On Wed, Sep 30, 2009 at 3:51 AM, Jonathan Clarke
On 30/09/2009 11:54, Zdenek Styblik wrote:
> I'd say it depends on the type of leak of credentials - if database is
> stolen, or password is sniffed through eg. http [web app] - in the first
> case, hashed passwords will buy time; the second - it doesn't matter,
> how's the password stored in LDAP - right?
Several different cases here:
1) Database is stolen: the stronger the hash algorithm, the more time you
2) Password is sniffed in plain text: hash-independant, since the attacker
already has clear text password
3) Brute force attack by attempting to bind to LDAP server: if the hash only
takes 8 characters into account, that makes brute-forcing a lot easier -
limited number of possibilities. Other than that, hashes should be
equivalent in this case, aside from server load.
Of course, there are other considerations, such as password policy locks,
password complexity and of course users with post-it notes.
Back to the original topic though: the way a password is stored is really
only the LDAP server's business. As Howard said, OpenLDAP uses SSHA by
default - unless you notice some performance hit from that, there's no
reason to change it.
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LIving the dream...