>>>> I believe this is broken, or obsolete. I'm using
Perl port of Unix
>>>> crypt() function, and it works just fine for "any" password
>>>> 8 characters limitation sounds like - history :)
>>> Actually crypt() is system-dependant. Different *nixes implement it
>>> differently. Many implementations accept passwords of any length, but
>>> only use the first 8 characters to create the hash. As a result, using
>>> crypt passwords is insecure and un-portable.
>>> So, yes, it sounds like history, but that's crypt for you :)
>> Errr ... well, it seems so.
>> I think I've hit the wall with eg. sshd x nss-switch when having
>> passwords crypted by anything else than crypt();
> nsswitch should not be used to authenticate against LDAP. That's what
> PAM is for. Clients should never know (let alone care) how the password
> is stored inside the LDAP server.
I'm not going to flame over PAM, but thanks (and no thanks - no offense).
There is no flame here - just a technical fact. PAM is for
authentication, NSS is for identity. There is nothing wrong at that
level - your application is broken [as was mentioned in a previous
I have no knowledge of how Padl's nss-switch works, neither
client should know anything about how's password encrypted.
If nss-switch is incapable of handling anything else than crypt because
of bad design (or what), then it's sad.
NSS doesn't handle passwords AT ALL. It turns "user number 101" into
"fred" and vice versa (UIDs/GIDs being like SIDs/RIDs in Windows - they
usually are turned into a name [login]).
>> Also, using SSHA might be a bit of overkill (I'm not
>> crypt()! :))
>> So, what's left? Or more, what's the suggestion - which crypt function
>> to use?
> SSHA is the default; if you have to ask then you probably shouldn't
> change it.
I think not using SSHA was recommended somewhere, because it's
heavyweight. It was probably an old book :)
Once again, I'm not *for* any specific crypto function.
But you are using crypto methods in your application, which is broken
behavior. Use TLS to encrypt authentication with the DSA and let the
DSA check the password using an ldap compare operation. Communication
is secure and the DSA never reveals the password (encrypted or