explicitly allowed by the directory. IMO, a client server being able
who should be allowed to log on defeats the purpose of centrally managed
The principle of least access is a good one, and it's certainly valid to
make sure that servers don't see more than they need to. But be wary of
this influencing an ability to "pick who should be allowed." I'd claim
that anybody that controls a server to the point where which entries are
shown by the LDAP server are the effective limiting factor controls that
server to the point where server-side vs. client-side filtering is the
least of your worries.
To put it another way:
Filtering '(memberOf=magicRootPeople)' on client:/etc/ldap.conf,
or filtering '(memberOf=magicRootPeople)' with an OpenLDAP ACL,
is utterly irrelevant when somebody can ed /etc/nsswitch.conf and change
it to "files."
Of course there's something to be said for onion layers and all that, and
restricting visibility can be desirable for numerous reasons. But stopping