That's what can be found in the FAQ on openldap.org:
https://www.openldap.org/faq/data/cache/605.html
I would trust this more then any rumors on any stackxxxx page ;)
Am 30.03.22 um 18:45 schrieb thomaswilliampritchard@gmail.com:
At risk of beating a dead horse, I'd like to hear considerations on STARTTLS vs LDAPS. I'm also particularly interested if openldap plans to support LDAPS long term or if there's actually a deprecation effort going on around LDAPS where it would one day no longer be supported by openldap.
This seems to be the most comprehensive post discussing the virtue of the two. https://security.stackexchange.com/questions/257749/is-ldaps-or-starttls-mor... I also found a post in this Archive from 2018 that seems to indicate a change of opinion where LDAPS should be preferred, and not deprecated. https://lists.openldap.org/hyperkitty/list/openldap-technical@openldap.org/m...
Does openldap agree that LDAPS should now be the preferred implementation and STARTLS should be discouraged?
I do not have a security background and there is certainly a lot of room for me to misunderstand, but it seems like STARTTLS leaves the door open for a "tls downgrade attack" where a man in the middle could essentially reply to a client effectively saying start tls is not supported and then the client falls back to non tls communication (which is obviously unfortunate). Even if the backend server is properly not responding to clients until STARTTLS is initiated, the man in the middle could initiate a connection with STARTTLS to the ldap server and be talking plaintext to the client. Is that legitimately possible or am I missing a nuance? If one were to only support clients over LDAPS it seems this would be mitigated?
Thanks for the considerations, looking forward to hearing the expert opinions on the topic.ml