived from OpenLDAP Software. All of the > modifications to OpenLDAP Software represented in the following > patch(es) were developed by Red Hat. Red Hat has not assigned rights > and/or interest in this work to any party. I, Rich Megginson am > authorized by Red Hat, my employer, to release this work under the > following terms. > > Red Hat hereby place the following modifications to OpenLDAP Software > (and only these modifications) into the public domain. Hence, these > modifications may be freely used and/or redistributed for any purpose > with or without attribution and/or other notice. -- -- Howard Chu CTO, Symas Corp. http://www.symas.com Director, Highland Sun http://highlandsun.com/hyc/ Chief Architect, OpenLDAP http://www.openldap.org/project/

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(ITS#6589) Patch - Mozilla NSS - support use of self signed CA certs as server certs
by rmeggins＠redhat.com 14 Jul '10

14 Jul '10

Full_Name: Rich Megginson Version: 2.4.23 OS: Fedora URL: ftp://ftp.openldap.org/incoming/openldap-2.4.23-selfsignedcacert-20100714.p… Submission from: (NULL) (76.113.111.209) MozNSS doesn't like self-signed CA certs that are also used for TLS/SSL server certs (such as generated by openssl req -x509) CERT_VerifyCertificateNow returns SEC_ERROR_UNTRUSTED_ISSUER in that case so, see if the cert and issuer are the same cert, and allow the use of it (with a warning) This patch file is derived from OpenLDAP Software. All of the modifications to OpenLDAP Software represented in the following patch(es) were developed by Red Hat. Red Hat has not assigned rights and/or interest in this work to any party. I, Rich Megginson am authorized by Red Hat, my employer, to release this work under the following terms. Red Hat hereby place the following modifications to OpenLDAP Software (and only these modifications) into the public domain. Hence, these modifications may be freely used and/or redistributed for any purpose with or without attribution and/or other notice.

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Re: (ITS#6588) Change log not up to date on www.openldap.org
by Kurt＠OpenLDAP.org 13 Jul '10

13 Jul '10

On Jul 13, 2010, at 2:39 AM, jonathan(a)phillipoux.net wrote: > Full_Name: Jonathan Clarke > Version: 2.4.23 > OS:=20 > URL: ftp://ftp.openldap.org/incoming/ > Submission from: (NULL) (84.14.151.50) >=20 >=20 > The page at http://www.openldap.org/software/release/changes.html only = lists > changes for the 2.4.22 release, although 2.4.23 is now released. Fixed. -- Kurt

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(ITS#6588) Change log not up to date on www.openldap.org
by jonathan＠phillipoux.net 13 Jul '10

13 Jul '10

Full_Name: Jonathan Clarke Version: 2.4.23 OS: URL: ftp://ftp.openldap.org/incoming/ Submission from: (NULL) (84.14.151.50) The page at http://www.openldap.org/software/release/changes.html only lists changes for the 2.4.22 release, although 2.4.23 is now released. This should be updated, I guess! In the mean time, changes can be consulted here: http://www.openldap.org/devel/cvsweb.cgi/~checkout~/Attic/CHANGES?rev=1.5.1…

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Re: (ITS#6585) close is called from dap_unbind_s with fd = -1
by asifiqbal.desai＠gmail.com 12 Jul '10

12 Jul '10

Can somebody take a look at this issue. Note that the issue here is with close() being called from ldap_unbind_s with fd = (-1). Please read the first line in my original bug description email as: This is a consulation bug for clarification on close() being called from ldap_unbind_s with fd = -1.

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