Erwann ABALEA wrote:
2011/8/1 Howard Chu<hyc(a)symas.com>:
> If there were indeed anything to be gained by such a feature, it would also
> need to be implemented on clients. Look around - do any web browsers allow
> you to isolate CAs like this?
Yes. You can basically isolate CAs into 3 categories (they can interleave):
- CAs trusted to issue server certs
- CAs trusted to issue email certs
- CAs trusted to issue code signing certs
Again, nonsense. It's not up to the end-user to configure such things, it's up
to the parent CA to set the appropriate keyUsage bits in the CA cert. Again
*if you trust the CA in the first place* then you trust it, period. If you
don't trust the CA to issue correctly generated certs, then that's a
completely separate problem and you shouldn't be dealing with that CA anyway.
> It's utter nonsense.
What is non-sense is having a bag full of CAs for mixed usage. More,
you even mix CAs that need to be sent to the client (so it can build a
certificate path) with CAs that the server trust (to verify client
-- Howard Chu
CTO, Symas Corp. http://www.symas.com
Director, Highland Sun http://highlandsun.com/hyc/
Chief Architect, OpenLDAP http://www.openldap.org/project/