https://bugs.openldap.org/show_bug.cgi?id=10488
Issue ID: 10488
Summary: Multiple out-of-bounds reads in servers/slapd/result.c
v2ref() function
Product: OpenLDAP
Version: unspecified
Hardware: All
OS: All
Status: UNCONFIRMED
Keywords: needs_review
Severity: normal
Priority: ---
Component: slapd
Assignee: bugs(a)openldap.org
Reporter: wangxiaomeng(a)kylinos.cn
Target Milestone: ---
Created attachment 1142
--> https://bugs.openldap.org/attachment.cgi?id=1142&action=edit
Fix two out-of-bounds reads in servers/slapd/result.c v2ref() function
The v2ref() function in servers/slapd/result.c is responsible for converting
LDAPv3 referrals to an LDAPv2-compatible string format. Two separate
out-of-bounds read vulnerabilities exist in this function, both caused by
insufficient checks for zero-length data before accessing the last character of
the data buffer.
Vulnerability 1: Out-of-bounds read in text buffer handling
Location: servers/slapd/result.c, line 94 (within the v2ref() function):
Vulnerable Code:
if ( text != NULL ) {
len = strlen( text );
if (text[len-1] != '\n') {
i = 1;
}
}
When the 'text' parameter is non-NULL but points to an empty string (""),
strlen(text) returns 0. Accessing text[len-1] (i.e., text[-1]) results in an
out-of-bounds read of one byte before the start of the 'text' buffer.
Vulnerability 2: Out-of-bounds read in BerValue referral handling
Location: servers/slapd/result.c, line 115 (within the v2ref() function)
Vulnerable Code:
len += ref[i].bv_len;
if (ref[i].bv_val[ref[i].bv_len-1] != '/') {
++len;
}
When ref[i].bv_val is non-NULL but ref[i].bv_len is 0 (a valid state per LDAP
BerValue semantics, representing an empty string), accessing
ref[i].bv_val[ref[i].bv_len-1] (i.e., ref[i].bv_val[-1]) results in an
out-of-bounds read of one byte before the start of the ref[i].bv_val buffer.
Fix
Add checks for zero-length data before accessing the last character of the
respective buffers. The fix addresses both vulnerabilities with minimal,
targeted changes that preserve the original functionality.
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https://bugs.openldap.org/show_bug.cgi?id=10497
Issue ID: 10497
Summary: o_ctrlflags usage confused
Product: OpenLDAP
Version: unspecified
Hardware: All
OS: All
Status: UNCONFIRMED
Keywords: needs_review
Severity: normal
Priority: ---
Component: slapd
Assignee: bugs(a)openldap.org
Reporter: ondra(a)mistotebe.net
Target Milestone: ---
There is widespread confusion about what is stored in o_ctrlflags (and
retrieved with get_<control> macros.)
Some code is spot on e.g., get_pagedresults() and checks for
SLAP_CONTROL_NON/CRITICAL/IGNORED as it should, most of them expect 0/1
(assert, manageDSAiT, ...)
We could correct all the get_* tests to check for > IGNORED or just add a has_
variant if we want to keep the code simple for those that don't need to bother.
And we want to fix autogroup to set o.o_permissive_modify correctly.
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https://bugs.openldap.org/show_bug.cgi?id=10456
Issue ID: 10456
Summary: Record time it took to run purge task
Product: OpenLDAP
Version: unspecified
Hardware: All
OS: All
Status: UNCONFIRMED
Keywords: needs_review
Severity: normal
Priority: ---
Component: overlays
Assignee: bugs(a)openldap.org
Reporter: ondra(a)mistotebe.net
Target Milestone: ---
accesslog could report a summary at the end of the purge saying how long it
took and how many entries were (or would have been if shutting down) removed in
that run. Thinking SYNC level as that's where most accesslog's messages go
already.
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https://bugs.openldap.org/show_bug.cgi?id=9493
Issue ID: 9493
Summary: slapo-accesslog handling of deletion of multi-valued
configuration attributes removes wrong value from list
Product: OpenLDAP
Version: 2.4.57
Hardware: All
OS: All
Status: UNCONFIRMED
Severity: normal
Priority: ---
Component: overlays
Assignee: bugs(a)openldap.org
Reporter: svella(a)technologist.com
Target Milestone: ---
I observed this in the debugger while working on a small feature addition to
slapo-accesslog.
log_cf_gen(), when handling the initial configuration of oldAccessLogOldAttr
(accesslog.c:989), linked list li_oldattrs is being built by inserting each
value in order at the head of the list, resulting in the list being in reverse
order. But when handling LDAP_MOD_DELETE of same attribute (accesslog.c:989),
it is using the index of the removed value (valx) to find and removed the entry
in the linked list, but it's counting from the head of li_oldattrs and not the
tail, resulting in the wrong item being removed from the list unless counting
from the head or the tail happens find the same item.
(Line numbers refer to commit 6c469f07935e351e349bf38fc223dab704c51a76)
Handling of oldAccessLogBase appears to have the same problem, and a cursory
glance through the source of other overlays reveals a similar pattern, and I'm
guessing the same problem.
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https://bugs.openldap.org/show_bug.cgi?id=9556
Issue ID: 9556
Summary: slapd-config should return invalidAttributeSyntax if
parsing schema description fails
Product: OpenLDAP
Version: 2.5.4
Hardware: All
OS: All
Status: UNCONFIRMED
Severity: normal
Priority: ---
Component: slapd
Assignee: bugs(a)openldap.org
Reporter: michael(a)stroeder.com
Target Milestone: ---
I'm currently testing error handling and interacting with LDAP clients (e.g. my
web2ldap).
Sending an invalid attribute type description results in an error (as expected)
returned by slapd-config:
RESULT tag=103 err=80 qtime=0.000032 etime=0.001271 text=olcAttributeTypes:
Unexpected token before SYNTAX 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.15 )
But result code other(80) seems not very useful. It's too unspecific to decide
on specific error handling.
It would be much more useful if slapd-config returns invalidAttributeSyntax(21)
in this case.
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https://bugs.openldap.org/show_bug.cgi?id=9959
Issue ID: 9959
Summary: Expose the lloadd connection endpoints in cn=monitor
for identification
Product: OpenLDAP
Version: unspecified
Hardware: All
OS: All
Status: UNCONFIRMED
Keywords: needs_review
Severity: normal
Priority: ---
Component: lloadd
Assignee: bugs(a)openldap.org
Reporter: ondra(a)mistotebe.net
Target Milestone: ---
ITS#9600 introduces a way to operate on lloadd connections, however it is
impossible to identify which socket this actually corresponds to. While we're
at it, might also expose the current bound identity there.
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https://bugs.openldap.org/show_bug.cgi?id=10266
Issue ID: 10266
Summary: Adopt broader RFC4511 NoD interpretation on lloadd's
client side
Product: OpenLDAP
Version: unspecified
Hardware: All
OS: All
Status: UNCONFIRMED
Keywords: needs_review
Severity: normal
Priority: ---
Component: lloadd
Assignee: bugs(a)openldap.org
Reporter: ondra(a)mistotebe.net
Target Milestone: ---
Server side, lloadd has long implemented a broad interpretation of NoD
unsolicited response handling: when the message is issued, no new requests are
accepted on the session however the client and server are both free to keep the
session open if there are any operations that have not resolved yet. The server
is still expected to close the connection as soon as no operations are still
pending.
This seems to interoperate with known clients. Those that want to will close
the session immediately, unaware of this possibility, those that also want to
interpret RFC 4511 this way can choose to wait for existing operations to
resolve.
This ticket is to track the lloadd's implementation of the client side of this
- when receiving a NoD message, we don't close the connection
immediately+unconditionally either but are willing to wait.
Related functionality:
- if connection was a bind connection processing a multi-stage SASL bind, the
bind should fail if/when the client attempts to progress it
- clients assigned to this connection through coherence at least 'connection'
are also marked closing
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https://bugs.openldap.org/show_bug.cgi?id=10502
Issue ID: 10502
Summary: feature proxyauthz should become default
Product: OpenLDAP
Version: unspecified
Hardware: All
OS: All
Status: UNCONFIRMED
Keywords: needs_review
Severity: normal
Priority: ---
Component: lloadd
Assignee: bugs(a)openldap.org
Reporter: ondra(a)mistotebe.net
Target Milestone: ---
Most stock lloadd deployments are against OpenLDAP, but since "feature" keyword
doesn't allow "off-switches", proxyauthz has had to have been an "off by
default" thing. This is insecure and probably a footgun for many.
We'll have to introduce a new configuration option to do this, one that allows
for gentler evolution.
This also allows us to reject a bindconf+no_proxyauthz combinations if we force
the rare admins who genuinely need it (no proxyauthz support in upstreams) to
opt in explicitly.
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https://bugs.openldap.org/show_bug.cgi?id=10517
Issue ID: 10517
Summary: mbedTLS doesn't verify certificate in reqcert try mode
Product: OpenLDAP
Version: unspecified
Hardware: All
OS: All
Status: UNCONFIRMED
Keywords: needs_review
Severity: normal
Priority: ---
Component: libraries
Assignee: bugs(a)openldap.org
Reporter: ondra(a)mistotebe.net
Target Milestone: ---
When setting the authmode to OPTIONAL, mbedTLS documentation[0] says that it's
the user's responsibility to check the verification result if they care.
`reqcert try` does care, but mbedtls_ssl_get_verify_result is never called in
that case and so an invalid cert is not detected (easy to test by changing line
204 in test067).
[0].
https://os.mbed.com/teams/sandbox/code/mbedtls/docs/tip/ssl_8h.html#a569528…
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https://bugs.openldap.org/show_bug.cgi?id=9640
Issue ID: 9640
Summary: ACL privilege for MOD_INCREMENT
Product: OpenLDAP
Version: unspecified
Hardware: All
OS: All
Status: UNCONFIRMED
Severity: normal
Priority: ---
Component: slapd
Assignee: bugs(a)openldap.org
Reporter: michael(a)stroeder.com
Target Milestone: ---
I'm using LDAP write operations with MOD_INCREMENT with pre-read-control for
uidNumber/gidNumber generation.
I'd like to limit write access to an Integer attribute "nextID" to
MOD_INCREMENT, ideally even restricting the de-/increment value.
(Uniqueness is achieved with slapo-unique anyway but still I'd like to avoid
users messing with this attribute).
IMHO the ideal solution would be a new privilege "i".
Example for limiting write access to increment by one and grant read access for
using read control:
access to
attrs=nextID
val=1
by group=... =ri
Example for decrementing by two without read:
access to
attrs=nextID
val=-2
by group=... =i
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