here is a scenario: Site has a ldap server on ldap://389. Firewall blocks access to 389 from internet. Everyone queries the ldap via anonymous binds. Site would like to allow staff the ability to query the ldap from outside the firewall. This would be done via ldaps:// 636 to users who have authenticated via username/password. They do not want to allow anonymous queries outside the firewall. Using the "disallow bind_anon" would prevent anon binds on both ldap:// and ldaps://. This would break the inside machines ability to query. If we dont use "disallow bind_anon" then machines outside of the firewall could query the ldap. ---Is the only option for them to setup two separate ldap servers? One with "disallow bind_anon" and one without. Then only open the firewall for port 636 to the ldap server which has "disallow bind_anon".

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-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On 02/14/2011 08:49 PM, Chris Jackson wrote: > here is a scenario: > > Site has a ldap server on ldap://389. Firewall blocks access to 389 > from internet. Everyone queries the ldap via anonymous binds. Site > would like to allow staff the ability to query the ldap from outside > the firewall. This would be done via ldaps:// 636 to users who have > authenticated via username/password. They do not want to allow > anonymous queries outside the firewall. > > Using the "disallow bind_anon" would prevent anon binds on both ldap:// > and ldaps://. This would break the inside machines ability to query. > If we dont use "disallow bind_anon" then machines outside of the > firewall could query the ldap. > > ---Is the only option for them to setup two separate ldap servers? One > with "disallow bind_anon" and one without. Then only open the firewall > for port 636 to the ldap server which has "disallow bind_anon". Another option than ACL magic: Wouldn't the x-mod= option to the listening socket, as described in the slapd manpage, help? (slapd -h ldap:/// ldaps:///????x-mod=-rw-------) I have never used it, though, and the manpage says you have to explicitly enable it at compile time.

I know: Anonymous bind can be disabled by "disallow bind_anon" and Unauthenticated bind mechanism is disabled by default. But if I use "disallow bind_anon it stops in on both ports. I want to stop it just on ldaps://.

On Feb 11, 2011, at 09:50 AM, Chris Jackson wrote: Is it possible to prevent anonymous and unauthenticated binds to ldaps:// 636 but allow them on ldap:// 389? I want to allow staff to query my ldaps:// outside of my network while requiring them to login to do so but allow anyone to bind (anonymous, unauthenticated, or authenticated) internally on ldaps//: 389. I know: Anonymous bind can be disabled by "disallow bind_anon" and Unauthenticated bind mechanism is disabled by default. But if I use "disallow bind_anon it stops in on both ports.

I want to stop it just on ldaps://.

Chris Jackson On Feb 14, 2011, at 11:28 AM, Aaron Richton wrote: Stopping users that are "unauthenticated" makes no sense; everything's unauthenticated at time=0. You might as well stop slapd if you want a 100% inability to serve data. You can deny anonymous users that aren't plaintext, including any ldaps:/// connections, with something like: access to * by anonymous ssf=0 transport_ssf=0 tls_ssf=0 sasl_ssf=0 none break by anonymous none early on in your ACL stanzas. I'm pretty sure this'll deny anonymous StartTLS users on 389, though; not sure if that's what you want. I can't think of any way to use the slapd access language to differentiate based on listeners, which would probably be the most elegant way to handle what you asked. To be fair, this entire exercise seems really odd from where I sit -- are you positive that this will have the desired effect? (If somebody out in Peru is permitted to connect in unencrypted and make anonymous queries, why not allow them to make those same queries encrypted? What's the difference?) here is a scenario: Site has a ldap server on ldap://389. Firewall blocks access to 389 from internet. Everyone queries the ldap via anonymous binds. Site would like to allow staff the ability to query the ldap from outside the firewall. This would be done via ldaps:// 636 to users who have authenticated via username/password. They do not want to allow anonymous queries outside the firewall. Using the "disallow bind_anon" would prevent anon binds on both ldap:// and ldaps://. This would break the inside machines ability to query. If we dont use "disallow bind_anon" then machines outside of the firewall could query the ldap. ---Is the only option for them to setup two separate ldap servers?

One with "disallow bind_anon" and one without. Then only open the firewall for port 636 to the ldap server which has "disallow bind_anon". Chris Jackson

On Feb 16, 2011, at 3:46 AM, <harry.jede(a)arcor.de&gt; <harry.jede(a)arcor.de&gt; wrote: > Chris Jackson wrote: >> On Feb 11, 2011, at 09:50 AM, Chris Jackson wrote: >> >> Is it possible to prevent anonymous and unauthenticated binds to >> ldaps:// 636 but allow them on ldap:// 389? >> >> I want to allow staff to query my ldaps:// outside of my network >> while requiring them to login to do so but allow anyone to bind >> (anonymous, unauthenticated, or authenticated) internally on >> ldaps//: 389. >> >> I know: >> Anonymous bind can be disabled by "disallow bind_anon" and >> Unauthenticated bind mechanism is disabled by default. But if I >> use "disallow bind_anon it stops in on both ports. > > Sure, this are global directives. > >> I want to stop it just on ldaps://. > > You don't need ldaps:// in your local network? May be. > I think a easier solution is to identify your Internet Gateway by > IP. > >> Chris Jackson >> >> >> On Feb 14, 2011, at 11:28 AM, Aaron Richton wrote: >> >> Stopping users that are "unauthenticated" makes no sense; >> everything's unauthenticated at time=0. You might as well stop >> slapd if you want a 100% inability to serve data. >> >> You can deny anonymous users that aren't plaintext, including any >> ldaps:/// connections, with something like: >> >> access to * >> by anonymous ssf=0 transport_ssf=0 tls_ssf=0 sasl_ssf=0 none break >> by anonymous none >> >> early on in your ACL stanzas. I'm pretty sure this'll deny >> anonymous StartTLS users on 389, though; not sure if that's what >> you want. I can't think of any way to use the slapd access >> language to differentiate based on listeners, which would probably >> be the most elegant way to handle what you asked. To be fair, this >> entire exercise seems really odd from where I sit -- are you >> positive that this will have the desired effect? (If somebody out >> in Peru is permitted to connect in unencrypted and make anonymous >> queries, why not allow them to make those same queries encrypted? >> What's the difference?) >> >> here is a scenario: >> >> Site has a ldap server on ldap://389. Firewall blocks access to >> 389 from internet. Everyone queries the ldap via anonymous binds. >> Site would like to allow staff the ability to query the ldap >> from outside the firewall. This would be done via ldaps:// 636 to >> users who have authenticated via username/password. They do not >> want to allow anonymous queries outside the firewall. >> >> Using the "disallow bind_anon" would prevent anon binds on both >> ldap:// and ldaps://. This would break the inside machines >> ability to query. If we dont use "disallow bind_anon" then >> machines outside of the firewall could query the ldap. >> >> ---Is the only option for them to setup two separate ldap servers? > > No. You should use ACLs to solve this problem. Read man > slapd.access an/or search the openldap archives. > > Assuming you have a NAT gatway as Firewall machine. > > Replace all "by anonymous" statements with these 6 statements: > > by anonymous auth continue > by peername.ip="127.0.0.1" read continue > by peername.ip="10.0.0.0%255.0.0.0" read continue > by peername.ip="172.16.0.0%255.240.0.0" read continue > by peername.ip="192.168.0.0%255.255.0.0" read continue > by peername.ip="gateway-ip" auth > > One may write these statements more effective, but in general they > will do. > > > Replace "gateway-ip" with yours. > > Put the above statements also in every ACL just before the > by * > when this ACL do NOT have an "by anonymous" statement. > > Maybe the last line could/should be: > by ssf=56 peername.ip="gateway-ip" auth > > Caveats: > Your gateway can no longer access your LDAP Server with > the "gateway-ip". But this is a Firewall Design Question. > > I've tested this only with unencrypted sessions; anoymous and > authenticated. But TLS or SSL will not grant more rights, if you do > not tell the ACLs to do so. > > > Here the output from the two searches: > > # ldapsearch -x -LLL -H ldap://192.168.231.90/ dn > Insufficient access (50) > > # ldapsearch -x -LLL -H ldap://192.168.231.90/ dn -D > cn=admin,dc=kronprinz,dc=xx -W > dn: dc=kronprinz,dc=xx > > dn: cn=admin,dc=kronprinz,dc=xx > >> One with "disallow bind_anon" and one without. Then only open the >> firewall for port 636 to the ldap server which has "disallow >> bind_anon". >> >> Chris Jackson > > -- > > Harry Jede The above example got me started in the right direction.

Everything appears to be doing exactly what I wanted to do.

I did notice that the anonymous bind users from ip addresses not 10, give an error 32. Anyone see any flaws in this?

The below ACL should be allowing anon binds when ip address is 10.*.*.* or allow authenticated binds from any ip address.

Chris