Justin Ryan wrote:
On Mon, Sep 15, 2008 at 9:43 PM, Howard Chuhyc@symas.com wrote:
That's a pretty empty statement. "More secure than LDAP" creates the false implication that there is something inherently insecure about LDAP storage. In fact anything stored in LDAP is as secure as you choose to make it. And of course, there are plenty of sites out there running Kerberos using LDAP as the data store of their KDC.
Using LDAP as the data store for your KDC reduces its' security.
To call such a statement empty and FUDly is pretty rude - it's fact.
Utter nonsense. You're spouting FUD, and that's the fact.
LDAP is a directory, it's designed for tracking information about things. It can store secrets, but it isn't designed, like Kerberos, to carefully control access to secrets. If your Kerberos secrets are stored in LDAP, you are losing some of what Kerberos gives you.
OpenLDAP has far finer-grained access control than any KDC. None of the KDC's data or methods are lost when using LDAP as the data store. If you believe a KDC that uses OpenLDAP as its data store is inherently less secure than using some other database mechanism, you simply don't understand how to configure OpenLDAP.
If you're such an expert on what LDAP is designed for, and the security requirements of a Kerberos KDC, please enumerate for us what security features you believe are missing?
From the KDC's perspective, there is no functional difference between a Heimdal KDC backed by slapd on ldapi:// vs the KDC backed by its own BerkeleyDB database. On the other hand, you gain the ability to perform secure, reliable, transparent replication of the credential store to other KDCs. And you also can use ACLs to permit/deny access to any elements of the KDC data, down to the individual value if necessary. The ACL mechanism in Heimdal itself is quite primitive in comparison.