Michael Ströder wrote:
Howard Chu wrote:
> Michael Ströder wrote:
>> Kurt Zeilenga wrote:
>>> Generally, the web application is part of the service which
>>> encompasses the web server and directory service. They should
>>> already have an appropriate trust relationship.
>> BTW: This is a very broad assumption not valid in all deployments.
>> Nevertheless it's always good practice to avoid overly powerful system
>> components since in this case the web application could have security
>> Kerberos with forwardable tickets could be a solution. One could argue
>> that as a forwardable ticket is a full TGT you also have to trust the
>> web application a little bit more. But given the limited lifetime of
>> TGTs the risk is significantly lower than long-time service credentials
>> for the web application together with the right for doing proxy
> Still, that is your problem
Howard, that's not a matter of "your" or "my" problem. In fact I
understand that sentence.
Generic "your" - probably should have said "the" instead.
> - you have to trust the web app to act
> appropriately on your behalf. If the web app has security problems, then
> sending any form of reusable credentials to it is a mistake.
And one could argue that the possible impact of security problems in
combination with proxy authz is higher than with a user impersonating
himself on the LDAP connection.
Yes, depending on how much freedom the proxying identity has. I should point
out that OpenLDAP's ACLs allow you to define separate privileges for a user
being proxied, vs a user that is authenticated directly. As such, you can
easily limit the damage that an untrusted proxy can inflict on a system...
> As a hypothetical solution, one could use a combination of
> proxy authorization. I.e., the web app receives a client credential that
> contains both authentication to the web app and to the LDAP server. The
> web app then attaches (the relevant portion of) this credential to its
> proxyAuth'd requests to the LDAP server. The LDAP server then doesn't
> have to give blanket proxy privileges to the app; instead it allows the
> proxyAuth by virtue of the actual client credentials also being present.
Well, that's IMHO how forwardable tickets in Kerberos works except that
you don't need proxy authz in that game. (It's on my roadmap to play
But a forwardable TGT is like a blank check - it can be used to acquire any
other service tickets. Again, if you don't trust the app in the middle, this
is not a good solution.
> In an X.509 framework, you might accomplish this by having
> generate their own sub-certificates (signed by their own client cert)
> with specific privilege attributes attached, and very short cert
> lifetimes (thus being analogous to Kerberos tickets in usage), and using
> these sub-certs to authenticate. Of course, nobody has developed a spec
> for any of this yet...
Why so complicated? A challenge-response SASL mech could send the
challenge from the LDAP server to the web app which relays it to the web
browser where the user signs it with his/her private key.
Because a scheme like what you describe is inadequate. One of the factors in
strong authentication is *mutual* authentication of all parties - proving that
the client is who he claims to be and the server is who it claims to be. A
pass-thru scheme like you describe will prove the client and LDAP server's
identity, but will not establish anything about the web app's authenticity.
When you have multiple parties in a conversation, all of them must be
authenticated to the same level of trust, otherwise the whole exercise is futile.
-- Howard Chu
CTO, Symas Corp. http://www.symas.com
Director, Highland Sun http://highlandsun.com/hyc/
Chief Architect, OpenLDAP http://www.openldap.org/project/