On 29/05/12 07:46, Tim Watts wrote:
On 29/05/12 00:00, Bernd May wrote:
> Hey,
>
> On 05/28/2012 10:25 PM, Tim Watts wrote:
>> 1) Rig OpenLDAP so all password changes get sent to the kerberos
>> server but do not use it for authentication. In the meantime we will
>> continue authenticate with the SSHA1 hashes in the user's LDAP
>> entry.
> The usual way to do this on most *nix systems is to actually 'rig' the
> PAM. In debian for example you setup your /etc/pam.d/common-password to
> contain something like:
>
> password sufficient pam_krb5.so ignore_root
> password required pam_unix.so nullok obscure min=4 max=8 sha256
> use_first_pass
>
> this sets up most of your tools to use the right modules when changing
> the password, e.g. 'passwd'.
Hi Brend,
Sorry - Bernd (typo),
Thanks for the reply.
Unfortunately there's a problem with that - the user would need their
old kerberos password before they could initiate a change and in this
case, their old kerberos password is unknown because Kerberos has only
just existed.
> I do not know if you could do something like 'referring' a password
> change request from the OpenLDAP server to the kerberos server but since
> this would be an invitation von mitm attacks I doubt it.
It will be a bit of a pity in this case if it's not possible :(
When using password hashes in the user entry, does slapd receive the
plaintext password or does the client generate the hash?
Sorry also - that was ambiguous. Add "when changing a password" to the
above sentence -
<coffee not yet worked>
--
Tim Watts
Personal Blog:
http://www.dionic.net/tim/