openldap-bugs October 2007

openldap-bugs@openldap.org

38 participants
215 discussions

Re: (ITS#5203) [LDAP: error code 32 - No Such Object];
by quanah＠zimbra.com 27 Oct '07

27 Oct '07

--On Friday, October 26, 2007 10:53 AM +0000 hiremath47(a)gmail.com wrote: > Full_Name: Siddeshawr > Version: Version 2.8 > OS: > URL: ftp://ftp.openldap.org/incoming/ > Submission from: (NULL) (203.92.60.81) The ITS system is for bug reports, not usage questions. Please use openldap-software(a)openldap.org for questions you have about using OpenLDAP. I will also note that "2.8" is not a valid OpenLDAP release. --Quanah -- Quanah Gibson-Mount Principal Software Engineer Zimbra, Inc -------------------- Zimbra :: the leader in open source messaging and collaboration

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(ITS#5203) [LDAP: error code 32 - No Such Object];
by hiremath47＠gmail.com 26 Oct '07

26 Oct '07

Full_Name: Siddeshawr Version: Version 2.8 OS: URL: ftp://ftp.openldap.org/incoming/ Submission from: (NULL) (203.92.60.81) Hi, If I try to add the following entry into the LDAP 'uid=seal_koa/denage(a)denimvage.com' javax.naming.NameNotFoundException: [LDAP: error code 32 - No Such Object]; remaining name at com.sun.jndi.ldap.LdapCtx.mapErrorCode(LdapCtx.java:3013) at com.sun.jndi.ldap.LdapCtx.processReturnCode(LdapCtx.java:2934) at com.sun.jndi.ldap.LdapCtx.processReturnCode(LdapCtx.java:2740) at com.sun.jndi.ldap.LdapCtx.c_lookup(LdapCtx.java:998) at com.sun.jndi.toolkit.ctx.ComponentContext.c_resolveIntermediate_nns(ComponentContext.java:152) at com.sun.jndi.toolkit.ctx.AtomicContext.c_resolveIntermediate_nns(AtomicContext.java:342) at com.sun.jndi.toolkit.ctx.ComponentContext.p_resolveIntermediate(ComponentContext.java:381) at com.sun.jndi.toolkit.ctx.ComponentDirContext.p_createSubcontext(ComponentDirContext.java:311) at com.sun.jndi.toolkit.ctx.PartialCompositeDirContext.createSubcontext(PartialCompositeDirContext.java:248) at com.sun.jndi.toolkit.ctx.PartialCompositeDirContext.createSubcontext(PartialCompositeDirContext.java:236) at javax.naming.directory.InitialDirContext.createSubcontext(InitialDirContext.java:176) Please suggest on the same. Regards, Siddeshwar

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Re: (ITS#5195) ssf not available during sasl bind
by russell-openldap＠stuart.id.au 26 Oct '07

26 Oct '07

I have now tried: security tls=128 sasl=128 It didn't work. All the commands below work without the 'security' option. ldapsearch -x -ZZ -D "uid=openldap,dc=auth,dc=lubemobile,dc=com,dc=au" -w "$(ssu cat /etc/libnss-ldap.secret)" -b "dc=pwd,dc=lubemobile,dc=com,dc=au" "(uid=it)" ldap_bind: Confidentiality required (13) additional info: SASL confidentiality required Which, when I think about it may be reasonable. I am apparently saying I require a sasl ssf of 128, and obviously I don't have that. This was a surprise though: ldapsearch -ZZ -U "openldap" -b "dc=pwd,dc=lubemobile,dc=com,dc=au" "(uid=it)" ldap_sasl_interactive_bind_s: Confidentiality required (13) additional info: SASL confidentiality required Is that a bug? Anyway, bugs aside, assuming I now have some idea how it works its useless for my application. I want to insist that userPassword to be encrypted when sent and received, be that via CRAM-MD5 or friends or by using TLS, but clear text is fine for the rest of the information in the ldap database, and in fact anonymous connections unencrypted connections are the rule for VPN access. The 'security' option applies to all connections. Anyway, to state the problem as clearly as I can, I can't see how to do the following combination of things: . Allow anonymous access over unencrypted connections for the bulk of the database. . Allow simple binds, but they must be over encrypted connections to protect userPassword. . Allow sasl binds over unencrypted connections, but the must not use clear text. . Not particularly relevant to me, but it would be nice to allow sasl binds using clear text if they are over an encrypted connection. The patch does this of course, but if there is some other way then the patch is irrelevant, except perhaps from a usability point of view.

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Re: (ITS#5195) ssf not available during sasl bind
by russell-openldap＠stuart.id.au 26 Oct '07

26 Oct '07

On Thu, 2007-10-25 at 16:33 -0700, Howard Chu wrote: > There are no shortcuts when it comes to security. If you don't take the time > to understand it you'll get it wrong, period. That's true of all systems, no > matter how simple or complex - if you don't take the time to understand the > system's security requirements, you will screw up. As in your example above, > which should use "auth" access, not "read" access. I am not sure I agree, but to borrow your words a discussion about short cuts to security seems irrelevant to this ITS, as is whether I made a typo in my example. The rather long winded rant is relevant in one minor way (sorry about the length). In your original counter example, you said correctly "slap_auxprop_lookup" is doing an internal search and thus doesn't expose the password. The fact that I would have to know that in order to realise that "acl ... by tls_ssf=" doesn't do what I want is what I was railing against. It is purely a technical detail. When plain text is used, the password is sent over the connection. The fact happens not to be the copy in the slapd database (and thus as you say the copy in the database is infinitely secure) is irrelevant to me, the user. You said that if "you don't take the time to understand [the] security [model], you will get it wrong, period". Well there is room for movement at both ends. You can insist the user spends a long time understanding slapd's security model, or you can make the model easier to understand. I think the patch does the latter. If you think I am wrong, ie it makes slapd configuration harder to understand, then by all means reject it.

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Re: (ITS#5195) ssf not available during sasl bind
by hyc＠symas.com 26 Oct '07

26 Oct '07

russell-openldap(a)stuart.id.au wrote: > On Thu, 2007-10-25 at 05:18 -0700, Howard Chu wrote: >> Using ACLs to enforce this requirement is the wrong approach though. You >> should just use the "security" directive instead. With your approach you're >> missing the fact that SASL may not have sent any password at all to slapd >> (e.g., when using DIGEST-MD5 or an OTP mechanism). As such, you're imposing a >> constraint that makes no sense. > > So you are saying: > > security sasl=128 simple_bind=128 > > would achieve that? I guess it would. > > However, with the patch applied this would have the same > effect, with the addition that if some other authorisation > mechanism were introduced (eg pam), it would fail unless > it was encrypted or I explicitly allowed it. > > acl <password-stuff> > by tls_ssf=128 ... read > by sasl_ssf=128 ... read > by * none > > This may look icky to you, but to someone who is just > trying to deploy slapd it means there is one less > slapd.conf option I have to get my head around. There are no shortcuts when it comes to security. If you don't take the time to understand it you'll get it wrong, period. That's true of all systems, no matter how simple or complex - if you don't take the time to understand the system's security requirements, you will screw up. As in your example above, which should use "auth" access, not "read" access. > <rant> > > Perhaps ease of configuration doesn't seem so important. > But I was at a talk given by Andrew Tridgell about why > he wrote tdb instead of using just using openldap. > Answer: because it took him 3 days to get slapd > configured and working. 3 days is an impressively > short time going on my experiences with it. He actually > said it wasn't because slapd had bugs, or slapd was too > slow, or slapd didn't have a feature. It was just > because in the final analysis, he could not see the > typical samba user being able to make the thing work. He should have come and talked to us. (In fact, since then, he has. We've shown how easily a canned Samba config can be setup, and we'll be collaborating closely on schema issues and other things down the road.) > When something is hard to configure typically the doco > is blamed. But that is often wrong and is wrong in the > case of openldap. The blame lies with the design of > the system. The programmers fail to see the > configuration of the system as another interface. They > will put hours of work into designing an API, and > devote 100's of lines of code to making sure that API > is easy to use, that it hides the complexities of its > implementation. Yet they ignore configuration, which > in effect another API - it is the interface between > the users and the program. You presume a lot here. Configuration in OpenLDAP 2.3 and 2.4 is a lot more rational than it ever was in prior releases, and that's because it has been the focus of considerable attention. The fact that your old methods still work, allowing you to limp along without reading about all the new methods, is a testament to the care that was taken in building the configuration enhancements. > If it had of been an API presented to other > programmers, I bet the original designer who of thought > "how can I hide all this behind a simple, clean, easy > to understand interface". But he didn't, and so now > openldap deservedly has the reputation as one of the > harder pieces of open source software to get up and > going. As a consequence it is deployed a lot less > than it should be. Nonsense. The primary reason OpenLDAP has a bad reputation in some circles is because distros like RedHat continued to bundle obsolete versions years after they had been dropped by the Project, and so a vast number of users were never exposed to the myriad improvements made over time. Regardless, OpenLDAP usage is still growing, and it looks like the growth will continue to accelerate. None of this discussion is relevant to this ITS. -- -- Howard Chu Chief Architect, Symas Corp. http://www.symas.com Director, Highland Sun http://highlandsun.com/hyc/ Chief Architect, OpenLDAP http://www.openldap.org/project/

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Re: (ITS#5195) ssf not available during sasl bind
by russell-openldap＠stuart.id.au 26 Oct '07

26 Oct '07

On Thu, 2007-10-25 at 05:18 -0700, Howard Chu wrote: > Using ACLs to enforce this requirement is the wrong approach though. You > should just use the "security" directive instead. With your approach you're > missing the fact that SASL may not have sent any password at all to slapd > (e.g., when using DIGEST-MD5 or an OTP mechanism). As such, you're imposing a > constraint that makes no sense. So you are saying: security sasl=128 simple_bind=128 would achieve that? I guess it would. However, with the patch applied this would have the same effect, with the addition that if some other authorisation mechanism were introduced (eg pam), it would fail unless it was encrypted or I explicitly allowed it. acl <password-stuff> by tls_ssf=128 ... read by sasl_ssf=128 ... read by * none This may look icky to you, but to someone who is just trying to deploy slapd it means there is one less slapd.conf option I have to get my head around. <rant> Perhaps ease of configuration doesn't seem so important. But I was at a talk given by Andrew Tridgell about why he wrote tdb instead of using just using openldap. Answer: because it took him 3 days to get slapd configured and working. 3 days is an impressively short time going on my experiences with it. He actually said it wasn't because slapd had bugs, or slapd was too slow, or slapd didn't have a feature. It was just because in the final analysis, he could not see the typical samba user being able to make the thing work. When something is hard to configure typically the doco is blamed. But that is often wrong and is wrong in the case of openldap. The blame lies with the design of the system. The programmers fail to see the configuration of the system as another interface. They will put hours of work into designing an API, and devote 100's of lines of code to making sure that API is easy to use, that it hides the complexities of its implementation. Yet they ignore configuration, which in effect another API - it is the interface between the users and the program. Like most projects openldap uses many libraries to do its thing. But makes no attempt to hide that from the user. In order to configure openldap you have to understand ldap, sasl, tls, berkley db, but whats worse you have to understand how they interact with each other within openldap. For example, ssf is a sasl concept. simple_bind is an ldap concept. But the "security" option has "simple_bind=<ssf_factor>", so suddenly you have to know both, even if you have no intention of using one of them. Ick, ick, ick. If it had of been an API presented to other programmers, I bet the original designer who of thought "how can I hide all this behind a simple, clean, easy to understand interface". But he didn't, and so now openldap deservedly has the reputation as one of the harder pieces of open source software to get up and going. As a consequence it is deployed a lot less than it should be. </rant>

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Re: (ITS#5202) ldapsearch -E pr segfault
by kurt＠OpenLDAP.org 26 Oct '07

26 Oct '07

On Oct 25, 2007, at 9:35 PM, hyc(a)symas.com wrote: > That doesn't make any sense, the fix for ITS#5100 is not in 2.3.38. After double checking, this issue is the result of a local source merge issue. I withdraw this ITS. -- Kurt

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Re: (ITS#5202) ldapsearch -E pr segfault
by hyc＠symas.com 26 Oct '07

26 Oct '07

ando(a)sys-net.it wrote: > kurt(a)OpenLDAP.org wrote: >> Full_Name: Kurt Zeilenga >> Version: 2.3.38 >> OS: Linux >> URL: ftp://ftp.openldap.org/incoming/ >> Submission from: (NULL) (75.141.229.206) >> >> >> Here's a stack trace; the command was: >> % ldapsearch -x -E pr=2/noprompt -b "o=test2,o=test" -s one "cn=*" cn >> . >> . >> (gdb) where >> #0 0x005303d4 in _int_free () from /lib/tls/libc.so.6 >> #1 0x0053172b in free () from /lib/tls/libc.so.6 >> #2 0x004201e3 in ber_memfree_x (p=0x805405d, ctx=0x0) at memory.c:149 >> #3 0x001d85e8 in ldap_control_free (c=0xbfe3ecd0) at controls.c:260 >> #4 0x001d8669 in ldap_controls_free (controls=0x9c801c8) at controls.c:285 >> #5 0x0804f703 in tool_server_controls (ld=0x9c76550, extra_c=0xbfe3ece0, >> count=-1) at common.c:1250 >> #6 0x0804b910 in main (argc=14, argv=0xbfe40e44) at ldapsearch.c:794 >> >> It's done the bind ok by this stage but never gets as far as sending the search >> request. > > I think this could be a consequence of fixing ITS#5100: probably, > ldapsearch's call of ldap_control_free() was incorrectly relying on its > broken behavior. That doesn't make any sense, the fix for ITS#5100 is not in 2.3.38. -- -- Howard Chu Chief Architect, Symas Corp. http://www.symas.com Director, Highland Sun http://highlandsun.com/hyc/ Chief Architect, OpenLDAP http://www.openldap.org/project/

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Re: (ITS#5202) ldapsearch -E pr segfault
by ando＠sys-net.it 26 Oct '07

26 Oct '07

kurt(a)OpenLDAP.org wrote: > Full_Name: Kurt Zeilenga > Version: 2.3.38 > OS: Linux > URL: ftp://ftp.openldap.org/incoming/ > Submission from: (NULL) (75.141.229.206) > > > Here's a stack trace; the command was: > % ldapsearch -x -E pr=2/noprompt -b "o=test2,o=test" -s one "cn=*" cn > . > . > (gdb) where > #0 0x005303d4 in _int_free () from /lib/tls/libc.so.6 > #1 0x0053172b in free () from /lib/tls/libc.so.6 > #2 0x004201e3 in ber_memfree_x (p=0x805405d, ctx=0x0) at memory.c:149 > #3 0x001d85e8 in ldap_control_free (c=0xbfe3ecd0) at controls.c:260 > #4 0x001d8669 in ldap_controls_free (controls=0x9c801c8) at controls.c:285 > #5 0x0804f703 in tool_server_controls (ld=0x9c76550, extra_c=0xbfe3ece0, > count=-1) at common.c:1250 > #6 0x0804b910 in main (argc=14, argv=0xbfe40e44) at ldapsearch.c:794 > > It's done the bind ok by this stage but never gets as far as sending the search > request. I think this could be a consequence of fixing ITS#5100: probably, ldapsearch's call of ldap_control_free() was incorrectly relying on its broken behavior. p. Ing. Pierangelo Masarati OpenLDAP Core Team SysNet s.r.l. via Dossi, 8 - 27100 Pavia - ITALIA http://www.sys-net.it --------------------------------------- Office: +39 02 23998309 Mobile: +39 333 4963172 Email: pierangelo.masarati(a)sys-net.it ---------------------------------------

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Re: (ITS#5202) ldapsearch -E pr segfault
by quanah＠zimbra.com 26 Oct '07

26 Oct '07

--On Thursday, October 25, 2007 5:11 PM +0000 kurt(a)OpenLDAP.org wrote: > Full_Name: Kurt Zeilenga > Version: 2.3.38 > OS: Linux > URL: ftp://ftp.openldap.org/incoming/ > Submission from: (NULL) (75.141.229.206) Brandon Hume also sees this behavior: /opt/csw/bin/ldapsearch -x -b dc=bofh,dc=ca -h localhost -E pr=2 '(objectclass=*)' dn # search result search: 2 result: 0 Success control: 1.2.840.113556.1.4.319 false MAkCAQAEBAIAAAA= control: 1.2.840.113556.1.4.319 false MAkCAQAEBP////8= Press [size] Enter for the next {2|size} entries. Where obviously that second value is bogus. --Quanah -- Quanah Gibson-Mount Principal Software Engineer Zimbra, Inc -------------------- Zimbra :: the leader in open source messaging and collaboration

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openldap-bugs October 2007